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

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THE STATE

IN ITS

RELATIONS WITH THE CHURCH.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY EXPLANATIONS AND STATEMENT OF SEVERAL PUBLISHED THEORIES.

1—7. Introductory Explanations. 8. Of prevalent Theories. 9, 10. Theory of Hooker. 11, 12. Comment. 13, 14. Of Warburton. 15—17. Comment. 18, 19. Of Paley. 20. Comment. 21, 22. Of Coleridge. 23. Comment. 24, 25. Of Chalmers. 26. Comment. 27. Of Hobbes and of Bellarmine and others. 28—30. Explanations.

1. PROBABLY there never was a time in the history of our country, when the connection between the Church and the State was threatened from quarters so manifold and various as at present. The infidel, with sagacious instinct, following out all that tends to the general diminution of religious influences; the Romanist, who, in order to erect his own structure of faith and discipline, aims first at the demolition of every other, and who seems, in general, to deem us so involved in fatal error, that we must pass through the zero of national infidelity in order to arrive at truth; the professor of political economy, who considers this connection as a visionary theory, only and mischievously known by its tendency, when obtruded into practice, to interfere

with what he deems the substantial interests of mankind; * the democrat, who naturally desires to strip government of all its highest duties, and leave to it the performance of no more than mechanical functions: of all these it was perhaps, on the whole, to be expected that they should unite upon any seemingly favourable occasion to press for their common object; and they have so united.

2. But others of a different stamp are beginning to view the connection of church and state with an eye of aversion or indifference: men attached to the state, but more affectionately and intimately cleaving to the church—unwilling to regard the two as in any sense having opposite interests, but wearied, perhaps exasperated, at the injustice done of late years, or rather during recent generations, by the temporal to the spiritual body—injustice, inasmuch as the state has too frequently perverted and abused the institutions of the church by unworthy patronage, has crippled or suppressed her lawful powers, and has, lastly, when those same misdeeds have raised a strong sentiment of disfavour against its ally, evinced an inclination to make a separate peace, and surrender her to the will of her adversaries. Such being the case, we can hardly wonder, though we may lament it, that some attached members of the church are growing cool in their approbation of the connection, under the influence of a nascent and unconscious resentment; and, while they

* See, for example, the preface to the "Principles of Political Economy," by Mr. Poulett Scrope, M.P.

seem at least to waver upon the question, there are others who, although they are themselves unshaken in their attachment to the principle, yet defend it upon grounds untenable for their purpose, and better fitted to be occupied as positions against them.

3. If, therefore, we believe that the connection of church and state, rescued on the one hand from Papal, and on the other from Erastian, tyranny of either power over its ally, be conformable to the will of God, essential to the permanent well-being of a community, implied and necessitated by every right idea of civil government, and calculated to extend and establish the vital influences of Christianity, and therewith to increase and purify the mass of individual happiness; then, as holders of that belief, are we all the most imperatively summoned to its defence in this the most critical period of its history.

4. The point of view from which it is now proposed to contemplate and discuss the question, is that which men occupy as members of a state; and the aim is to show, that the highest duty and highest interest of a body politic alike tend to place it in close relations of co-operation with the church of Christ. It is from this position that I propose to regard it; first, because the combatant in defensive warfare naturally resorts ἐπὶ τὸ κάμνον, to the quarter which is threatened and in danger; because the church is not likely to be the moving party in measures for the dissolution of this connection, while the state has, it is too certain, given signs, though perhaps unconsciously, of that inclination; and therefore it is the mind of the state, not of the church, which

requires to be more fully exercised upon this subject, in order to the better knowledge and fulfilment of its duty.

5. But besides the fact that we are more ignorant of our duty as citizens than as churchmen, in respect of the connection, we shall find another reason for instituting the investigation in the former capacity rather than the latter. The union is to the church a matter of secondary importance. *Her* foundations are on the holy hills. Her charter is legibly divine. She, if she should be excluded from the precinct of government, may still fulfil all her functions, and carry them out to perfection. Her condition would be anything rather than pitiable, should she once more occupy the position which she held before the reign of Constantine. But the state, in rejecting her, would actively violate its most solemn duty, and would, if the theory of the connection be sound, entail upon itself a curse. We know of no effectual preservative principle except religion; nor of any permanent, secure, and authenticated religion but in the church. The state, then, if she allows false opinions to overrun and bewilder her, and, under their influence, separates from the church, will be guilty of an obstinate refusal of truth and light, which is the heaviest sin of man. It is of more importance, therefore, for our interests as a nation, that we should sift this matter to the bottom, than for our interests as a church. Besides all which, it may be shown that the principles, upon which alone the connection can be disavowed, tend intrinsically and directly to disorganization, inasmuch as they place government itself upon a false foundation.

6. These are the main reasons for handling the question in that sense which most applies to individual Christians, anxious to be informed how they may best discharge their duties in respect of this connection, as members of the state: while, at the same time, we shall find ourselves led by the proposed process to exactly the same conclusion, as if, setting out from an opposite quarter, we were called upon to assist in directing the operations of the church, with reference to the best means of extending its utility. There is a substantial conformity between our several duties, though not always an apparent one. The only question is, respecting the order of the processes by which they are demonstrated.

7. Our inquiry, however, is into the grounds and reasons of the alliance, not into its terms. The precise arrangements, by which the respective rights of the contracting parties are to be preserved, are matter of very great importance, but they are entirely distinct from the preliminary question, whether they ought to be contracting parties at all. There are indeed, points of contact between the two subjects, but they are incidental, and it is enough to indicate that which is the specific object of these pages, and which constitutes an object of adequate magnitude when taken alone, while the other, it is true, is alike important and neglected. Milton* wrote to Sir Harry Vane the younger,

> ——— besides, to know
> Both spiritual power and civil, what each means,
> What severs each, thou hast learnt, *which few have done:*

* Sonnet xvii.

but the praise which was rarely due in his days, ought, I fear, to be still more rarely given in our own.

8. It does not appear that our literature is well supplied with works which would meet the necessity above described, and furnish men with sound principles (*axiomata summa*) upon the fundamental conditions of the union between the church and the state. Bishop Warburton has written upon it with much acuteness and ability, but in the dry and technical manner of a man who lived in times when there was no strong pressure in one direction requiring to be warmly and feelingly met from another. Mr. Coleridge has dealt admirably with the subject in his 'Idea of Church and State;' but he does not carry out his conceptions into detail, nor apply them to practice sufficiently to meet the wants of general readers. Dr. Chalmers has handled some points connected with this inquiry in a manner the most felicitous, but, in other parts of his recently published lectures, he has laid down principles, we fear, not less seriously detrimental to our cause. The work of Dr. Paley on Moral and Political Philosophy is a store-house of anything rather than sound principles. Hooker looked at the question under influences derived from the general controversy with the Puritans, and rather with reference to the terms than to the grounds of the connection. None of these writers regarded the subject in the aspect most imperatively required by present circumstances: namely, that which shows that governments are, by "dutiful necessity," cognizant of religious truth and falsehood, and bound to the maintenance and propagation of the former.

We proceed, however, to give summaries of the respective theories of the above-mentioned writers.

9. If the 6th, 7th, and 8th books of the 'Ecclesiastical Polity' are to be taken as representing the opinions of Hooker, at least they cannot be said to do so with the accuracy, nor consequently with the authority, which belongs to the earlier and larger portion of the work. In the 8th book, however, he teaches,* that the same persons compose the church and the commonwealth of England, universally; that the same subject† is therefore intended under the respective names of church and commonwealth; and it is thus variously named only in respect of accidents, or properties and actions,‡ which are different. His opponents contended for a personal separation, which precluded the same man from bearing sway in both; he for a natural one, which did not forbid such an union of authorities.§ "The church and the commonwealth are in this case, therefore, personally *one society*, which society" is "termed a commonwealth, as it liveth under whatsoever form of secular law and regiment—a church, as it hath the spiritual law of Jesus Christ." Banishment, however, casts out of the church; but excommunication does not cast out of the commonwealth.

10. In this society, considered as a church, the king is "the highest uncommanded commander."‖ He holds his entire office under the law, and by the willing consent and subjection of the people, though still by divine right, even while at man's discretion.¶ His

* Ecclesiastical Polity, book viii. c. i. 2. † Ib. c. i. 5.
‡ Ib. c. i. 2. § Ib. c. i. 2. ‖ Ib. c. ii. 1. ¶ Ib. c. ii. 6.

chief ecclesiastical powers are, the title of headship; the right of calling and dissolving the greater assemblies; that of assent to all church orders, which are to have the force of law; the advancement of prelates; the highest judicial authority; and in general an exemption from the ordinary church censures to which others are liable, at least from excommunication: but the question of this last he declines to determine.* The conveyance of power is not to each sovereign in succession, but to one originally, from whom the rest inherit; and the body cannot help itself, but with consent of the head, while there is one. The king's judicial power is subject to church law; and it is the head of all, simply because not confined to a district, but legally reaching to all.† Regal power‡ is not naturally limited to the good of men's bodies. Kings have "authority§ over the church, if not collectively, yet divisively understood; that is, over each particular person in that church where they are kings." He does not contend for the particular‖ title of head to be applied to the sovereign, if that be offensive. The subject in which this power is to reside¶ need not be *one* personally. The commonwealth, when the people are Christians, being *ipso facto* the church, the clergy alone ought not to have the power of making laws** "*Quod omnes tangit, ab omnibus tractari et approbari debet.*" And historically the fact is,†† that canons of the clergy in their synods have generally taken no effect *as laws* without the approbation of

* Ecclesiastical Polity, book viii. c. ix. 2. † Ib. c. viii. 1. ‡ Ib. c. iii. 2. § Ib. c. iv. 6. ‖ Ib. c. iv. 8. ¶ Ib. c. iv. 7. ** Ib. c. vi. 7, 8. †† Ib. c. vi. 9.

governors; not even those of the council of Trent in Romish kingdoms. Until that approbation, they are but the opinions of wise men on the subject-matter. The parliament, by 1 and 2 Phil. and Mar. c. 8. ratified by enactment the cardinal-legate's dispensation, to give it the force of law. The king's power of assent is a power derived to him from the whole body of the realm.* Secular courts here regulate secular causes, spiritual courts spiritual causes.

11. We have now extracted matter enough to show the general doctrine of the Eighth Book of the Ecclesiastical Polity on the relations between church and state. And thus much at least is clear: there can be no doubt that it teaches, or rather involves, as a basis and precondition of all its particular arguments, the great doctrine that the state is a person, having a conscience, cognizant of matter of religion, and bound by all constitutional and natural means to advance it. It is impossible not to recognise throughout the book a texture of thought such as pre-eminently distinguished the great man whose name it bears. And yet, on the other hand, it contains some statements which lead us to rejoice that he is not responsible for it as it stands, and that it does not carry with it the weight of his plenary authority; the authority of that noble and sanctified intellect, to which Pope Clement VIII., according to Walton, paid so just and eloquent a tribute.† "There is no learning that this man hath not searched into, nothing too hard for his understanding. This man indeed deserves the name of an author: his books will get reverence by age,

* Ecclesiastical Polity, book viii. c. vi. 11. † Walton's Lives, p. 228.

for there is in them such seeds of eternity, that, if the rest be like this (the first), they shall last till the last fire shall consume all learning." The perfect copies of the three last books were unhappily lost after his death: the rough draughts were given to Dr. Spencer, his friend, and made up by him according to the best of his ability; and he writes of them in very strong terms, that there were left "nothing but the old, imperfect, mangled draughts, dismembered into pieces: no favour, no grace, not the shadow of themselves remaining in them."* And again, "the learned will find in them some shadows and resemblances of their father's face."

12. Although the book speaks of the natural separation of the two societies, and so lays a ground for clear reasoning upon their mutual relations, yet in other places it seems to lose sight of the distinction between a society and the mere total of the individuals who may belong to it; and to assume that the people of England composed one society which bore two different names, rather than two societies accidentally co-extensive as to the persons they comprised. And even this we know was not in strictness true. There were, even under Elizabeth, known members of the state who were not members of the church. Some confusion appears to arise from the want of a clearer line. For example, it is said that the canons even of general councils are only the preliminary opinions of wise men upon the subject-matter until they have received the royal assent. Now we may grant that they want the assent of the state in order to take effect as a part of the law of the land; but who

* Walton's Lives. App. to Hooker, p. 25.

will doubt that they have a validity *in foro conscientiæ*, affecting the members of the church, independently of any civil approbation whatever? Another most important question is raised respecting the derivation of power from the body at large. This theory fell in with Hooker's purpose, because he was thus enabled to limit the ecclesiastical headship, and show it to be secondary to the body, though superior to individuals. We need not here examine into its soundness, as it is not within our scope. It is enough to say, that it bears out the theory of union between church and state, so long as the body which he contemplates is composed mainly of members of the church, and its conscience, representing the result of the general belief of the people, yields homage to her doctrines. The religious duty of kings was "the weightiest part of their sovereignty,"* even while heathens. Do they then lose it, he asks, by embracing Christianity?

13. Bishop Warburton, in the 'Alliance of Church and State,'† taught that civil society, being defective in the control of motives and in the sanction of reward,‡ had in all ages called in the aid of religion to supply the want. The state contemplates for its end the body and its interests; has for its means, coercion; for its general subject-matter, utility. The church is a religious

* Book viii. c. vi. §3.

† See Postscript to the Fourth Edition ('Works,' vol. vii. p. 320), where a partial summary is given.

‡ There is a much nobler and purer statement of the inadequacy of the state, taken alone, to fulfil its purposes, in No. IX. of 'Letters to a Member of the Society of Friends,' pp. 50-52: ascribed to the Rev. F. Maurice, chaplain of Guy's Hospital.

society, of distinct origin; having for its end the salvation of souls; for its subject-matter, truth; for its instrument, persuasion; regulating motives as well as acts; and promising eternal reward. Though separate, these societies would not interfere, because they have different provinces; but, the state having needs as above stated, and the church wanting protection against violence, they had each reasons sufficient for a voluntary and free convention.

14. Accordingly, the societies united; not indeed under any formal engagement with all the stipulated conditions, but like sovereign and people in the original contract. That is, the theory of the alliance accurately represents the true *idea* according to which they ought to unite. And this idea was actually realised by the then existing state of things in England; where an established church and a free toleration were made perfectly to agree by the medium of a test-law, without which, either dissenters will obtain political power and destroy the church; or, in the other extreme, the church will persecute dissenters. And the conditions of the union are, that the church receives a free maintenance for the clergy; a share, for her security, in the legislative body; and a coactive power to be used in her spiritual courts for a purpose which is also a state purpose,—namely, the correction of certain forms of vice. In return for which, she surrenders to the state her original independency, and subjects all her laws and movements to the necessity of the state's previous approval. If there be more than one such religious society or church, the state is to contract with the

largest; to which will naturally belong the greatest share of political influence.

15. The greatest *moral* defect in this theory is that indicated by the concluding sentence. The state is to contract with the largest religious society. The adoption of a national church is then with it matter of calculation, and not of conscience. The state in this view has no conscience. It is not contemplated in the bishop's work as a moral person, having responsibility before God, nor as an aggregation of individuals, each having personal responsibilities, and bound in all things according to their capability to serve God, His church, His truth: therefore under obligation to regard that service as in itself an end of positive value, independently of the resulting benefits to the state.

16. The propositions of this work generally are to be received with qualification. It is a very low theory of government which teaches, that it has only the care of the body and bodily goods; and might seem besides to imply, that all physicians are more peculiarly statesmen. There was far more truth in the εὖ ζῆν* of Aristotle; under which we may consider that the state, bound to promote the general good of man, finds the church ready made to its hand, as the appointed instrument for advancing that department of human well-being which is spiritual, and contracts with it accordingly.

17. And there does appear to be something reasonable in the objection of Bolingbroke to the representation of the alliance in the light of a fact, on the ground that it is a fiction. But, says Warburton, it is no more a fiction

* Arist. Pol. iii. 5.

than the celebrated original compact. Nor is it: but both are fictitious: and Bolingbroke also censures the teachers of the original compact for having represented men as if they had at some time anterior to civil society been independent, when it is notoriously untrue; and this untruth is made the basis of other and greater untruths concerning the derivation of power from the people, and the consequent denial of a divine authority in government. In fact, Warburton appears to have adopted the views of Locke, and to have copied his representation of the alliance from the original compact, not himself objecting to the use that has been made* of that arbitrary mode of stating the case, but, on the contrary, considering any derivation of political from patriarchal rule as an absurdity.

18. Dr. Paley† has supplied us with a view of religious establishments, distinguished by his own great and highly characteristic merits, but likewise tainted by the original vice of his false ethical principles, and by the total absence of any substantive conception of the visible church. According to this author, the rights, offices, order, family, and succession of the priesthood, were parts of the Jewish religion, as well as the means of transmitting it. But no form of outward institution enters into the composition of Christianity. "The authority, therefore, of a church establishment, is founded upon its utility:" and the end is "the preservation and communication of religious knowledge." Regard to political ends has only served to deteriorate the church

* Postscript to the Fourth Edition.

† Moral and Political Philosophy, book vi. chap. x.

wherever it has been allowed. Three things, accordingly, are requisite:—

1. A clergy, or order of men set apart for religion.

2. A legal provision for their maintenance.

3. The restriction of that provision to the ministers of a particular sect.

19. He contends for the necessity of a clergy "to perpetuate the evidences of Revelation, and to interpret the obscurity of those ancient writings in which the religion is contained;" and to conduct public worship with decency. From these peculiar occupations he deduces the necessity of a separate maintenance. Voluntary contribution would yield but an insufficient supply, and would lower the tone of instruction. As to the third condition, the form of religion ought to be such as to comprehend all existing differences of opinion; but if the prevailing opinions be "not only so various, but so contradictory," as to render their junction impossible, then, where patronage is allowed, and one set of people appoint the teachers whom another set are to hear, there must be a test—the simplest possible—to secure some unity of proceeding. Such test, therefore, "may be considered merely as a restriction upon the exercise of private patronage." Again, if the parishioners chose their ministers without a test, intolerable discords would arise. The recognition of all sects appears scarcely compatible with that which is the "first requisite in a national establishment—the division of the country into parishes of a commodious extent." One sect, therefore, should be preferred. But tests ensnare consciences, often come to "contradict the

actual opinions of the church, whose doctrines they profess to contain," and proscribe tenets long after they have ceased to be dangerous. Any form of Christianity is better than none, as all tend to good. This justifies the magistrate's interference; which therefore carries no violation of religious liberty while he is only "providing means of public instruction." But where his faith differs from that of the majority, he should establish the latter, as the chances of truth are equal. Toleration promotes truth; but *exclusion* may perhaps be defended where disaffection happens to be connected with certain religious distinctions. Generally there is no reason why these should prevent men from discharging civil functions together, more than differences of opinion on questions of "natural philosophy, history, or ethics."

20. The views here given of the office of the clergy, of the visible church, of creeds, of the method of weighing different forms of Christianity, and of the irrelevancy of religious distinctions to the discharge of civil duties, are full of the seeds of evil. The truths which the author seems to have perceived with clearness were, the national benefits of a recognition of religion; the futility of the allegation that the civil magistrate is not competent to its advancement, or not justified in "providing means" for that end; the compatibility of an establishment for religion with religious liberty; the need of a provision for preserving as well as diffusing the truth; and the tendency of the voluntary method of support to deteriorate the quality of pastoral instruction.

21. The argument of Mr. Coleridge "on the Constitution of the Church and State according to the Idea of each" is alike beautiful and profound. He shows, from an analysis of the parts of the body politic, that, in order to its well-being, there must necessarily enter into its composition an estate, whose office it shall be to supply those governing and harmonising qualities of character, without which the remaining elements cannot advantageously cohere.* His first estate is that of the land-owners, or possessors of fixed property, barons and franklins—providing for the permanency of the nation. His second, that of the merchants, manufacturers, artisans, "the distributive class," whose especial office it is to secure the progressiveness of the nation, and personal freedom, its condition. In the King, again, "the cohesion by interdependence and the unity of the country were established." But these, viewed alone, are as it were but the material means for attaining their several ends.

22. There must be a soul, underlying and animating them all, a *cultivation* of the inward man, which is the root, the corrective, and the safeguard of *civilisation*. The nourishment of this paramount ingredient of national life constitutes the function of a third great estate: living on reserved property for more free devotion to its duties, and divided into two classes; a smaller number dwelling at the fountain-heads of knowledge, guarding the treasures already acquired, opening new shafts and mines, and dispensing† their acquisitions to

* Church and State, p. 42.

† Che di su prendono, e di sotto fanno.—DANTE, *Paradiso*, II. 123.

their brethren; the *second* division of this estate, a far larger number distributed throughout the country, supplying for every spot a resident guide and teacher; and thus connecting each part of time and each part of the nation with the rest respectively. Such is the natural "clerisy" of a state. Upon such a theory, drawn according to human principles, supervenes what Mr. Coleridge has felicitously termed the (in reference to this theory) "happy accident" of the Christian church,* "the sustaining, correcting, befriending opposite of the world, the compensating counterforce to the inherent and inevitable defects of the state as a state;" not primarily to any particular state, inasmuch as the whole world is her inheritance, but yet with applicability, by subdivision into branches, to each particular state.

23. It may be well to observe, with reference to the analysis of the two first estates, that its classification is true on a large scale, not in minute detail: it is the delineation of a painter, not of an anatomist; and yet the painter has regard to anatomy, but he generalises its results. The landed estate is not entirely permanent; it is also productive and progressive; but, on the whole, the habits of mind and action which belong to it are indisposed to change. It hangs more evidently on superior power, and has less of self-dependence. The trading class appears more an agent, and less subservient: thus it has more of the spirit of egotism, and is consequently more inclined to judge, and to alter what has been judged already; while, on the other hand, there are influences which check this tendency, as the necessity

* Church and State, p. 133.

of order and tranquillity to the prosperity of trade, and to the regular action of the labour-market; and the disposition of those who have acquired property to pass into the class of landholders. But these explanations in no way detract from the substantial truth of Mr. Coleridge's definition; and I do not venture any further to incumber the masterly sketch which he has drawn.

24. The profuse and brilliant eloquence of Dr. Chalmers, and the warm heart from which its colouring is principally derived, have necessarily contributed to render the scientific development of his views less accurately discernible than it would have been had he written more apathetically. His lectures on church establishments teach that Christianity is the sure foundation of order and prosperity; that the efforts of individuals, without aid from government, are insufficient to bring it within reach of the whole population; that the territorial division of the land into manageable districts, with a general cure of souls over all persons within them, is the most efficient method of giving to Christianity an universal influence: that such division cannot well be carried into effect but by a church of one given denomination. Again, with respect to the religious tenets within which a government may choose its national establishment, he contends that the church should be wholly independent in respect of its theology *—that there should be "maintenance from the one quarter, and an unfettered theology from the other:"—but he subsequently, in effect, qualifies this doctrine.†

* Lecture ii. p. 37. † Lecture iv. p. 115.

25. He teaches that the government should determine what shall be its establishment, if possible, simply by the answer to the question, "What is truth?" but if not, then with a modified view to the benefit of the population at large. He considers a state incompetent to enter upon the details of theological discussion, but abundantly qualified to decide upon certain broad and leading principles. Upon the former consideration he holds them justified in selecting, or in adhering to the selection of, any one of the Christian denominations, which, being Protestant, are also evangelical; as, for example, Methodist, Independent, Baptist: he does not, however, supply any precise test for determining to what extent the epithet "evangelical" may be applicable. But, upon the latter consideration, he teaches that the state is competent, nay, that any man,* "with the ordinary schooling of a gentleman," and "by the reading of a few weeks," may qualify himself to decide upon the broad question which separates Protestantism from Popery, namely, whether the Scriptures be or be not the only rule of faith and practice in religion.

26. It did not enter into the purpose of Dr. Chalmers to exhibit the whole subject, but even in these propositions he has, it may be apprehended, put forward much questionable matter. He appears by no means to succeed in showing, upon his own principles, that his territorial establishment must be of one denomination: he would probably find it impossible, upon stricter investigation, so to define Evangelical Protest-

* Lecture iv. p. 119.

antism as to make it an universal criterion for the guidance of governments; it might further be argued, that he has surrendered the condition without which all others fail, in omitting from his calculation the divine constitution of the visible church; and that while he does not so much as inquire whether on the one side it would be difficult or easy to reject the unevangelical Protestants, he has, on the other, very greatly underrated the difficulty of the questions at issue between the church of Rome and her opponents. But no more: it is painful even to indicate points of difference from a man so distinguished, so excellent, so liberal—and one, too, who has studied and explained the machinery of a religious establishment with such admirable effect.

27. The reader will probably agree that it is unnecessary, with a view to the practical purposes before us, to enter upon any detailed investigation of two other theories of the connection between Church and State, which embody the respective extremes of opinion adopted on the one hand by Hobbes, and on the other by Bellarmine and ultramontane Romanists. They are theories of derivation, rather than of connection, properly so called. According to the first, the Church and her religion are mere creatures of the state. According to the second, the temporal power is wholly dependent and subordinate. These views are not avowed amongst ourselves. A third extreme opinion of a different kind, namely, that the magistrate has no concern with religion, is that against which the general argument of the succeeding chapter is directed.

28. It remains to observe, before proceeding to the formal investigation of our subject, that, when we speak of the Church of England as having actually entered into connection with the State, we use a phrase which has more of historical truth, undoubtedly, than belongs to the celebrated original compact with which Bishop Warburton compares it. But the alliance probably was made by Ethelbert rather under an impression of personal conscience, than in any deliberate view of what we may term scientific results, or upon any formal specification of terms. In speaking, therefore, of its having been made on such and such conditions, we use the language of convenience, not of historical precision; and the meaning merely is, that we are stating the terms which justify the connection in respect of their fulfilling the duties and the purposes of both the bodies concerned.

29. It is not easy to find any single word which accurately describes the relation subsisting between the two societies, in respect of the degree of its intimacy. Alliance means too little: it puts too much out of view the Christian conscience of the state, and seems to suppose too great an original distance between the parties; whereas, in their personal composition, they very greatly mix; and when Warburton says the state will *ally* with the largest communion, because that will have most influence in the legislature, this should mean that the majority of persons composing the legislature will have such a conscience as will approve and establish that communion. The word incorporation would evidently

be as much too strong. Even union, though it is on many accounts convenient, may convey too much if it be understood as making two into one. Connection is too indeterminate, but is, perhaps, on the whole, for some reasons, the most convenient, as most free from the risk of misapprehension; while, by the term "relations," our language enables us to express in the most comprehensive form whatever functions or qualities of the two societies admit of mental association.

30. Lastly, the argument which follows is not *specifically* addressed to infidels; hardly, indeed, to persons in a state of systematic separation from our national church; nor, on the other hand, to those who have deliberately considered all its conditions, and their own obligations as its members; but to those who form the mass of the educated community, and whose minds have imbibed a general belief of the lawfulness and duty of public support of religion, yet without any clear and reasoned conclusions either upon the grounds or the limits of that duty. I presume, therefore, on but a very small portion of favourable predispositions in the mind of the reader, while I shall hope to show him, that a sincere believer in no more than the general principle of Theism will, upon looking attentively at the nature and the necessities of the state, and its capabilities in respect of religion, be led on, by regular and progressive inferences, to the full adoption of the principle which demands the continued union of the church with the constitution of the country.

CHAPTER II.

THE THEORY OF THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE CHURCH AND THE STATE.

1. The phrase "Church and State." 2. The argument from utility generally. 3. The general doctrine. 4—18. Argument for the obligation hereby incumbent on Governors as men. 19—21. Argument for the obligation incumbent on the Nation as a person, to profess a religion, 22. And to propagate it. 23—27. For the voluntary principle is insufficient. 28—31. And the State may have the means of giving pecuniary aid. 32—41. And has other extrinsic means. 42—47. And has intrinsic competency. 48—53. And adequate inducements. 54—62. Especially when we arrive at the Church. 63. —66. Which should be established singly by her Members. 67. The result of Establishment arises in natural order. 68—71. Danger and evil otherwise accruing. 72—77. Duty limited to the use of due means. 78. The argument summed up. 79—86. Applied.

1. THE phrase of "Church and State," so familiar to our mouths, has been adopted in the present day as a watch-word by a great political combination, which is unjustly dealt with when it is called a party, because it comprehends men of many parties, united not from unfaithfulness to their peculiar principles, but from falling back in the movement of events upon those which they hold in common. Doubtless many of those who use the motto have well considered its meaning, and yet that is not a matter of narrow compass, obvious to the eye upon a superficial view, but a deep fundamental truth of human society, nay, more, of human nature,

prolific of results alike affecting individual character and public institutions, so that it may be within the bounds of truth to believe that, however sincere in almost all cases, however intelligent in many, those may be who are now contending throughout all ranks for the maintenance of the union between church and state, yet the phrase is, to most among them, no more than the index of an hereditary or personal attachment, most valuable in itself, but greatly needing, and capable of effectually receiving, the (as it were) extrinsic support of distinct intellectual conviction.

2. It is not a repetition of the arguments of Bishop Warburton that is here intended, or a mere exhibition, in any form, of the uses of this connection. Protection received on the one hand, and obedience inculcated on the other, are facts in themselves which I, at least, am not about to deny, and they undoubtedly manifest an interchange of benefits, such as should tend to support the credit of the alliance itself. But in our period the uses are questioned and denied, and it is necessary that we fall back upon the examination of its rights. No theory upon a subject essentially ethical, which has reference to results alone, will be found sufficient in the day of trouble. It may be that the same proposition is applicable to theories founded upon causes alone. The fact is, that the all-wise God has given us evidence enough to support our convictions, but not too much; a strength according to our need, but not beyond it. Had questions of the deepest interest been so palpably and undeniably plain as to need no extrinsic support, faith

could not have been tried; while, had those extrinsic props been wanting, it could not have survived the trial. We cannot then afford to dispense with any class of confirmatory arguments and evidence tending to uphold our practical principles; but we must travel both backwards into the region of causes, and forwards into the region of results, in order to do them and our own consciences full justice in the time of need.

3. Under this complex view, then, let us proceed to declare, as follows, the general doctrine which is embodied, as respects our own case, in the phrase "Church and State." That in national societies of men generally the governing body should, in its capacity as such, profess and maintain a religion according to its conscience, both as being composed of individuals who have individual responsibilities to discharge and individual purposes to fulfil, and as being itself, collectively, the seat of a national personality, with national responsibilities to discharge, and national purposes to fulfil: that it must have the extrinsic, and, in proportion as it is a good government, will have the intrinsic, qualifications for professing and maintaining such religion: that religion offers sufficient inducements to such a policy: that as, in respect of its extension, it should, for the benefit of the state, be the *greatest* possible, and we are therefore bound to show, in considering the above-mentioned national purposes, that the direct aid of the state promotes that extension; so, in respect of its quality, it should be the *purest* possible, that is to say, should be the Catholic Church of Christ: that such adoption by

the state follows in the way of natural order upon the general prevalence of a religion in the community: that the means should be appropriate, and such as are authorised by the rules both of the religion and of the constitution.

4. Let us now proceed to explain and support the parts of the foregoing statement. First, that there should be a profession and maintenance of religion by the governing body. By its profession is meant the observance of its ordinances, on the part of those who compose that body, throughout their acts done in that particular capacity; by its maintenance, the upholding of its institutions through the instrumentality of influence and pecuniary support, in proportion as they may be at its disposal, with the ultimate view of offering that religion to every individual within the nation.

5. But it is generally, and not universally, that we are to plead for the literal fulfilment of this duty. All communities do not exhibit a natural growth, and the relations of governor and governed may exist under some partial convention, which precludes the immediate and full development of all the functions which belong to them as a general rule. For example—in Saxony the royal family is Roman Catholic, the nation Lutheran: in British India, a small number of persons, advanced to a higher grade of civilization, exercise the powers of government over an immensely greater number of less cultivated persons, not by coercion, but under free stipulation with the governed. Now the rights of a government, in circumstances thus peculiar, obviously

depend neither upon the unrestricted theory of paternal principles, nor upon any primordial or fictitious contract of indefinite powers, but upon an express and known treaty, matter of positive agreement, not of natural ordinance. It would be an absurd exaggeration to maintain it as the part of such a government as that of the British in India to bring home to the door of every subject at once the ministrations of a new and totally unknown religion: yet even here the general obligation to advance the well-being of the governed subsists in all its force; there must, therefore, be the desire and the endeavour to propose and propagate Christianity to an extent only limited by the degree in which the people are found willing to receive it; and the denial of this obligation is an error far more pernicious than even the attempt to precipitate its fulfilment.

6. Why, then, we now come to ask, should the governing body in a state profess a religion? First, because it is composed of individual *men;* and they, being appointed to act in a definite moral capacity, must sanctify their acts done in that capacity by the offices of religion; inasmuch as the acts cannot otherwise be acceptable to God, or anything but sinful and punishable in themselves. And whenever we turn our face away from God in our conduct, we are living atheistically. It is the deliberate avowal of the principle of turning away from him, of living "without God *in the world*," which constitutes atheism in its ordinary, though not its strict, signification. This was the atheism of Lucretius, and his is pre-eminently an atheistic sect:—

"Omnis enim per se Divûm natûra necesse est
Immortali ævo summâ cum pace fruatur,
Semota ab nostris rebus, sejunctaque longè."*

He does not forbid men to pay acts of worship, but he says, "Avoid referring the facts of the world to divine government," or else (in his too beautiful language),

"Nec delubra Deûm placido cum pectore adibis;
Nec, de corporè quæ sancto simulacra feruntur,
In mentes hominum divinæ nuntia formæ,
Suscipere hæc animi tranquillâ pace valebis."†

It is, therefore, the recognition of actual relations between God and man that saves us from atheism, and not an abstract acknowledgment of His existence.

7. It is most important to stop for a moment and reflect that, while on Christian principles we are commanded to discharge our social duties, "as unto the Lord" and not to man, so, even in the view of rationalism, we must ever bear in mind that, whatever be the functions, whatever the external circumstances, of each particular person, he has a nature and a law within him, which protest against being absorbed and lost in the external energies required by those functions; which claim to rule over him and to direct the paramount conditions of his life; and by the supersession of which he surrenders his human birthright and patrimony, the inward and central freedom of his being, and becomes but as a captive, chained, though it may be to a triumphal car.

8. There is a striking and almost an indignant remonstrance on this subject contained in an oration which

* Lucr. I. 57. † Lucr. VI. 74.

was recently delivered by Mr. Emerson, an American, at an American Cambridge.* He says, "There is one man present to all particular men only partially or through one faculty." "The individual, to possess himself, must sometimes return from his own labour to embrace all the other labourers." "The planter, who is man sent out into the field to gather food, is seldom cheered by any idea of the true dignity of his ministry. He sees his bushel and his cart, and nothing beyond, and sinks into the farmer, instead of man on the farm." And so it is with us, that he who holds offices of public trust runs a thousand hazards of sinking into a party-man, instead of man employing party for its uses —into a politician, instead of man in politics—into an administrator, instead of man in administration. Upon the observance of a distinction substantially analogous to this depend alike the freedom and dignity of our being, and that highest result of its highest dignity and freedom, its implicit submission to God; for thus only do we keep in view the reflective nature of man and the judicial powers with which his conscience is intrusted.

9. In fulfilment, then, of his obligations as an individual, the statesman must be a worshipping man. But his acts are public; the powers and instruments with which he works are public: acting under and by the authority of the law, he moves at his word ten thousand subject arms; and, because such energies are thus

* Oration delivered before the Phi Beta Kappa Society. Boston. James Munro and Co. 1838.

essentially public and wholly out of the range of mere individual agency, they must be sanctified not only by the private personal prayers and piety of those who fill public situations, but also by public acts of the men composing the public body. They must offer prayer and praise in their public and collective character, in that character wherein they constitute the organ of the nation, and wield its collected force. Wherever there is a reasoning agency there is a moral duty and a responsibility involved in it: the governors are reasoning agents for the nation, in their conjoint acts as such. And therefore there must be attached to this agency, as that without which none of our responsibilities can be met, a religion. And this religion must be that of the conscience of the governor, or none. He cannot, that is, cannot rightly, believe one and profess another. It is with *profession* alone that we are at present concerned. For these reasons, then, the *public* profession of religion ranks among the personal obligations of governors as individuals.

10. Let it not be thought a doctrine belonging to Christianity alone, and far less one savouring of fanaticism, that the acts of men in their governing capacity have need of being sanctified by Divine worship. Hear on this the language of Plato:—"It will be for you, then, as it appears, Timæus, to proceed, when you have, according to law, invoked the gods." Timæus: "Nay, Socrates, all minds in any degree well regulated call upon the Deity at the outset of every undertaking, be it small or great: but for us, who are

about to institute some inquiry into the nature of the universe, how it was generated or whether it be eternal (περὶ τοῦ παντὸς, ἦ γέ γονεν ἢ καὶ ἀγενὲς ἐστιν), unless we be altogether gone astray, it is essential that, addressing both gods and goddesses, we should pray that we may speak wholly according to their mind, and consistently with ourselves." * Government occupies in moral the place of τὸ πᾶν in physical science: it requires, if anything can require, the active providence of God, and this is a ground, or no circumstances will ever afford a ground, for associating with its arduous work the ordinances of religion.

11. Looking again to the other end of the scale, and passing from the most theistical of ancient philosophies to that one among modern nations whose public institutions are least so of all wherein Christianity is generally professed by the people, the inquirer will derive even from the practice of America an attestation of our principle, that, viewing governments as made up of human beings, there immediately and inevitably arises a necessity for their having a collective worship. The meetings of her legislative body are opened with prayer. True it is that prayer may be and is offered by ministers of the most various and conflicting persuasions: by Roman Catholic, Anglo-American, Baptist, Unitarian: probably the enumeration has a far wider range in principle than even this. We speak not here of the abstract consistency or propriety of this heterogeneous

* Timæus, 8.

worship; but we highly value the acknowledgment, more conspicuous amidst such anomalies, that where there is a government there should be *a* worship, *a* religion.

12. We may state the same proposition in a more general form, in which it surely must command universal assent. Wherever there is power in the universe, that power is the property of God, the king of that universe—his property of right, however for a time withholden or abused. Now this property is as it were realised, is used according to the will of the owner, when it is used for the purposes he has ordained, and in the temper of mercy, justice, truth, and faith, which he has taught us. But those principles never can be truly, never can be permanently, entertained in the human breast, except by a continual reference to their source, and the supply of the Divine grace. The powers, therefore, that dwell in individuals acting as a government, as well as those that dwell in individuals acting for themselves, can only be secured for right uses by applying to them a religion.

13. We have thus far considered the obligation of governors towards religion in general as signifying some recognised and established relations on the part of man towards God; but this, without its being intended in any degree to intimate that all religions, or even that all forms of religion couched under the Christian name, are of equal authenticity and value. This inquiry belongs to a distinct province. If we can show the obligations of men to religion, much more shall we hereafter be able to show the obligation of Christians to

Christianity, of Catholic Christians to the church; and we do not weaken but strengthen the argument by proving how wide is the extent of its applicability. That argument is, that, according to the true and best theory of politics, individual persons charged with the functions of government are unable to fulfil them, according to the degree of light within their own consciences, without professing a religion such as is according to that light, and countenancing it by such means as they constitutionally possess; that the principle of an established religion is a natural and legitimate consequence of the mere fact of government, however defective the idea of religion entertained by the governors.

14. It is true that the religion of the state will then in many cases be far from perfect, but its faultiness will belong to the original process by which the particular view on which it rests was attained, not to the obligation of governors as such to uphold it. When we see the professors of a false creed indifferent to its propagation, although we may bless God for the result, we cannot but regard the fact as aggravating the case of the holders of such creed. The fault lies in the creed, not in the propagation, although it be continued and transmitted through it. It does not arise between the premises and the conclusion, but we are to look for it in the premises themselves. It is the fault of the materials, not of the structure; and the way to amend it is, not by repudiating the principle of a national religion, but by endeavouring to recast that

religion according to the laws of truth; to change not its nationality, which is an accident, but its error, which is of the essence.

15. Probable evidence, be it remembered, is binding upon us as well as demonstrative; nay, it constitutes the greatest portion of the subject-matter of duty; and so a dim view of religious truth entails an obligation to follow it as real and valid as that which results from a clear and full comprehension; as real and valid, although it be true that different degrees of guilt are incurred by the disregard of the one or the other. So, if I find a purse, which I conjecture belongs to my neighbour, I am as truly bound —it is as legitimate a part of my moral duty—to take it to him and ascertain the fact, as it would be at once to restore it if I absolutely knew him to be the owner; and yet the sin of withholding it would vary according to the degree of probability in the evidence. Now this law holds good as well with regard to a partial as to an ambiguous view of truth: and thus a more limited perception of religion still leaves a case of obligation to profess and promote it, while any substantial proposition continues to be believed: just as, if our apprehension of the Divine will be indistinct and uncertain, we are nevertheless bound to follow it so long as a reasonable balance of probability remains in favour of the reality of our impressions. There is a close analogy between the two cases; in both there is a fraction or residue of truth, which residue we are bound to obey.

16. And here we may meet the objection which is

often urged in a startling form. "Then, if it be the duty of a Christian government to advance Christianity, it is the duty of a Mahometan government to advance Mahometanism." Now let us take a distinction. There are men even among us who view religion, and especially state religion, as a deceit intended to tame and subdue the people. It is to be feared that among Mahometans this is more extensively the case. I do not say that such a class of men are bound to propagate religion: but this I do not scruple to affirm, that, if a Mahometan conscientiously believes his religion to come from God and to teach Divine truth, he must believe that truth to be beneficial, and beneficial beyond all other things, to the soul of man; and he must, therefore, and ought to desire its extension, and to use for its extension all proper and legitimate means: and that, if such a Mahometan be a prince, he ought to count among those means the application of whatever influence or funds he may lawfully have at his disposal for such purposes.

17. For suppose but a moment that the truth he holds to be revealed is the unity of God. I say that the sight of this portion of religious truth entails the obligation to pursue it. Nay further: that the errors which he holds along with it are errors which he sees as truths; that as such he is bound upon his own principles to seek their propagation; and that, if he does so, the fault lies in the original conception, in the manner by which he came to conviction, and not in the acting upon that conviction, supposing it fully formed:

whereas, if he does not so, then he betrays what he believes falsely to be truth, as much as we by the like conduct should betray what we believe truly and know to be truth, and—our view being confined simply to the fact of convictions of equal strength in similar subject-matter entailing the same obligation upon the individuals entertaining them—the fault in both cases would be the same.

18. Nor is it necessary here to enter into any detail upon the formal origin of political power. It is equally the property of God; men are equally bound to sanctify it, whether it be derived to the governors immediately or through the people. Where the government is democratic, and the majority are of a given religion, the principle above stated will apply. Where government is founded on paternal principles, and the fiction of popular sovereignty is discountenanced, there the function of choice in the legislature is still more apparent. The latter case is that of our own country. But if there be those who would class it with the former, still the national estate of religion (for we are not yet concerned with it as the church) represents in its present form the religion of the majority of the people, and it is their duty to sustain it in its position.

19. Thus far on the personality and consequent religious responsibilities of the men who compose a governing body: but there is also a real and not merely supposititious personality of nations, which entails likewise its own religious responsibilities. The plainest exposition of national personality is this—that the nation fulfils the

great conditions of a person: namely, that it has unity of acting, and unity of suffering; with the difference that what is physically single in the one, is joint, or morally single, in the other. National influences form much of our individual characters. National rewards and punishments, whether by direct or circuitous visitation, influence and modify the individuals who form the mass. National will and agency are indisputably one, binding either a dissentient minority, or the subject body, in a manner that nothing but the recognition of the doctrine of national personality can justify. National honour and good faith are words in every one's mouth. How do they less imply a personality in nations than the duty towards God for which we now contend? They are strictly and essentially distinct from the honour and good faith of the individuals composing the nation. France is a person to us, and we to her. A wilful injury done to her is a moral act, and a moral act quite distinct from the act of all the individuals composing the nation.

20. Upon broad facts like these we may rest, without resorting to the more technical proof which the laws afford in their manner of dealing with corporations. If then a nation have unity of will, have pervading sympathies, have the capability of reward and suffering contingent upon its acts, shall we deny its responsibility; its need of a religion in order to meet that responsibility? Of that religion of grace, by which alone human responsibilities can be met? If these or any of them be denied, let it be shown us what broader or surer basis can be laid for them in the case of an indi-

vidual, or how the responsibility of an individual, and with it his consequent need of the grace of Christ, can be proved either from his constitution or from experience, without at the same time showing, even though implicitly and unawares, that the case of a nation or combination of individuals is analogous, and that they have, with the same liability, the same necessity. A nation then having a personality lies under the obligation, like the individuals composing its governing body, of sanctifying the acts of that personality by the offices of religion, and thus we have a new and imperative ground for the existence of a state religion.

21. But, it may be asked, is not this demand satisfied by the piety of private persons? Now all private persons are not pious, and never have been so; and it would be enough to say in reply, our poverty cannot dispense with any of either the private or the collective acts of religion which appertain to a state and to its members. But more. There are qualities in a combination which arise out of the union of its parts, and are not to be found in the parts taken singly when resolved into their separate state. Such a combination we find in the government and laws of a country: not a mere aggregation of individual acts, but a composite agency of many, each of whose separate efforts in part modifies, in part is blended with, the rest, and issues in a result which is the act of the nation in its collective personality. It is this composite agency which, as it has a being, should also, in virtue of that very circumstance, have a worship of its own.

The acts of the national personality are those of the governing body, which is the organ of that personality; and the religion which is to sanctify it must be a religion of the governing body, which we have already once deduced from the responsibilities of the men composing it, as individuals, and which we now once more infer as the natural attendant upon all agency which is truly national.

22. But, it may be said, it is one thing for a government to solemnise its own public acts by the ordinances of religion, and it is another to press them upon the people. Is not its own duty discharged by doing all things in the spirit and with the celebration of prayer? and why should it apply the national means to the active propagation of its religion among the people? Why, more especially when religious opinions are divided, should the government, by allying itself with one of their forms, alienate from itself the rest, at least to the extent of adding to its general and secular character something to which they cannot feel attached? Admitting the value of religion to the nation, is this the proper method for its advancement?

23. In answer to this question, we propose to show that, while the efforts of individuals are and have been insufficient to produce and perpetuate the requisite extension of religion of any kind through the nation, the government has, by the constitution of a well-ordered state, the means; by its own composition, the qualifications; by its ends and purposes, the inducements, to propagate religion according to its conscience,

first, for those who cannot afford to supply it for themselves; next, for those who are disinclined to do so; and lastly, as holding up a model for all.

24. Now, of all the parts of this subject, probably none have been so thoroughly wrought out as the insufficiency of what is termed the voluntary principle. It has been shown that, while demand under the circumstances of modern society commonly creates supply, and while therefore it is needless to use adventitious means in order to provide any commodity or good for which there is a natural desire, in the case of religion the desire is least when the want is greatest, and those who are most indifferent upon the subject require to be most solicited by the public institutions of religion, not less for the welfare of the state than for the salvation of their own souls. It has also been unanswerably shown, that there are very large portions of the community whose temporal means are insufficient to enable them to bear the expense of religious establishments: and perhaps no one, who looks at the competition for employment in an old and thickly-peopled country, will be of any other opinion than that such inability is likely to continue. And those who are at first merely unable to pay will, if neglected, in no long course of time, add to inability unwillingness.

25. The next step in the argument is, to point to the actual amount of voluntary exertion, and to require from the adversary, as we fairly may, the acknowledgment of its total insufficiency. On this subject no details need be adduced. It is admitted on all hands

that the religious provision of our town population is lamentably scanty. The conclusion is yet more inevitable if we observe the internal workings of all that sectarian machinery which depends upon the voluntary principle, for we find that its general law is to provide for those who can pay for the provision, but that its whole structure is such as to leave no room for the argument that the agency of government paralyses its exertions; inasmuch as it evidently does not contemplate or tend towards supplying on a large scale the wants of the poor, leaving for them a decent margin as a subsidiary appendage, but applying its main efforts merely towards organising a system, of which value received shall be the law, and in which the wine and the milk are to be bought *with* money and *with* price *. In quality too, as well as in quantity, the radical defects of the voluntary system might be shown.

26. Perhaps, however, there has been something of sanguine overstatement by the advocates of establishments, when they have magnified the efficacy of government aid in opposition to the feebleness of isolated individual exertions. The truth seems to be, that we require both. The tithe system of Europe arose, it can hardly be doubted, not according to either of the extreme opinions which have been held respecting it, but from the combined action of public law and private will. We want in this day a similar concurrence. The assistance of the state should be so given as to stimulate the benevolence of individuals, not to supersede it; as the

* Isaiah lv. 1.

national personality and responsibilities do not supersede the personality and responsibilities of individuals.

27. There is another short argument for the interposition of government, which we cannot forbear to mention, though without placing more than a qualified reliance on its validity. It has been amply shown, particularly in the Scotch controversy, that the best method of giving an universal application to religious influences is by a territorial division of the country into manageable districts, within each of which a minister of religion shall be responsible for at least offering to the whole people the ordinances of the church, and where he is vigilantly to avail himself of all the opportunities of influence which his position and the contingencies of life afford. Now, such territorial division, as investing a minister of religion with an authorised character, and empowering him to solicit with effect the general population of a district, can hardly be carried into full effect except by the aid and the power of a government.

28. As respects the competency of government to assist in filling up the void which has been assumed to exist, let us consider it first in reference to the possession of external means. Upon this head there can be little doubt. Let us look to pecuniary support as the first of these. There may be particular constitutions which limit the rights of government, by excepting from its province certain particular purposes, of which one may be, the advancement of religion by devoting thereto the money of the state, the increase with which God has blessed the people. In such cases government

is undoubtedly crippled and restrained under positive compact. But its general duty, as independent of the fixed compact, is this: to advance the well-being of the people by all means, which, tending to that object, are likewise such as government may not be intrinsically incompetent to employ. If, therefore, we shall hereafter show that there are great purposes of government which religion effectually serves, there will be no doubt that government has constitutionally the right to promote it by pecuniary means.

29. There is, indeed, an opinion sometimes held, that the consecration of funds by states to the support of religion, does not promote religion. Such an opinion is the very acme of paradox, and is contradicted by the nearly universal practice of mankind. For endowments of every kind, and of infinite variety in amount as well as in form, have prevailed from the days of Abraham (at least) until our own, among Pagans and Christians, in sects and in the church. Singularly enough, it is maintained by Romanists and Dissenters in the United Kingdom, where state assistance is not accessible to them: but it is utterly contravened by their practice in our colonies wherever they have an option; nor is there, I believe, a single case in which they have declined a proffer of aid.

30. We are to observe, that the objections to a state religion, grounded on the abuse connected with the control of endowments, are not levelled, by those who use them, at endowments in general, but at state endowments in particular. But, upon looking coolly at the

question, we find that the abuses themselves attach to the practice of endowment in general, not to that of state endowment in particular. Undoubtedly, wherever there is considerable property devoted to a particular purpose, it holds out temptation to worldly men to step in, with a view of enjoying the property and neglecting the purpose. But this temptation exists in full force, whether that property have been so dedicated by an individual or by the state. Rather, indeed, the argument herefrom is in favour of national establishments: because the state has much better means, by its own perpetuity, of securing the permanent administration of its gifts from abuse, and of enforcing responsibility, than the individual who dies and is forgotten, or at least more imperfectly and feebly represented in his descendants. Nor is this merely speculation. Can the world supply a case of funds more purely and effectively applied in support of an ecclesiastical system, than that of the Scotch church? a case where more results are produced from equal means, absolutely or proportionably? a case where less of evil motive or conduct mingles in the system of management? And yet not only is this a state church, but one in which the government directly exercises an immense patronage.

31. Indeed, upon a general survey, I do not see the slightest ground for maintaining that, of two churches equally endowed, one acknowledged and aided by the state, and the other deriving equivalent revenues from private sources, the latter will, *cæteris paribus*, be purer

as a religious society than the former. If we compare the Roman Catholic religion as professed in Ireland with the same religion on the Continent, we are testing the argument at a disadvantage; because in Ireland it is an unendowed as well as an unestablished church; and yet I do not think any inference can be drawn unfavourable to the above positions. Doubtless, it remains to the adversary to contest the expediency of endowment, and to maintain that the church ought to live only from day to day; although he would do so in the face of all precept and practice, with such exceptions as scarcely break the uniformity of the rule. It is manifest that he would thus get over the temptations afforded by endowment to indolent persons; but it is far from being equally clear that he would exclude a yet more dangerous class, of those, namely, who speak to the passions, and the fancies, and the prepossessions of men, and who not merely neglect, but positively pervert, the truth of God. It is needless, however, to discuss at length a proposition which perhaps no party seriously maintains.

32. But there are other respects, besides the command of extensive funds, in which the state, as such, appears naturally to possess powerful means of increasing the influence of religion.

The question that naturally suggests itself upon the manifestation of an intention, in the providence of God, for universalising the application of religion, is, what would be the machinery best calculated to carry it out? Obviously, if it could be so carried out, sin and sorrow are at an end, and the will of God is again enthroned

and acknowledged in all the workings of an obedient creation. Obviously, too, its full and permanent effectuation is a difficult, and has hitherto been found an impracticable, task. For how, as long as the mass of men are in juxtaposition with evil as a body, should they fail to be tainted by it, and how should its elasticity and self-propagation prove, among such materials, less powerful over a kindred nature, than the operation of the antagonist principle over an adverse one? The Divine Spirit alone could maintain the truth of Christianity in the world from hour to hour. Without Him it would have passed away, like primitive revelation from the greater part of the descendants of Noah. Still He works with human means. Human means seem insufficient for the whole of His work, even when they have received from him a capability for advancing it; but never does He fail to use that capability where it exists.

33. Now, when men wish to give to a language every chance of perpetuation, what course do they pursue? They associate it with public law, with judicial pleading, with the authentic acts of the body politic. As, on the other hand, if the object be its extinction, they studiously exclude it from all these. Not the adoption of either the one or the other set of measures guarantees the attainment of the end. But they are respectively in the nature of means towards it; and likely to reach it, if it be attainable at all. And so, if the purpose be to perpetuate or abolish a custom; or to imprint permanently, or erase thoroughly, any mark from the face of human

character *taken in the mass*, the same course is pursued. The power of public law, and the moral influence of public authority over men, in respect of their social sympathies, and their sense of honour and shame, as well as grosser motives, are brought to bear as the probable and prudential means of arriving at the proposed object.

34. And with justice: because the minds of individuals are variable and uncertain; that is, of by much the greater number of individuals. A part of their inclinations set one way, and at a given time prevail: another part set in the opposite direction, and they too have their season of superiority. But when in some general practice or law, which stands for an expression of sovereign will, corroborated by the testimony of public concurrence, there is embodied some influence which favours the one and obstructs the other of these drifting tides; this, while it secures for the sympathetic principle free scope and action under its own shelter, likewise stands as a fixed barrier against the antagonist principle in its alternate predominance; so that, for the most part, it is fully able, between two conflicting tendencies, to cast the balance, ultimately and permanently, in favour of that which harmonises with itself.

35. We are all, in a greater or a less degree, the creatures of sympathy, and the general authority of a public law and sanction is a fact that cannot be doubted. It lies deep in our nature, as does the principle of which it is an individual manifestation; namely, that man, gregarious as an animal, is, in a more comprehensive

sense, as a *being*, social. *Quòd autem socialem volunt esse vitam sapientis*, says St. Augustine, *multò magis approbamus.* Man is open to the influence of opinion from those around him, and the more so as the pressure of that opinion is either proximate, or rendered powerful by the number or weight of those who concur in it, or by the form of its expression. Now public law, generally speaking, has all these advantages; especially if it has, as in the case before us, great antiquity on its side. And we speak studiously of those powers only which it exercises through the medium of opinion, avoiding, as wholly irrelevant to the matter, the physical force which may be exercised in its proper place, but there alone.

36. Not only, however, has public law an advantage in its fixity, for confirming and perpetuating the hold once taken by a principle upon the mind of a people; but by other means too does it operate in the same direction. It operates upon the cold calculating and worldly-minded man, who will support a good law to avert the confusion from which he thinks his interest will suffer, as he would support a bad one which appeared likely to have the same effect. It operates upon the timid who are friendly, enabling them to do what, in fact, they wish, without the shame or the sense of affectation, by casting the balance of opinion in their favour. It operates upon men in general through the sentiments of loyalty and patriotism, because whatever is comprehended in the great outlines of the institutions of the country becomes a part of the proper object of those sentiments. It operates even upon the most hostile, not

only by arraying substantial strength in favour of what they oppugn, but by showing, under ordinary circumstances, such a presumable amount of that strength, as either to render active proceedings useless, or at least greatly to fetter and retard them.

37. In truth, national organization is evidently of divine appointment, as growing out of the primary necessities and impulses of our nature, and tending to its highest developments: γινομένη μὲν τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν, οὖσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν *. Nations are the families into which the human race has what may be termed its primary distribution. The rulers of nations are as the heads of families; whether the power be less or more restricted, its essence is akin to that of the corresponding station in the smaller society. The power of the rulers and *ruling institutions* in a nation (and in the division between these two let as large a space as is possible be given to the latter) is as *real*, over practice and opinion, through the medium of opinion, as is that of parents; setting aside for the moment, in both cases, all resort to coercive authority.

38. Thus have we striven to show that there is in law and government a capacity to give universality and stability to the effect of great principles in general, which individual agencies, and those of smaller organized bodies, possess in an inferior degree; and that consequently, under ordinary circumstances, when the latter fail, the former may succeed. But where the former fail, the case remains hopeless. It must always be borne in mind, that we speak of principles which do

* Arist. Pol., I. c. 2.

not come self-recommended and acceptable, at first sight, to our natural propensities; those undoubtedly will maintain themselves in individuals without the aid of law; and will even work themselves up through individual minds to such a degree of power as to alter or violently overthrow the law. But if nature be on the whole adverse; if time be required for the operation of the influences which are to counteract that hostility; then, if we cannot universalise and establish a principle by the aid of the law, *à fortiori* we cannot do so without it.

39. The application to religion is obvious; it is alien to our natural inclinations, and teaches us to deny them; it comes to our carnal view discredited by (apparently though not really) teaching us to part with enjoyments that we have, in the hope of obtaining others that we do not see, and have not yet acquired the capacity to appreciate; it urgently needs all the assistance of authoritative opinion and example, to keep men within the range and reach of that voice of the church which conveys the promise of divine grace, and which may mollify and awaken them. But in order to raise a set of prepossessions favourable to religion, in order rather to create influences which may neutralise and repress the prepossessions of nature unfavourable to religion, we require to bring to bear upon men every secondary instrument which is legitimate in its mode of operation; and the uppermost of all these, that which combines, embodies, and (so to speak) perpetuates the rest, is the influence of fixed law.

40. It will however be asked, by way of objection, how then did Christianity find its way up to thrones, and establish and incorporate itself in systems of law? The answer is this—it arrived at the summits of society by the miraculous impulses of its original propagation, whose vibrations had been measured, no doubt, with reference to the space they were to traverse, and did not exhaust themselves till they had reached the farthest point to which they were destined. The unity and the orthodoxy of the faith subsisted in its fulness during that period. But if the vigour of Christianity in its best days aimed at the places of human authority as affording a vantage ground for the church, and attained them; and if after attaining them her heavenly powers shall be found in the allotted time too weak to leaven the whole mass, or to secure their own predominance there; then, in their fall from that elevation, the decriers of national religion may indeed obtain a triumph for themselves, but it will be one full of melancholy demonstrations, and yet more melancholy forebodings regarding the religious condition of the world.

41. So much for the power of law and government, extrinsically considered, to be instrumental in the promulgation of religion. The questions of their intrinsic competency, and of the sufficiency of the inducements which religion offers to the state, must be considered and proved, in order to demonstrate the obligation which we have affirmed to lie upon the framers and administrators of public institutions. Let us next take the question of internal competency.

42. The argument which proves that government ought to profess a religion, does not of necessity prove that the propagation also of that religion is obligatory upon it. Because a man possesses the external means of promoting an object, as for example wealth and influence, it does not follow that he ought to set about it, or even to select those who shall set about it, or to lay down rules for their selection, if he have not the internal qualifications of mind which will enable him rightly to discharge that office; but if he have these internal along with those external qualifications, then the case is complete, and we read his duty in the simple possession of them, just as the anatomist infers from the structure of the teeth or the digestive organs in man, and in the inferior animals, by what kind of food they were providentially ordained to be supported. Now the right of pre-eminence, as Burke has observed, essentially resides in talent and virtue, not in a limited but in the largest acceptation of the words; in talent, having reference to men as well as things, to practice as well as study; in virtue of a personal kind, or according to a social standard; but most of all, and with a transcendent sense, in that which flows out of religious principles of God's appointment. These qualities are found to pervade the masses of men in very varying degrees. Wherever there is a tendency towards equalization of talent and virtue, the relation of governor to governed should become one regulated more by opinion, and less by coercion. But there always has been inequality enough to make it obvious that some men are better

fitted to command than others, and therefore that their being in places of authority is a benefit not merely to themselves, which is a secondary question, but to the community at large.

43. We have seen, then, that there are in governments generally certain external means of a nature calculated for the propagation of religion. We have seen that the mere possession of those external means is not enough to prove the obligation, unless there be in governments intrinsically a competency of character such as shall enable them to use those means aright and effectually for their purpose. Further, we find that there are dispersed through the mass of the nation men so far endowed with abilities superior to the average, that they are by nature marked out as qualified to lead in civil society, and to discharge political functions. Now if there be a tendency in the institutions of a country to draw such men to such duties, then surely we find in the governors a competency to choose in matter of religion better than the average of the people will do it for themselves, and, commensurate exactly with that superiority, an obligation to exercise that choice, and, as it were, advise the people to accept and follow that religion which the governing body has adopted as the best.

44. I do not say that individual convictions in an opposite direction are to give way to such an influence, or to follow the patronage of the government, but simply this, that if the judgment of the legislature be upon the average better qualified to find and attest the truth in such a matter than that of the people, then, to that very

same extent, it is entitled and therefore bound to be the instructor of the people. And I think this may be proved almost from the mouth of the opponent; for he will surely admit that in a case where the people are wholly uninstructed, and the government emanates from the bosom of a Christian and an enlightened nation, this duty of instruction exists. Now suppose the people advanced nearer to the government in point of intelligence by one or by several degrees, surely the previous obligation has not therefore terminated. It may have undergone modification in proportion to the growing competency, and, as it were, manhood of the community, in respect of religion; but it must still exist, and can only cease and determine at the time when the mass of the people is equally well qualified to choose with the government, or at least when the difference between them in point of competency, if any, has become indiscernible; for by the amount of that difference the nation is a gainer in being reminded as it were of the purer faith, and thereby, God willing, called to it. And who shall say that in subject-matter so precious any difference, whose reality we have ascertained, can be unimportant?

45. Now is not every government worthy of its name, and valuable to the people over whom it rules, just in proportion to the degree in which it gives over and entrusts the destinies of the nation to the best and wisest of the mind of the nation? The dictates of that mind, of the highest abilities, and of the most upright and trustworthy characters which the land can boast, are to

be elicited, and by sound and good institutions are elicited, from the recesses of private life, and the best men are adorned with pre-eminence and power * ; or if not fitted for administrative duties, still they are watched accurately and heard respectfully, and their views, if not their voices, are made effective in the construction of laws and the direction of policy. Is it meant that this high end is universally, or generally, or anywhere perfectly attained? No; but simply this, that every government is good simply in proportion as it attains thereto; that if we believe our government to be essentially good, it is because it possesses and exhibits this power, and that in proportion as our institutions attract into the governing body the best wisdom of the nation, they endow it with the capacity, and impose upon it the obligation, so far to choose for the people in matter of religion, as to propose to them what it has chosen.

46. If, then, the government be good, let it have its natural duties and powers at its command; but if not good, let it be made so. In considering abstract principles, we agree, and of necessity, concerning all men and things, upon the supposition that they have, taken for all in all, a tolerable aptitude for the purposes which they are appointed to obtain. Because man has by nature such an aptitude for secular objects; and by Christian grace there exists a similar aptitude with reference to religion. We follow therefore the legitimate

* This accordingly is commonly assumed to be the case. See, for example, the Speech of Mr. Roebuck on the Criminal Law Mitigation Bills, May 19, 1837. "We, Sir, are or ought to be the *élite* of the people of England for mind: we are at the head of the mind of the people of England."

course, in looking first for the true ἰδέα, or abstract conception of a government, of course with allowance for the evil and the frailty that are in man, and then in examining whether there be comprised in that ἰδέα a capacity and a consequent duty on the part of a government to lay down any laws or devote any means for the purposes of religion, in short to exercise a choice upon religion.

47. But even if we suppose that the government had no such superiority, we are still at liberty to argue that it is bound to establish a religion. We now return to the common ground taken by the advocates of establishments, who have contended that because there are classes who cannot, through poverty, and classes who will not, through indifference, adopt a religion for themselves, therefore the government ought to supply them with one; not forcibly, but by placing it within their reach. On this well-travelled argument I do not again enter; but I will add to it this further one, that since the state is not to furnish them with any kind of religion indiscriminately, but with one, and that according to its conscience, so it should also be considered as holding forth to the whole nation this one permament form of truth, placing it as it were at the door of every man, and desiring to draw other religionists by gentle influences away from whatever of error appears to be in their schemes, as well as to attract towards religion those who are entirely without it.

48. Granting, then, that the state, if it be well ordered, is both internally competent, and externally supplied

with means, to advance religion, it remains to ask, has it sufficient inducements? Are the results of religion so material in themselves, and have they such bearings upon the proper object of government, as naturally to associate the two? For it has been forcibly argued, as for example by Bishop Warburton, that opinions, as such, are not within the proper scope of government, the science whereof is wholly conversant with practice, and with opinion only as leading towards it; a quality of opinion, however, so common, as greatly to qualify the terms in which such an argument can with safety and truth be urged.

49. Now these results are very various in aspect, though depending on few principles, and they have been argued out by different writers in very different terms. If we set aside the personal conscience of the governor, and suppose him a being blank with regard both to feelings and to responsibilities, a pure political mind, we shall and will find abundant reasons, of the highest state expediency, to show that all forms of religion are not of equal value; and here, in writing of inducements, we find it impossible any longer to handle the subject in general terms, because the amount of these inducements varies directly with the purity of the religion; and in the endeavour to unfold them, we must gradually arrive at the summit of our contemplations, which is crowned by the Christian Church. It has been contended by Bishop Warburton, that civil society is defective by reason of its inability to apply the sanction of punishment uniformly and certainly, or the sanction of reward at all;

and that religion supplies the sanction of reward: therefore, he continues, following out his peculiar argument, it is necessary for the state to ally itself with the church, in order to its own security, and thus to apply in its own behalf the hopes and terrors of a future life.

59. But the argument is surely capable of being stated in a much larger form than with reference to the diminution of crime, and the promotion of good conduct, by a distant hope of reward. Religion is the great instrument of *making* man—of forming, moulding, educating him. In spite of his natural aversion to things divine, the religion of a country is ever found by experience to have a greater influence on its character and destinies than any other cause. It is able to operate upon men through very many channels, both visible and unseen, and it finds its way very far inwards, whether for good or for evil; whether positively, by the effort required for its acceptance, or negatively, by that needed for its utter rejection. Not only therefore by the amount of its influences for good, where it is employed aright, do we measure the state's inducement to adopt it; but by the fearful evils, the terribly disorganising consequences, which follow when it is perverted, and the evidence of which is as appropriate a motive for the governing body as the acquisition of substantive advantages.

51. Still more specifically may it be shown how Christian religion contributes to make good subjects; it is by destroying that law of selfwill and selfworship, the ancient idol, the great lie of this world, which galls and

scourges us even until now. The antagonist truth is, that our mere will does not constitute a rightful law of action, but is always to be led by regard to extrinsic grounds of duty, to grounds assuming a thousand appearances, which are themselves but signs of the supreme will, our true and only law. It is by teaching man not only his actual poverty, but his moral and essential dependence; by teaching him that the mere fact of his wishing to do this or that does not constitute a reason for doing it, unless he can trace that wish up to some higher cause or object; that religion takes away the grand principle, as of individual, so likewise of social misery and disorder.

52. Undoubtedly she does not propose to private persons the will of governors, as constituting in all cases a law to which they are implicitly to submit; this were to substitute one human idol for another. But she does this: she inculcates absolute obedience to all law not sinful, while it continues to be law, as the essential condition of order in societies. And with respect to the alteration of laws, or the introduction of new ones, she puts every individual in a condition to exercise with content the functions which the constitution assigns to him, be it that of merely expressing his desires, or that of giving any suffrage or decision upon the subject matter proposed, because she commands one and all concerned to abjure the law of private inclination, and to direct their observation to the common reason and justice of the case, which all should be, and when they have obeyed those injunctions all are, able in a considerable degree

to appreciate. If it be replied, men do not obey these injunctions, it is only equivalent to saying, men are not thoroughly penetrated by the influence of religion, and this, instead of weakening, only enhances the inducement to avail ourselves of every probable and reasonable means of bringing them under her more effectual control.

53. We have, then, these distinct heads, under which the efforts of Christianity, in the due development of its functions, directly and most powerfully aid the purposes of the state: by proposing more powerful motives to do good and avoid evil; by the general development and invigoration of the human faculties; by removing the great obstructions to unity and peace in societies, caprice, selfsufficiency, arbitrary will, and predisposing the minds of men to submit to reason; and, we may add, by the importance which is given to peace, as a distinct substantive object, for which, independently of its results, and when considered merely as implying the absence of the opposite evils, much ought to be sacrificed and endured.

54. Such as we have described to be the practical development of Christianity, is undoubtedly its practical development more and more in proportion as it is professed and taught according to the will of its Founder. That is to say, in the catholic and apostolic church, purely administered, we are to anticipate the realization of all those results upon character which have been described as so beneficial to the state. Let us hear Mr. Coleridge on this part of the subject*: "Whatever

* Church and State, p. 134.

is beneficent and humanising in the aims, tendencies, and proper objects of the state, it" (the church) "collects in itself as in a focus, to radiate them back as in a higher quality; or, to change the metaphor, it completes and strengthens the edifice of the state, without interference or commixture, in the mere act of laying and securing its own foundations."

55. But there is another kind of inducement, besides its production of the best moral results at a given time which we shall find belonging to the church, and establishing her claim, independently of any grounds of conscience, to our preference. Undoubtedly the political and general principles, which lead us to the conclusion that a religion ought to be established, will likewise lead us somewhat farther, and show us that it ought to be established along with the best guarantees for its permanence that can be obtained. That which the ruling powers, which the wisdom and virtue of the nation have expressed as the truth of religion, and chosen amidst rival and surrounding, but in their judgment inferior, forms, it ought to hedge about with fixed institutions and practices, and to embody in permanent records, in order that it may not thereafter relapse into one of those inferior forms, and leave the people for whose benefit it was designed a loser to the extent of that inferiority.

56. It is the wisdom of man, and especially of the public man, placed upon the watch-tower for the advantage of his fellows, to look beyond the present, whether of time or place, until his eye fails him in the distance, because

that which is future has as real and as important relations to us, who are immortal creatures, as any one of the moments ticked away within our hearing; and we may observe that even human laws deal with rights not yet in operation as having real existence, and as entitled to consideration on principles of justice. This truth holds not only with reference to our state after death, but likewise as respects our span of earthly life: much more does it hold of nations, whose future bears a larger proportion to their present than that of individuals; and of men as acting for nations. In all laws and institutions therefore he will esteem their durability a capital element, and he will beware of being entrapped into the fallacious assumption, that whatever system can upon the moment show the greatest amount of activity and effect, is, therefore, the one which in the long run will give a similar result. In short, the fable of the tortoise and the hare is applicable in its moral to institutions as well as to individuals.

57. The fixity which is obtained by laws is inoperative and dead, unless there be a corresponding sentiment animating the human beings by whose instrumentality they are to be carried into execution. But upon the other hand that motive principle, which man alone can supply, is capable of being incited, assisted, governed, and perpetuated by the existence of a fixed extrinsic record having all the veracity and authority which can attach to any of our acts. The statesman, therefore, if for a moment we suppose him in the situation of one choosing the modifications under which a national faith

is to be established, would see that preference is to be given to Quakerism over any such forms of Christianity as decline to receive the entire word of God and claim the right of denying its divinity where it clashes with their preconceived opinions; because there exists in the one case, and not in the other, a permanent unchangeable attestation of the principles professed at one period of time, which attestation is in the nature of a security for their being preserved at another.

58. But further. To a form of Christianity like Quakerism he would still, on principles purely political, prefer a form like that of Independency, or that adopted by the sect of the Baptists; because, in addition to the volume of the revealed word, they adhere to the use of certain significant institutions termed sacraments, which, setting aside for the time all consideration of their higher uses, are witnesses in attestation of the sacred Scriptures, by which they also are themselves attested. Again, he would prefer to these communions which reject all documents of belief formed from the Scriptures, a system like that of the established church of Scotland, which, by adopting a confession of faith, limits the interpretation of the Scriptures, and tends to fix a belief more definite than that which follows all the fluctuations of mere individual or traditionary judgment. And lastly, he would again prefer to this the polity of the English church, which superadds to the evidence and guarantees of the Word, of sacraments, of creeds, and of primitive practices, a perpetual succession of clergy by whom these have been received, as they were delivered, in regular order from hand to

hand; and which thus supplies us with a living voice of perpetual witnesses, in addition to those which are not active without a human agency to set them in motion.

59. Another prudential reason which would induce the statesman to prefer a permanent form of religion to one of uncertain stability is this—that the religious system of a country cannot be administered directly by the state itself. The universal practice of history, unless with the peculiar exception of the papacy, has been to separate the functions of civil government from those of the priesthood, when society had attained any considerable magnitude. The state, therefore, cannot be immediately and permanently cognisant of the doctrines taught, in the sense of exercising over them that supervision from day to day which belongs to ecclesiastical superiors. Consequently its relations are formed with institutions; and as teaching is always, though in different degrees, liable to vary and degenerate, it is the interest of the state to contract with that which shall offer the fairest probability of retaining all the features which it had when the contract was made, so as to save the necessity of revision and the risk of rupture.

60. Thus much of permanency. But now of truth, which is its foundation. As a statesman believing in God (for we have not yet invested our ideal person for the purpose of the present argument with the responsibilities of a member of the catholic church) will prefer revealed to unrevealed religion, the one coming to him as matter of knowledge, the other of conjecture; or, at the least, the one as determinate, the other as undefined;

still, on the same principle of theism, he will be bound to prefer the entire revelation of God's will, to any partial exhibition of it. The two conditions, therefore, for which he would naturally look, are all that is attainable of truth in the religion itself, and of fixity in the institutions for its maintenance and propagation. And these conditions meet in the church, attested as she is by eighteen hundred years of chequered indeed but never interrupted existence.

61. But the state has this further and very great advantage in alliance with the visible and perpetual society which is appropriately termed the Church of Christ. It is most difficult and invidious for governors to select any one form of mere opinion as such and endow it, or any institution simply preferred because the doctrines taught in it are agreeable to the views entertained by themselves. The church professes to be an institution not deduced by human reason from any general declaration of God's will, but actually and (so to speak) bodily given by God, founded through his direct inspiration, and regularly transmitted in a divinely appointed though human line. The state, therefore, does not here propose an opinion of its own for the approbation of the people, but a system to which it has itself yielded faith and homage, as of divine authority. The difference is twofold: it is that between inheritance and acquisition; it is that between an attested and a conjectural authority from God.

62. The inducements, of which the enumeration has now closed, are all matters intrinsic to the church; and

up to this point we have endeavoured to show, that rational men, entertaining the average belief of men as such in a Creator, and serious in it, and being called to exercise the functions of government, ought to apply to the acts of government the offices of religion, for the discharge of their own personal responsibilities before God, paramount to all social relations; and that in inquiring, not already under Christian prepossessions, what is the best religion for the profession of the state, they will, even without taking into view the scope of particular doctrines, arrive naturally at the adoption of the Christian church.

63. If, however, the claim of the church be preferable for state purposes, it does not seem at once to follow that it should be exclusive, as against sects of Christianity professing to concur in its fundamental doctrines. Perhaps, in order to determine this question, we must alter our point of view; and having heretofore looked at the question in the position of one who, owning an obligation to religion, simply finds his answer to the question, "what religion?" by considering how the broad conditions necessary to its efficacy for state purposes may *best* be fulfilled, let us now suppose with Hooker that the persons composing the nation are all members of the church, that the governors are accordingly members of the church: in such case they will not be perplexed by being left to determine this great question upon calculations of expediency, or by the results of an analytical inquiry into the composition of different religions, claimants for state patronage, in order to decide

whether there be in them more of truth than of falsehood, more of virtuous than of vicious tendency. They are called to no surrender of truth, to no bewildering of the conscience. God has given them a vineyard wherein to labour; and they need not go beyond its bounds, for it will afford employment more than enough to all the energies they can set in array.

64. The church, therefore, is the society with which, and with which alone, they can consistently form such an alliance as has been here described, an alliance, more or less, of incorporation. And as they know that she will best support the state, so their affectionate regard to her as having the stewardship of grace, and to Him who is her Head and their Redeemer, will supply them with an accumulated strength of persuasion and of motive to be diligent in promoting a co-operation so natural, so needful, and so valuable. If, in short, we take up the subject as members of the church, we find her not merely a form, a vessel, an appendage, but a *part* of Christianity, revealed as one, the doctrine of unity in one society revealed as a portion of the living covenant; and this of course precludes us, not indeed from discharging obligations incumbent on us as of good faith under any existing laws, but from entering into schemes even for the promotion of God's word in any manner coming short of that which he has sanctioned and ordained, so long as the means of fulfilling his entire command are graciously vouchsafed to us. While the doctrine of "one body" is authoritatively declared by Scripture,

to recognise the Christian religion in separate bodies might be to countenance the sin, which lies somewhere, though it may be hidden, or may be divided among many offending parties, in every such putting asunder of what God has united.

65. Indeed, more general considerations would lead us towards the same result, though they might scarcely reach it. Some kind of unity is desirable, nay needful. Now unity of opinion can never be absolutely ensured, and is a question of degree: it would be impossible for a government permanently to contract with any set of opinions as such, because it could not be competent to detect deviations in their subtle and nascent forms, and it might only become aware of their existence when they were too strong to be corrected and repressed. And the name of Christianity affords no security whatever for the substantial unity or convergency of the doctrines taught. There is, for example, a far wider space between Catholic Christianity and Unitarianism (regarded in the abstract), than between Unitarianism and the religion of the works of Plato. We might, then, argue for the church on principles of reason, as offering, in her one communion, the best guarantee of that unity which is so important to the state.

66. Further, if there be between any set of distinct religious communions not merely a nominal but a substantial difference, then the idea of union with more than one is fatally at variance with the idea of personality and responsibility in the government as the organ of the national life. It is sad when two persons

take discordant views of religious truth. But it is still more sad, when one person contentedly acquiesces in each of these discordant views; because, though he might not know which is truth, he must know that truth is one. Arguing, therefore, from the principle of the personality of the state, we arrive at a conclusion that, in order fully to satisfy it, the alliance must be with one religion and no more.

67. To practical men, not the weakest argument upon this subject will be, that the union of the church and the state appears to have grown up in the order of social nature, and by no means as the result of any conspiracy of ecclesiastical ambition with civil despotism. When Dante wrote the "Ahi Costantin," * it was of the supposed donation of temporal sovereignty to the bishop of Rome that he meant to record his disapprobation. But the union of the church and the state must have been found a powerful instrument of extending the influences of religion, if we may trust the combined evidence of friends and foes. Of friends, for did not the principle receive too long continued, universal, and pure a sanction from the church and her holiest and wisest members, to allow those who walk with her reasonably to doubt of its general propriety? Of foes, for Julian the Apostate, in his organised efforts to supplant the gospel, adopted the very machinery of the church, and brought the whole powers of the state to bear, by a regular heathen establishment, upon the attainment of his object.

* Inferno, xix. 115.

68. As has been observed by Dr. Sumner, the present bishop of Chester, the natural course of religion, as it drew more and more individuals within its pale, was to produce more and more endowments. And the principle of voluntary endowments, independent of tithe, had gone so far at the time of the Reformation, that we understand in England one-third, in Scotland no less than a moiety of the land, was owned by the church. Now is it compatible with the safety of a state that such a society should exist, forming practically an *imperium in imperio*, and wielding such temporal resources, without being in fixed relations of civil subordination to itself? If the state claims the right to perpetuate the law of mortmain, and prevent the dedication of property to divine uses, it must be on the principle that those uses are already fully supplied: for if they were not, then the general interests of property would afford no justification for a law so essentially restricting its free disposal. And if the state, then, has authority to check even private benevolence when the supply to the church is redundant, surely it has a corresponding obligation to increase that supply when it is deficient.

69. The two societies, both (though differently) ordained of God, and having harmonious purposes, have spontaneously allied themselves in all the old Christian countries. But the danger to the state, it may be argued, from the separate and independent juxtaposition of the church, is not to be apprehended when the church is itself divided, and many denominations of religionists

are combined in one civil community. It may be true that the legitimate form of Christian polity will not, in earthly rivalry with other religious societies, always obtain the preponderance. But how wretched an alternative is here offered to us as an equivalent for immunity from the ambition of the church! We must, in this case, where there is no predominant religion, have government divested of its religious conscience; set to administer equity and justice without the aid of those ordinances which are the only permanent guarantee of morals among men; appointed to concentrate the mind and civilisation of the whole nation in a most powerful agency, but doomed to leave that agency unsanctified!

170. It may seem a light thing to us, who live in habitual coldness and worldliness, to speak of leaving such an agency unsanctified. Too much of our life is in the like condition. But let us not erect our human frailties and backslidings from our law into a new and false law. If the light that is in us be darkness, how great is that darkness! If we deliberately avow the principle of acting without God, how much more shall we act without Him than when we had not yet adopted it, and how shall we render advancement towards a practice more consistent with our present professions hopeless and impossible! Thus, then, does the sin of religious divisions bring its own punishment: not only its own punishment, but a civil retribution also, incapacitating government for its highest functions, and gnawing as a worm at the root of that fair tree.

71. There may be a state of things—in the United States of America, perhaps in some British colonies, there does actually exist a state of things—in which religious communions are so equally divided, or so variously subdivided, that the government is itself similarly chequered in its religious complexion, and thus internally incapacitated by disunion from acting in matters of religion; or, again, there may be a state in which the members of government may be of one faith or persuasion, the mass of the subjects of another, and hence there may be an external incapacity to act in matters of religion. We do not here trace out all the consequences, but it has been shown that this involves dereliction of the functions and responsibilities of government; and it is enough, therefore, for the present, to have marked each of these combinations of circumstances as *a social defect and calamity*.

72. As has here been intimated, we repudiate the supposition that the governor is to over-ride the constitution of a country for the sake of promoting religion; or that he is to use force against a private person for the like purpose. As regards the first, the argument we have held is simply, that, because means naturally accrue to governments in general of promoting religion, they are bound to use those means for that end; just as the individual man finds in the fact of his possessing capacities, or property, or opportunities, for doing God service, the obligation to perform that service. But a government can only with justice be said, or thought to have, what the fixed laws or customs of each parti-

cular country assign to it. In violating the constitution, therefore, to promote religion,—for example, in an illegal exaction of funds for that object,—it would give to God what belongs not to itself, but to another; and it would no more be rendering to him a right or acceptable service, than if the private man committed robbery and dedicated the proceeds to sacred uses.

73. As respects the second objection, namely, that the use of force in religion naturally and logically follows from its adoption by a government as such, it may be observed, in answer, first, that the arguments which have been urged respecting the incompetency of a government to exercise constant and minute supervision over religious opinion, and consequently to enter into relations of co-operation with those professing particular religious opinions upon the ground of those opinions, seem also to point out that a government exceeds its province when it comes to adapt a scale of punishments to variations in religious opinion, according to their respective degrees of deviation from the established creed. To decline affording countenance to sects is a single and simple rule. To punish their professors according to their several errors (even were there no other objection) is one for which the state must assume functions wholly ecclesiastical, and for which it is not intrinsically qualified.

74. Again, it may be said, that if the government be more competent to choose than the individual, and be consequently both entitled and bound to offer to the individual the result of that choice, the same argument

must go to the extent of proving that the government is also bound to force its religion upon the subject, as carrying with it a greater likelihood of truth, and thus a probable advantage to the recipient. The answer is, that it requires much more than such a probability to warrant any human agency in breaking down the natural freedom which God has given to man. To solicit and persuade one another are privileges which belong to us all; and the wiser and better man is bound to advise the less wise and good: but he is not only not bound, he is not allowed, speaking generally, to coerce him. It is untrue, then, that the same considerations which bind a government to submit a religion to the free choice of the people would therefore justify their enforcing its adoption.

75. There is an analogy apparently favouring the objection we are now combating, in the fact, that public laws, for the most part, are not of an optional nature, and that, instead of appealing to the reason of an individual, they enforce his compliance. Now this is the case with some classes of laws which are coercive; but others are purely permissive. Laws and institutions, having it for their object to bring before the people some mental or moral benefit, establishing, for example, institutes, in order to the promotion of literature, art, or science, rarely attempt to force upon the subject the advantages they are designed to convey, partly because it may be supposed there will be found no want of readiness to accept and use the benefits thus offered; but also in part because there is an obvious incongruity

felt between the notion of force on the one hand, and of advantage to the higher faculties on the other.

76. And here, in truth, we come to one of the strongest reasons against religious compulsion. In proportion as we ascend from the lower to the more elevated desires and capacities of man, we leave the region of coercion, and enter that of freedom and choice. Our animal life deals with us as with slaves. Our intellectual wants are chiefly felt when a higher stage of refinement has been reached; and yet they are discernible in an atmosphere where the subtle forms of spiritual beings, which are the objects of our spiritual faculties, would be wholly lost. These are not forced upon our attention: witness the thousands who care not for them. And indeed there is a radical incompatibility in the nature of things, which ought to exempt the domain of religion from the intrusion of force. The service which God requires is the service of the will. The conversion of the will to God is the fundamental change which Christianity aims at producing. The will, by its very essence, by its very definition, cannot be coerced, for if rendered subject to the action of force, the human being no longer has a will.

77. In one point of view, however, this argument may not be sufficient to preclude religious persecution. For it may still be held, and not wholly without truth, that although coercion cannot produce conviction by its own immediate agency, it may set men about searching into the truth, and so bring them towards conviction, and put them in the way to arrive at it. Here, indeed,

the question would incidentally arise, whether, in general, and particularly, whether in the temper of the present day, any such degree and kind of coercion could be used, as should not be more than counterbalanced by the reaction it would excite? But this does not touch the merits: and it is more fairly pleaded that coercion may be available in repressing error, than that it can actively assist the reception of the truth. It may, undoubtedly, one would on general grounds apprehend, check the dispersion of error, and thereby prevent minds from being tainted, which might, if it moved freely, come under its influence. The conclusive reason therefore against persecution is this: it is not prescribed to man as an instrument for his use, and it is one which, not being so prescribed, it would be sinful to employ; as it would, for example, be sinful to take away animal life had we not the Divine permission to that effect. For mere error men are not allowed to punish; and no theory of a church establishment leads by any fair consequence to an opposite conclusion.

78. It has now, perhaps, been sufficiently argued that both as a combination of moral individual persons, and as the active organ of the national personality; both as having a conscience, and for the sake of national benefits; both for positive reasons to procure advantage, and for negative reasons, to avoid detriment, the governing body or state, in order fully to discharge its duties, must seek, must profess, must support, must propagate a religion; must profess it personally and collectively; must propagate it freely and persuasively, indirectly and by the

use of instruments; of the instruments made ready to its hand by that divine ordinance, which has separated for ever a class of men to minister in the Christian sanctuary.

79. Now these views require to be strictly sifted. They cannot rest in mere speculation, but if affirmed as true, will be found full of points of contact with daily life, so far at least as regards that large and increasing portion of the community, who are called under the British constitution to exercise some degree of direct influence upon public affairs. Therefore, before finally resting in the principle, let us ask ourselves whether we have counted the cost? It is very clear that these later times have been parents to an opinion, that government ought to exercise no choice in matters of faith, but leave every man without advice, or aid, or influence, from that source, to choose for himself. And many hold this opinion under an idea that the overthrow of national establishments, as such, will be beneficial to pure and undefiled religion. They hold and contend thus, quite undisturbed in their convictions by the ominous and yet undeniable fact, that they share them with all the enemies of law both human and divine. They know not the acuteness of Satanic instinct. May they become alive to it while there is yet time! But we have to calculate upon encountering not merely the political difficulties which these strangely mingling classes of men will create, but likewise the more bitter and more painful reproach that we are injuring the cause of Him, whom, in maintaining the union between church and state, we profess to serve.

80. Nor need our opponents go far for a case in exemplification of their propositions. Upon us of this day has fallen (and we shrink not from it, but welcome it as a high and glorious though an arduous duty) the defence of the Reformed Catholic Church in Ireland, as the religious establishment of the country. The Protestant legislature of the empire maintain in the possession of the church property of Ireland the ministers of a creed professed by one-ninth of its population, regarded with partial favour by scarcely another ninth, and disowned by the remaining seven. And not only does this anomaly meet us full in view, but we have also to consider and digest the fact, that the maintenance of this church for near three centuries in Ireland has been contemporaneous with a system of partial and abusive government, varying in degree of culpability, but rarely until of later years, when we have been forced to look at the subject and to feel it, to be exempted, in common fairness, from the reproach of gross inattention (to say the least) to the interests of a noble but neglected people.

81. But however formidable, at first sight, these admissions, which I have no desire to narrow or qualify, may appear, they in no way shake the foregoing arguments. They do not change the nature of truth, and her capability and destiny to benefit mankind. They do not relieve government of its responsibility, if they show that that responsibility was once unfelt and unsatisfied. They place the legislature of this country in the condition, as it were, of one called to do penance for past offences; but duty remains unaltered and imperative,

and abates nothing of her demands on our services. It is undoubtedly competent, in a constitutional view, to the government of this country to continue the present disposition of church-property in Ireland. It appears not too much to assume that our imperial legislature has been qualified to take, and has taken in point of fact, a sounder view of religious truth than the majority of the people of Ireland, in their destitute and uninstructed state. We believe, accordingly, that that which we place before them is, whether they know it or not, calculated to be beneficial to them; and that if they know it not now, they will know it when it is presented to them fairly. Shall we, then, purchase their applause at the expense of their substantial, nay, their spiritual interests?

82. It does indeed so happen, that there are also powerful motives on the other side concurring with that which has been here represented as paramount. In the first instance, we are not called upon to establish a creed, but only to maintain an existing legal settlement, where our constitutional right is undoubted. In the second, political considerations tend strongly to recommend that maintenance. A common form of faith binds the Irish Protestants to ourselves, while they, upon the other hand, are fast linked to Ireland; and thus they supply the most natural bond of connection between the countries. But if England, by overthrowing their church, should weaken their moral position, they would be no longer able, perhaps no longer willing, to counteract the desires of the majority, tending, under the direction of

their leaders (however, by a wise policy, revocable from that fatal course), to what is termed national independence. Pride and fear on the one hand are, therefore, bearing up against more immediate apprehension and difficulty on the other. And with some men these may be the fundamental considerations; but it may be doubted whether such men will not flinch in some stage of the contest, should its aspect at any moment become unfavourable.

83. What if the truth be this; that among many acts of oppression, many of folly, others again of benevolence and justice, partial or not followed out to their consequences, we have done one, especially among these last, which was in itself thoroughly wise and good, had it been viewed as introductory, and not as final? Who can doubt, that in the position occupied by Elizabeth and her government, it was right on their part to carry into Ireland the restoration of the Christian faith (just as they had carried it through England) with the additional advantage of the almost unanimous acquiescence or concurrence of the bishops, and for this purpose to employ the appointed means of religious ministration to the people? But when the initiatory means had been thus adopted, the whole residue of the labour was relinquished. Those wise and salutary measures which brought the people of England from rebelling in favour of the Roman Catholic church and her superstitions, to their present mood of steady attachment to a purified belief, were not extended to Ireland. The names of Bedell and of Boulter are bright upon the desolate

retrospect; but the attempt has not been made until within a period comparatively recent, (thank God it has commenced,) to ascertain what results will follow from the general proclamation of scriptural religion throughout Ireland.

84. Upon us, therefore, has devolved the duty of supplying, under more critical circumstances, the want of all those measures which might have been taken at an earlier period, and we have still the power of truth to befriend us, greater than any that can oppose. Is this faith of our national church deeply rooted alike in our convictions and in our affections? If so, is it one merely separated by some slight shade from the Roman church, not simply such as she is in theory, but such as she is in the aggravations of her practice, and of her practice, above all, in Ireland? If the difference be broad and clear, if it be represented everywhere in character and conduct among that people, do we shrink from asserting on their behalf the truth which they have a right to know, nay a desire to know, but which, by the interposition of an unnatural and an illegitimate authority, they are prevented from knowing?

85. Public men feel the duty of securing to the subject the advantages of intellectual cultivation. It has been proposed in this country to render such education compulsory, as is actually done in some others. The expediency of such a measure has been doubted, but those who claim to represent the spirit of the age have hardly questioned the right. Is then the benefit of spiritual truth more ambiguous or less extensive than that of in-

tellecual culture, and can those who are bold enough to propose enforcing the reception of the one, be timid enough to shrink from avowing and approving the offer of the other? We have not yet arrived at the general assertion of such monstrous propositions. And it is a question of spiritual truth in Ireland, arrayed against a church which has hidden the light that is in her amidst the darkness of her false traditions, and which adds to the evils of false doctrine those of schism. Yet we speak of a general principle, not merely of the striking and obvious case which has been cited for the sake of illustration.

86. Because, therefore, the government stands with us in a paternal relation to the people, and is bound in all things to consider not merely their existing tastes, but the capabilities and ways of their improvement; because it has both an intrinsic competency and external means to amend and assist their choice; because to be in accordance with God's word and will it must have a religion, and because in accordance with its conscience that religion must be the truth as held by it under the most solemn and accumulated responsibilities; because this is the only sanctifying and preserving principle of society, as well as to the individual that particular benefit, without which all others are worse than valueless; we must disregard the din of political contention, and the pressure of worldly and momentary motives, and in behalf of our regard to man, as well as of our allegiance to God, maintain among ourselves, where happily it still exists, the union between the church and the state.

CHAPTER III.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE CHURCH AND THE STATE UPON THE TONE OF PERSONAL RELIGION IN THE CHURCH.

1. Objection, that personal religion is deteriorated by the connection. 2—4. Favoured by present circumstances. 5—10. It would imply an actual incompatibility of two duties. 11—14. Argument upon the allegation of superior activity in Dissenting bodies. 15—21. Argument upon selection, the method of dissent; and upon universal solicitation, the method of establishments. 22—29. Argument upon the partial religion of large numbers in establishments. 30—33. Establishment tends on the whole to enlist secondary motives in favour of religion 34. Does not exclude the voluntary principle. 35. Nor imply excessive wealth. 36—41. Certain beneficial effects of nationality on the tone of religion. 42—44. And of endowment, which is akin to establishment. 45. Case of Rome. 46—48. General argument applied to England. 49. Recapitulation.

1. THERE is an objection to the principle of the national establishment of religion not dependent upon any peculiarity in the terms under which the church and the state may in a given case be united, but which confronts the entire argument, and, if founded in fact, undoubtedly overthrows it. It is this, that union with the state is proved by our own case to be detrimental to the inward life and health of the church, and lowers the tone of religion in her individual members. If this be false, it is not difficult for the church to bear the scoffs

which are aimed at her in respect of her legal establishment, and patiently to work out a destiny akin to that of her Divine Founder and Living Head, glorification through suffering. But if it be true, then however apparently complete be the fortifications of external argument, however reasonable or even resistless the antecedent grounds of the connection may appear, the foe is within the walls, and at the rear of the defenders. Nothing can stand against the proof (if proof could be given) that a diminished amount or deteriorated quality of personal religion is the result of that alliance, which we have affirmed to be not less grounded in the nature and truth of things than affirmed by the general suffrage of mankind.

2. There arise, however, from the circumstances of the day, some influences which tend to prepossess certain classes of minds in a manner favourable to the objection now before us. Every man will admit, that the loss of the temporal endowments of the church, and of the national homage which is still awarded to her, is, at least, within the bounds of obvious possibility. And such a prospect, even if regarded as remote, still has set many affectionate minds at work to store up topics of comfort as preparatives for acquiescing in such a dispensation should it be God's will to send it. Looking back to history, as well as inward upon the heart and mental constitution of man, they are glad to recognise in the case of churches as well as individuals, the recorded and experienced benefits of affliction, and to find with what literal and palpable truth it is, that "all

things work together for good, to them that love God." They conceive that the result of the present trials has already been, and that the consequence of protracted and extended trials will be in a still more eminent degree, to produce intelligence, fortitude, and devotedness in the children of the church. As the temporal advantages which have belonged to her are more and more questioned or curtailed, higher motives will in many minds gradually supersede those which are more sordid. Those who have only known her surface and exterior, will take refuge from the altered and inclement atmosphere in the inner recesses of her bright and glorious tabernacle. And entering by degrees into the depth, the unity, and the spirituality of her character and scheme, her disciples will be more and more united in heart and soul to their forefathers in the church of God, and will rejoice in the identity of their hope, love, and life, with those which animated and nursed the primitive and apostolical saints.

3. It is, however, a common, though we think an unwarranted corollary from these pious and reasonable anticipations, that the overthrow of the church as an establishment will *in natural course* advance its interests as a church; and therefore, that it exists as an establishment for the benefit of the nation, but purchases that benefit at the expense of a certain portion, perhaps a large one, of its own purity and strength.

4. There can scarcely be any who, upon reflection at least, will not feel shocked and startled at this supposition. The well-being of the church is surely an

object too sacred for compromise or exchange. The value of spiritual truth utterly transcends every other so-called advantage, and none of them are in any way commensurable with it. No *political* gain can justify our incurring religious detriment. So it seems as if either we must be bound to surrender the national establishment, in virtue and by direct consequence of our love of its inner principles and system, or that a fallacy somewhere lurks in the idea, that the interests of the nation as such have demanded and obtained a sacrifice, however partial, of the interests of the church as such.

5. Of all trials which wound and lacerate the susceptible heart, perhaps none is so afflictive as a case which appears to be one of contradictory duties. There is in reality, indeed, no such thing. There is not, there cannot be, reciprocal opposition among the commands of God. All duty has one source in the Eternal Mind, and one direction, for the purposes of love, conceived in that mind. One duty is never sacrificed to another: but that which in one combination of circumstances *would be* duty, in another combination of circumstances is not duty; the minor obligation is intercepted as it were, in embryo, while yet unformed, and in this sense only is superseded by the major one. But the law which makes it a duty to obey a parent or ruler in all but sin, and the law which makes it a duty to disobey him in sin, are not conflicting laws, nay, they are not even parallel and concurrent laws, but are identical; and the conduct

adopted, under each, is ultimately referrible to one and the same ground-work.

6. This is one of the eternal truths which belong to a pure theism, but which readily escape the superficial glances of the human mind. It sinks into retirement and desuetude, and when it is, as it were, exhumed, it comes like a stranger among men, and is questioned as a novelty. But in truth, if we had several duties, we should have several gods: for every proper and original law of action would be the index of a several deity.

7. For every such case, then, as that before us, there *must be* a real solution; yet the difficulty of finding it may be extreme. But such cases, at all events, will not be held to arise out of the *immediate* ordinances of God. Social order and government is so evidently and directly by divine appointment on the one hand; and the good of the Christian church so manifestly the most palpable object on earth of God's dispensations, upon the other, that an opposition between these two, each so strongly claiming the highest and most irrefragable authority, upon the bare mention distracts and confounds the heart.

8. It does indeed often happen that, when an authority given by the Almighty is perverted by its earthly steward, one subjected to it may be much perplexed in the endeavour to fix that point in the progress of abuse, at which the subsidiary right becomes absolutely annulled, and duty commands him to resort to the ori-

ginal and comprehensive law of God, which cannot be contravened. Thus, supposing a parent enjoins that which is sinful; since his authority is undoubtedly such as to render obligatory what is in itself indifferent, we may find it a serious matter to determine *when* that binding power loses its validity from being placed in opposition to the general and less determinate, though more authoritative will of the Creator.

9. But in a case where human agency does not intervene at all; where we have recognised the principle of a church establishment, not indeed as matter of directly and definitely imposed command, but of investigation into fundamental laws, and of conviction therefrom resulting, that its principles were intimately interwoven and its interests uniformly parallel with those of the body politic; in such a case we may surely hope, that any incompatibility or discrepance which it is attempted to show or to assume, must be a semblance only, and destitute of any foundation whatever, either in theory or in practice. The essential oneness of the divine will; the manifest convergency of the divine dispensations; the stamp of concord on all practices or institutions whose origin is from heaven, impress so strong and deep a general persuasion, as ought to fortify us beforehand in the particular case, against any supposition that the interests of the church are at variance with those of the establishment.

10. It would not, however, be wise or warrantable to rest in such a persuasion alone. For two classes it may indeed suffice: those, namely, who cannot or need

not inquire further, and those who have inquired thoroughly, and have summed up their thoughts upon the special instance in a full and deliberate ratification of the general principle. But there is much scepticism which cannot and ought not to be thus laid asleep; many minds habituated to half perceptions of truth, and to practical error as their ordinary result; many aroused to honest and unsatisfied inquiry, which may already have glanced at the obvious conclusion, "if the nation should hereafter show a disposition to cast off the church, let it do so at its peril, we will acquiesce, as the church will be the better for it."

11. To supply the verbal defects, and to unfold the ambiguities of such reasoning as this, is exceedingly important, inasmuch as the defenders of the union between church and state cannot, until it has been refuted, gird up their loins for the conflict with a clear persuasion of the rightfulness of their object, or without a dim suspicion, that it is not only unjust as regards others, but suicidal as regards themselves, their attachments, and desires.

12. The foundation of the sentiment which is wont to embody itself in the foregoing argument has probably been, an impression commonly entertained among the advocates of principles hostile to a legal recognition of religion or of the church, that a greater degree of religious activity is found to exist within the compass of the unestablished bodies of this country, relatively to their numbers, than partiality itself can allege to pervade the great masses of the established church.

13. If the allegation have reference only to *an* activity, and that activity one conversant with religion, we cannot doubt that it is true in point of fact, while we totally deprecate, and are prepared to repel, the inferences which have been hastily or inimically drawn from such an admission. In the first place, let us observe, that the term activity applies much more to outward than to inward vitality; and that its application is more readily allowed to that which produces palpable and sudden change than to causes of simple and regular progression; while yet the power that feeds a tree is more truly generative, and in the end fruitful of greater results, than that which tears it down.

14. It may appear invidious, but it is necessary to mark the distinction between the system calculated to produce most activity at a given time, and that which will most effectually perpetuate its own existence unimpaired in essential points. For there is a common notion or assumption, that these two characteristics are coincident. We need not go far to exemplify the reverse. It may be fairly allowed, that there was, under the later Stuarts, more religious energy in the congregations of the expelled ministers than in the generality of those of the established church of England. Many of the former we know were endowed by the zeal of their members, as well as adorned by their piety. What is at this moment the comparative state of the two? The establishment has arisen from her torpor, she is awake and has put on strength; and

in an age already venerable, she manifests the vigour of the earliest youth;

> "In età matura
> Parimente maturo avea il consiglio
> E verdi ancor le forze." *

But those seceding bodies have forgotten the faith for which once they were forward to contend, and almost without an exception have lapsed into Socinianism. Doubtless we have here to consider the catholicity as well as the legal nationality of the church: but the illustration may properly serve to impress upon us the necessity of distinguishing permanent from transitory energies.

15. Dissenting bodies naturally act upon the principle of selecting individuals from the mass of the nation by applying to them the stimulants of religious menaces and inducements, and associating them into congregations. The care of the dissenting minister is for a congregation, not a locality; he deals with persons, each of whom is supposed to have more or less a special reason influencing severally his mind and actions, by which alone, and not in consequence of any appointment independent of himself, he has become a member of the flock to which he belongs.

16. How widely different is the case of an establishment. Her ministers are not to act upon this principle of preference, but to offer, and so far as they are permitted, to administer the ordinances of religion to every living soul. Not that their attentions are to be divided into

* Gerusalemme Liberata, vii. 61.

shares of a strict equality, but none are to be excluded: while they cherish the best with peculiar fondness, their regards are ever to be directed towards the reclamation of the absolutely profligate, and the retention of the worldly-minded within some at least of the restraints of religion. It is one of the peculiar offices of the establishment, and often forms, to the minds of superficial observers, the *gravamen* of the charges against her, that she sustains in an outward, and partial, and accommodating religion, a large number of persons who are not animated by its living and life-giving principles. Now this is termed lending encouragement to hypocrisy and lulling into delusive slumbers the souls of a perishing people.

17. Bring them to an inward religion if possible by love; if not thus, then by the hope of happiness; if not thus, then by the fear of perdition: if again there be no inward attraction of the soul to God, and they have no principles higher than those of nature, keep them even in the human religion rather than none at all: let them attend Christian ordinances from habit, from deference to society or to superiors, from fear of infamy, constantly if they will, or if not, yet frequently, or if not, yet sometimes: the smallest degree of religious observance is better than none at all, however inefficacious for practical purposes be the life within it; because while there is life there is hope. This is the principle and language of a pure establishment, which deems all spiritual life so precious that it would gather and save its very atoms, like the dust of gold, so long as that

little which is done is done by the right means and in the right direction. And such should its practice be.

18. But upon comparing the condition of a country blessed with a church establishment, and not solely dependent for religious ordinances upon the results of voluntary exertions, with that of another bearing the Christian name, but without any such institution, we find the difference to be that, while in both cases there are large numbers professing and cherishing individual religion, in the first a larger proportion of the people observe Christian ordinances, and there are infinite shades of character filling up the wide space between the children of God and of Satan, without any broad line of discernible demarcation: in the second, to a given amount of religious profession there is a greater amount of religious activity, and there is a more fearful mass of persons wholly cut off from the public profession of the Gospel and the appointed way of immortality.

19. Now when we change the subjects of our comparison, and take the case of our own country alone, we find, I apprehend, that a similar relation obtains between the establishment and the sectarian bodies. The former does not cast off the dross of the community, or rather that which appears dross but contains much pure ore. She attempts and professes to secure a feeble, partial, and an outward observance of religion, in default of, and she hopes in preparation for, that which is vigorous, complete, and operative with a transforming power upon the inward nature of man. She is content to be encumbered in her course with the inert and lifeless

weight of large numbers of persons who are strangers to conscientious and individual religion, and although she is ever busied in searching among the mass for the capable recipients of a vital principle, and dealing to each man according to his strength, and seeking to extract from each man whatever of religious love and service he is qualified to render, yet such a heavy and unprofitable residue she must always bear upon her, inasmuch as while the good are draughted off one by one into the enjoyment of her loftier discipline, new crowds of the indolent and the worldly-minded are continually entering within her pale, there, she trusts, to be educated into Christian maturity.

20. She must be contented, however irksome the office, to provide for those whom the dissenting minister cannot attract to his congregation because they do not care enough for religion to contribute to its expenses, as well as those who are precluded by the real pressure of poverty, or by the rarity of population in a particular district, from joining any such voluntary assemblage, and again, for another large and important class who resort to religious observances primarily on the score of deference to public practice and opinion, which practice and opinion is generated and maintained chiefly by the influences of an establishment.

21. But granting, as a consequence, that the *average* religious principle of the members of our venerated establishment is lower than that of dissenting bodies: it remains obvious in the first place, by general admission, that this circumstance belongs essentially to its

condition and office as an establishment: in the second, as we think, and shall strive to show, it does not imply any compromise between spiritual and political interests, a thing if taken strictly we believe in its own nature impossible, and whose existence, at least in this particular instance, we shall now attempt to disprove.

22. What, then, can be meant by those interests of a church, which it is said, or felt, or feared, we compound for the sake of state expediency? The interests of a church are not the mere attachments of its members to its *peculiarities*, so far as they are inessential to its existence as a church: if they were, we might yield our point, and admit that the effect of an establishment such as our own, is to induce a Catholic spirit and a liberal discrimination between matters necessary and matters indifferent. Discouraging in all things the capricious exercise of individual will, and setting little value upon the authority of mere opinion, its practices have been severely proved, and have acquired their claim to observance in the lapse of generations, so that the full force of our individual self-will and pride is much less brought to bear in exciting our attachment to an established church, than where innovation is easy and perpetual, and each man stands to defend what has been, in a greater degree, produced or subjected to modification by his own personal agency and judgment.

23. The true interests of a church are best to be ascertained by considering its nature. It is an organised body; governed by the laws and ministers of Christ, having the charge of the Word, and the exclusive admi-

nistration of the Sacraments, and dispensing both for the promotion of a spiritual life. Her end then is "the greatest holiness of the greatest number." Her inanimate machinery has no capability of pleasure and pain; has no interests in any intelligible sense. Her living members have all one and the same interest: the aggregate of that interest constitutes the interest of the church, and it is the production, not of the greatest possible excitement connected with religion, nor of the greatest possible enjoyment connected with religion, nor of the greatest possible appearance of religion; nay, not even the greatest possible quantity of actual religion at any time or place; but the greatest possible permanent and substantial amount of religion within that sphere over which its means of operation extend. By religion, we would be understood to mean, conformity to the will of God.

24. Now we, who hold the principle of national establishment, believe, that although a higher average of active religious motive may be found in limited and sectarian bodies, yet this is simply because the establishment is set and appointed to embrace, along with her more spirited and intelligent children in Christ, those who are too timid to make a religious profession; those who hesitate between this world and the next; those who give a limited and insufficient scope to the action of Christian principle; those who attend Christian ordinances only in compliance with human opinion, or those who see nothing in Christianity but a system of outward forms, in an establishment nothing but a me-

thod of preserving social order, and of repressing religious extravagance.

25. And it may doubtless be said, that the very constitution of an establishment, as thus represented, indicates an unsound state of things; that the observance of Christain ordinances ought not to be exacted by the force of human opinion, but rendered by the spontaneous and joyful action of the heart; that these false and imperfect services of so many differing classes cannot be satisfactory to God. And unsound, indeed, is the condition of human society; but the question is, Would it not be more unsound were the restraining influences of an establishment withdrawn?

26. Certainly her faithful members must be content to stand side by side with many who care little for religion; but the promises of Christ may secure them from the danger of contagion; and they may also acquire from their position a livelier remembrance of that lesson, that we may not say one to another, Stand by, for I am holier than thou. I say, the promises of Christ: for the establishment does but fulfil His prophetic declarations, in not attempting any universal separation of the tares from the wheat; of the good fish from the bad: content with the laws of her mixed condition upon earth, emulous of the example of her Lord, who ate with publicans and sinners, and generous as her heavenly Father, who sends rain and light upon the just and the unjust, rendering benefit, but not therefore receiving pollution.

27. It is undoubtedly well for the state, that the hopes and fears of a future life should be used in aid of those

which have reference to temporal prosperity and punishments; that religion should check the ignorant and the irreligious; that men should worship they know not what, rather than not worship at all: but is it ill for the church? Her principle is, to gather up the very crumbs of devotional offerings; to feed the babes with milk; not to break the bruised reed, nor to quench the smoking flax, until the Redeemer shall come in his glory, to send forth judgment unto victory. A small obedience is better than none. To think of God seldom, is better than not to think of Him at all. To love Him faintly is better than to be in utter and unvarying indifference or aversion towards the Giver of all good. Better—not as though our acts were strictly and truly good; but because these states of life and feeling indicate a mental condition less hopelessly inaccessible to the influences of the Spirit of grace, than those of total alienation from the means of grace. Better for the pupil, if the face be set invariably forwards; for the instructress, if she be always leading and beckoning him in the same direction. The church lives in the use of means; and trusts in God for the production of results.

28. Did we, indeed, believe, with the foes of the establishment of the church, that the natural effect of this operation was to keep these dark worshippers in their darkness, we must join their ranks, and emulate their zeal for the work of demolition. But while we see that the established church brings crowds of persons to the outer courts and the lower steps of the temple, we believe further, that she is well calculated to use every

effort for their advancement to those which are inner and higher; and that but for her beneficent agency, they would remain utterly remote from the sights and sounds of worship, from the impressions and associations to which now, by the laws of bare humanity, they are subject, and which, though not universal, not infallible, nor intrinsically efficacious, may yet be blessed, and often are blessed, and are the natural means and channels of blessing.

29. Is the *Church*, then, wounded or injured by this charitable operation of the *Establishment?* We do believe that her members may be less doatingly enamoured of her distinctive marks, as distinctive marks, than would be the case were she severed from the state; and we admit that their liberality may receive a tinge so far latitudinarian, that they may confound her essential with her unessential peculiarities; or again, they may regard her human trappings more than the unearthly lineaments which these are intended to adorn. But we do not believe that, except it be from adventitious causes, in no way inseparable from the connexion, she has a smaller number of members under the influence of active religion, than, on the other supposition, she would possess. We do not believe that their Christianity is of an inferior quality because they belong to an establishment; but, on the contrary, that it is, on the whole, more calm, more catholic, less alloyed by the contagion of spiritual pride and selfishness; more comprehensive in its views of the manifold functions and capacities of human nature. We do not believe that they suffer de-

triment from juxtaposition with the less heavenly-minded members of the establishment; because, though it is written of gratuitous and unordained communion with the kingdom of Satan, that a man cannot touch pitch without being defiled, yet recognising the manifest prohibition of our Lord to him, at an entire local separation (as it were) of the hypocrites from the saints in this life, we do not anticipate for the former any evil from that contact which may occur in the discharge of duty; and there is in view the animating prospect of thus arousing many a dormant spirit unto holiness, and rescuing many a tender lamb of the Redeemer from the fangs of the roaring lion.

30. It is true that there may be a certain class of persons, who are alienated from religion simply because it is established; and who, startled at the apparent paradox of an authority jointly divine and political, may be repelled from the very examination of the Gospel by that *primâ facie* incongruity. And though it be true that that paradox is capable of easy explanation, that the divine and the national characters of the church establishment are capable of real, and generally of easy discrimination, yet this risk, so far as it extends, must be admitted to be in the nature of a sound and fair objection.

31. But the question before us is one of spiritual expediency; and we must inquire, whether there be not more who will be attracted towards religion by the instrumentality of an establishment as such, than those who will be driven from it. Look to the thousands

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with whom worship is matter of sheer usage, and unconnected with any active exercise of the mind upon Divine truth. Thus the beneficial action is upon masses. But those whom the *paraphernalia* of a national church, or the bugbear of a law church, frighten from the sanctuary, are units here and there, thinly interspersed through the community. A peculiar tone of character, a singular mixture of intellect and caprice, of philosophical rashness and timidity, can alone account for the rejection of a religion by no means necessarily associated with the state, because it happens in a particular case to be so allied; and, as this temperament is rare and idiosyncratic in the extreme, so it is entitled to proportionably less weight in our calculations. Not, therefore, to no weight at all; but this remote danger is not to preclude a course attended with such large and immediate benefit to the spiritual interests of masses of mankind.

32. In the long run, and upon a large scale, as I have already had occasion to argue more at length, the prejudice of mankind is in favour of establishments, political as well as religious. The destructive spirit has characteristic particular and critical periods; but, upon a comprehensive average, a tendency to acquiescence in existing institutions is the rule, and a tendency to disturb them the exception.

33. We are prepared, then, to assert it generally of a national church, that it brings human and secondary motives to bear upon mankind in favour of religion, with a power greater than that which would belong to

it, *cæteris paribus*, when unestablished, because ordinarily it would not occupy the same station in public estimation. The fashion which might, in a wealthy and luxurious country, choose to reject attendance at church, is enlisted in its favour. A narrow and feeble provision, no doubt; but we must not despise the day of small things.

34. There is no intelligible argument for the position, that the number of actively pious persons would be increased were the national church destroyed. The question at issue is not fairly represented, where it is said that it is between the voluntary principle and that of an establishment. In truth, it is between the voluntary principle alone, on the one hand, and that principle in association with the co-ordinate principle of an establishment, on the other. There is ample scope for the voluntary principle when the state has done as much as it is ever likely to do. There is as yet a great void, filled neither by the state, nor by the voluntary principle. But the state, as a directing and superior power, has means of eliciting, and of systematising, exertion, which no individual or association can command.

35. Since, however, we live in an age of religious parsimony, when the voluntary principle affords to ministers of religion little more than a bare maintenance, men forming their judgment from the time may allege, that the wealth of establishments chokes them with worldly ministers. The answer to this is, that such wealth does not accrue to them as establishments. Let us take, for

example, the history of our own island. If we admit that the tithe was given by legislative enactment, still the tithe did not constitute the bulk of the wealth of the church. Its enormous aggrandisement was by gifts of lands, which were notoriously and indisputably voluntary. It is, perhaps, not too much to inquire, if any case can be pointed out of a very wealthy church which has derived its opulence from the gift of the state? Upon the other hand, that disposition of the national endowments of religion in Scotland, which is so commonly quoted as a model of economy, and which certainly is entitled to the praise of working great results from small means, is not owing to private economy, but to a law of king Charles the First.

36. And if we are warranted in assuming that the nationality of a church does not diminish the number of its actively devoted members, or its quantity of vital religion; so neither has it been often alleged that its tendency is to deteriorate what we may term the quality of that piety. As its besetting sin is torpor, so its most natural virtues are calmness and stability; and that fixedness of institutions, which the addition of nationality tends to give to any religious system, is certainly calculated to impart both a finer and a firmer tone to spiritual character. The abhorrence of mere individual will, as such, which properly belongs to the catholic church, and which renders her odious or unattractive to turbulent spirits, has a beautiful effect upon the chastened mind, and presents man before God in the attitude which befits him, not as a creator, or an in-

ventor, or even a reproducer, of a system, upon which he shall read Self everywhere or anywhere inscribed, but as a recipient of pure bounty and compassion. The idea of inheritance, with all its at once ennobling and subduing effects, is perfectly realised in that body alone, where we are the heirs, not merely of antiquity, but of inspiration, and the long line of Christian generations brightens, instead of fading, as it recedes.

37. Now it is necessary to be very cautious in comparing any results of a political institution with those which flow immediately out of God's appointment. The mere adoption and establishment of a religious body by the state does not supply the want of any conditions which are required to constitute the church. Establishment and dissent present to us one contrast; catholicity and sectarianism another. But still, so far as there can be an adumbration of what is palpably divine in systems of church polity constructed, in some at least of their parts, according to human conjecture, we do find that religion, not authenticated by apostolical descent, does certainly appear under less disadvantage when honestly united with the state, than when presented in the form of mere private association.

38. The Scottish establishment has deprived herself of the episcopal succession, and therein, we cannot but believe, of her strongest argument as an establishment against the competing claims of any other religious body; but, if we compare her in respect of evangelical doctrine, or of the general spirit of her members, or of the capacity she has evinced of transmitting a definite religious cha-

racter from generation to generation, with other Protestant bodies not having the succession, whether in Germany, or Switzerland, or America, or France (the cases of Denmark and Holland would be less in point), she appears, by the side of each and all, in a light highly favourable. And what better reason can be assigned for this remarkable fact, than that, in her case, the idea of a national clerisy, or estate of religion, has certainly been wrought out, upon the whole, with greater fidelity than in any of the others which have been named, and the instruction, both of old and young, has been systematically provided for, and solemnly committed to her charge?

39. Habituated to the false or secondary conceptions which arise out of our inveterate political sectarianism, we are very apt to look upon the state in an irreverent or careless temper, and to forget that next to the church it exhibits the grandest of all combinations of human beings. It is a venerable idea, in which the supremacy of law as opposed to mere will is asserted, by which the sociality and independence of our nature are proclaimed, and the best acts and thoughts are arrested and perpetuated in institutions, and a collective wisdom is made available for individuals, and the individual is humbled and disciplined by being kept in qualified subordination to the mass. The adoption of a moral principle, or scheme, or institution, by the state, is among the most solemn and the most pregnant of human acts: and although it cannot place what it adopts upon a ground higher than its own, any more than water can rise above its level, yet that ground is one of

an order having more of natural justice, more of experimentally demonstrated permanence, more of divine authentication, than any other, except the church, which it feebly though perceptibly imitates; and certainly much more than that private will, which, sooner or later, learns to wanton in the whole spirit and practice of dissent, reversing every fundamental law of the universe, and asserting the isolation, and deifying the arbitrary caprice of man.

40. The individual adopted into such a national estate of religion is then in a situation of advantage with regard to his inward discipline, as compared with that which he would occupy in a system theologically similar but unestablished. Law is the highest of human authorities: thus he is taught to obey and to revere, the essential and first conditions of our well-being. The proportion of the single person to the mass is smaller as the aggregation is more extensive: therefore, and in the same ratio, the spirit of self is more repressed in the nation than it would be in some voluntary association carved out from the larger body.

41. Again: not only is the numerical importance (so to speak) of the individual less in proportion as the society is large, but his temptations to self-sufficiency and pride are likewise liable to be curtailed in proportion as the society is permanent. The more permanent the society, the greater becomes the authority attached to it; the minds of men are predisposed to submission, and the notions of domineering will are in a commensurate degree repressed. Now the state as such is less permanent in

its nature than the church, but more so than any scheme of individual device: and thus again nationality, perpetuating as well as conspicuously exhibiting the body of a public religion, gives the aid of all the venerable associations which it commands, and affords another emphatic contradiction to the exorbitant pretensions of self-will.

42. While, then, the noblest form of religion, and the authenticated form of Christianity, is presented in the catholic church, whether it does or does not occupy the vantage-ground of legal establishment, it yet appears that the instrument next in point of efficacy for the propagation and perpetuation of religion, is that nationality which, among the uncertain conditions of our human state, embodies what has least of uncertainty. But there is another very specific cause which remains to be noticed as tending to preserve the purity of established religion. Establishment and endowment are distinct: but what is generally and extensively endowed will, for the most part, come sooner or later to be established; and what is established is by the very force of the term likewise endowed. And, further, endowment does but ill harmonise with the very nature of dissent, because it introduces something of independence into the religious institution itself, and liberates it at least in part from the dominion of those successive wills which are too apt to revel in its absolute control.

43. Now endowment, which is thus in its own nature akin to establishment, and alien to dissent, having a tendency to give to the minister of religion some degree of exemption from the arbitrary influence of his congre-

gation, has also a commensurate tendency to preserve the purity of doctrine. Plato deemed it scandalous and at variance with the laws of virtue, to teach for a fee. Saint Paul claimed that those who ministered in the Gospel should live by their ministry:* but the vital powers given to the Church enable her to admit many popular influences, which, if she dealt with mere abstractions of philosophy, and not with a living covenant of grace, she would be obliged jealously to exclude. And yet who does not see that the Apostle himself, in writing to his converts, that he had laboured for his own support, because he would not be chargeable unto any of them,† affords an express recognition of that truth for which we here contend, namely, that when the Christian flock are placed habitually in the position of paymasters, notions of pride and self-sufficiency will infallibly associate themselves with that function, and men will claim the right to determine upon the doctrine, for whose inculcation they are continually reminded that they supply the pecuniary means?

44. It seems hardly too much to assume, that, upon the whole, religious truth, of whatever amount, is safer in the hands of teachers than in those of the taught; in those of men who devote their minds specifically to the subject, and accept it in lieu of any worldly profession, than in those of the crowd, who have other objects upon which to bestow their chief energies, and who, for the most part, bestow upon this such a residue only of their

* 1 Cor. ix. 14. † 1 Thess. ii. 9; 2 Thess. iii. 8.

attention, as fails to be absorbed by the material wants and interests of life. Not that in the hands of either it is absolutely secure; nor that it can anywhere be pure, except under the safeguards which God has appointed. But such elements or fractional parts of truth as are embodied in any system of religion, will, upon the whole, be better preserved by those most devoted to that system, than by the mass of its nominal adherents. Doubtless the watchmen require to be watched, and a compound action, of the teachers and the people reciprocally, affords a better guarantee than that of each taken singly would supply: still it remains true, that the voluntary method tends to give a preponderating influence, in determining the doctrine which shall be taught, to the less qualified class; and the method of endowment, and therefore of establishment, which is so much akin to it, verges in the opposite direction.

45. The whole Roman history may be appealed to in proof of the augmented influence which nationality gives to the forms of religion, considered independently of their substantive truth or falsehood. The doctrine of unity of establishment will not apply, in a case where there was no exterior body constructed by Divine command for the conservation and exhibition of truth. But in the midst of the strangest anomalies, we find from indisputable and indeed universal testimony, these facts: firstly, that in Rome, more than in any other ancient polity, the will and the energies of the individual were subordinated throughout all ranks to the state. The oligarchical privileges held by the patricians sufficiently

account for their patriotism; but the conduct of the Roman people, their moderation, disinterestedness, and self-devotion, cannot be similarly explained. Never, probably, was human nature, on a large scale, without the aid of revelation, carried so much out of itself, as by that prevading principle of patriotic honour, which filled the ranks of the Roman armies for centuries together with men who had little of their own to defend, and little to sacrifice but life, which to them was much, and which they spent freely in the field of battle. Now combine with this the second equally unquestionable fact that in Rome, as we learn from the unsuspected authority of Polybius,* the stamp of public religion was impressed not only upon all the institutions of the state, but upon all the actions of life; and as we find the influence of things unseen (in however corrupted forms), simultaneously at a *maximum* in the individual and in the state, we cannot but infer a natural harmony, and a reciprocal causation, between these two parallel manifestations, and by how much the more it may be shown that the religion was impure, and that the influence exercised was not that of truth, by so much the argument for nationality is corroborated, because the results produced must in the same proportion be set down to its credit.

46. Thus much upon the broad and general question. When we regard more specifically the case of England, where the church claims catholicity, and realises accordingly the hereditary principle even more perfectly

* VI. 54.

than the state, it may seem incongruous to ascribe to her legal incorporation those beautiful characteristics in her offices of religion which belong more properly to her divinely-written charter. And the more so, because the particular conditions of our nationality have never yet been carefully and permanently adjusted. We speak not of the difficult questions which arise in mixed matter between the church and the state, but there can surely be no doubt in the mind of any man who has reflected with care and candour on the question, that the powers most naturally and absolutely inherent in the ecclesiastical body are heavily and unduly fettered by acts or through omissions of the state. The discipline of this church appears to require more than executive diligence and wisdom can supply: an efficient reorganisation, and a development of principles which in the long continuance of lax and vicious practice have almost escaped from our view. Legal recognition, however, neither, according to its idea, ought to be, nor in practice always has been, adverse to efficiency and vigour in the internal government of the church: who, then, will deny, that these great objects are yet attainable, and that we may live to see great accessions of strength derived from actual experience to the argument of these pages, that the nationality of religion is favourable alike to its quality and its general extension?

47. Those who dwell most fondly upon the spiritual prerogatives of the church considered, as she is, catholic, will, nevertheless, do well to remember, that the promise of perpetuation, which is absolute to the body at

large, is, to the members in particular, conditional and contingent. It is, therefore, not too much to say, that the nationality may materially contribute to the permanency, and thus to the authority of this branch of the church. Supposing her unjustly robbed of her secular patrimony, it might be that danger would accrue to her from pecuniary dependence; the necessity of eleemosynary support might preclude her from occupying a position of sufficient dignity and authority towards her own members. Except possibly in such a case as that of Romanism, which too often proves itself to be founded on the dogma of sheer spiritual slavery, we scarcely believe that it would, at least in these times, be possible to exclude undue influence sustained by the power of the purse; the church might then, whether by a slower or more rapid, a direct or indirect process, be starved into heterodoxy.

48. It has thus been attempted to take a view of the question of connection between church and state, which, though very incomplete, inasmuch as it looks to consequences alone, and further, only to a part of the consequences belonging to that union, is nevertheless full of interest, because it touches vital considerations, which are decisive, if determined against us, of the whole matter at issue. For if religion be injured by the national establishment of the church, it must forthwith and at whatever hazard be disestablished. But if not, we need be little moved by the taunts of those who reproach us with a "law church." It is a law church: we rejoice in the fact: but how? Just as by the sove-

reign's proclamation against vice, the morals of the nation are crown morals. The law in one case, the crown in the other, adopts and attests the truths of God, and does them homage.

49. For we have found the supposition, that religion is secularised by contact with the state, to be fallacious. We have found, that the most devoted piety enjoys in the church a climate not less genial than elsewhere; we might, perhaps say, more so: that in respect of liberal views of smaller peculiarities, and of discouragement to individual egotism, a national church has, as such, especial advantages for elevating and purifying personal religion: that she as a great and appropriate work, particularly in exercising a partial dominion over the indifferent and even the ungodly, bringing to bear upon them, in favour of the gospel, and their own happiness, a great force of human and secondary motives; and that, from the comparative independence of her position, she is also peculiarly adapted for the permanent conservation of divine truth. If these things be so, we must get rid of that superficial impression, unfavourable to the nationality of the church, which arises upon the first view of the very mixed character of her component parts, and must remember that, in containing together the good and the bad, she is fulfilling, for the time of her dispensation, the clear intentions of that Lord whose coming she awaits with joy.

CHAPTER IV.

SKETCH OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL SUPREMACY OF THE SOVEREIGN IN ENGLAND.

1, 2. Objection, that the church is enslaved by the supremacy; and notions respecting it. 3, 4. Necessary law of adjustment for the powers of distinct bodies having connection together. 5—9. The authority in its general character negative, and does not destroy the independence of the church. 10—12. The power, the right, the law. 13. Appointment of bishops. 14. Attempt to classify. 15. Want of precision in our theories. 16. Case of the Scottish establishment.

1. ALTHOUGH it would be deviating widely from the purpose of these pages to discuss systematically, or in detail, the terms of compact between the church and the state, it may be allowable to say a few words, by way of meeting another objection sometimes taken *in limine*, that the regal headship in the Anglican church is essentially such as to render her the slave of the state, and to deprive her of all pretensions to a distinct character as a spiritual institution; and this is the more necessary, because Bishop Warburton * speaks, in large terms, of the church as surrendering its supremacy, and becoming dependent on the civil power, as a natural consequence of the alliance. A question might be raised upon the very term of headship, but this we set aside; nor need we dwell on the facts, that the title of head was given

* Alliance, book ii. chap. 3.

before the foreign or papal jurisdiction was renounced, and that a different appellation was adopted under queen Elizabeth; or inquire whether the powers of the sovereign in this country have been essentially altered by the Reformation; or whether they are greater than those now exercised by many princes in communion with the Roman church.* It is only attempted here to show, that the general idea of the ecclesiastical supremacy of the sovereign does not involve what is unlawful or unreasonable.

2. Some, it may be feared, conceive of this supremacy as absolute, and deem the head of the state to be the fountain of all authority to bear office in the church, as he is in the state; not distinguishing those powers and attributes which appertain to the bishops and clergy in their distinct capacities as church ministers and state officers respectively. Others again, like Mr. Leslie, in his able argument on "the regale and the pontificate," conceive that the supremacy of the monarch is purely civil, and such as he might hold with the same propriety not being a Christian; a theory nearer, perhaps, than the preceding one to the truth, which, nevertheless, appears to occupy an intermediate position between the two.

3. When two independent bodies enter into reciprocal relations, which are neither such as to fuse into one their

* See for example the curious work of Count dal Pozzo on the Austrian Ecclesiastical Law, pp. 22, 23, 55, 81, 101. (Murray, 1827.) And I must direct the particular attention of the reader, upon this important point, to Mr. Palmer's work on the Church, Part I., Ch. X., Objection XIII.

distinct personalities, nor are, on the other hand, capable of being determined prospectively by written stipulations, with no other additional provision or reservation than the alternative of a total rupture, it becomes a matter of equal delicacy and importance to constitute a power, which may be found generally competent to regulate their joint action according to circumstances as they shall arise, without either being absolutely tied to the limited sphere which a written contract could define; or, on the other hand, hazarding a resort to the extreme measure of dissolving the alliance. That power must be one, and must be paramount. But although paramount, and although mainly deriving its character from one of the two bodies, it does not destroy the independence of the other, because there always remains the remedy of putting an end to the connexion, and the usefulness of the power is founded on the assumption that they will be generally in such a degree of harmony, that though there must be one fountain of authority for administrative purposes arising out of the connection, yet it will pretty much express and represent the tendencies of both.

4. Now those powers which belong to the church as a religious society may, of course, be competently administered by her spiritual governors, and the analogous proposition holds good with regard to the state; but when the alliance has been formed, the church has become an estate of the realm, having certain relations with the other estates, closely united and interwoven with them, and entailing a necessity, for the well-being of the whole, of some uniformity of operation between them. Now it is for the government of these relations from time to time

that an authority is required neither purely ecclesiastical nor purely civil, inasmuch as the relations themselves are of a compound character. To take an example: if a bishop reject a candidate for a living upon ecclesiastical grounds, he cannot lawfully be corrected by the state; but if he do it upon arbitrary grounds, or grounds not ecclesiastical, he may; because the accession to the living is not to a spiritual function alone, but to certain civil emoluments along with it. Since then civil and ecclesiastical consequences are thus mixed up, and both flow from acts properly ecclesiastical, there arises a necessity for this mixed authority, which, having as much sympathy as possible with both bodies, and representing both, shall be more akin to this kind of jurisdiction than either of them, taken singly, would afford; accordingly the head of the state, under the condition that he shall be also a member of the church, is invested with it. He exercises an appellate jurisdiction; he judges not the cause, but the judgment; assuming the grounds which are supplied by ecclesiastical law, and inquiring whether its principles have been fairly applied to the particular subject matter.

5. But the authority of the sovereign in regard to church laws is chiefly negative. The general principle should be, that neither body may do what substantially affects its relations with the other except by consent of that other. It is indeed true that such a principle is not at this moment in free operation among ourselves. We have not, however, here to show what is the agency of the church, nor what is the agency of the state in respect to her, but what is the legitimate recognised

function of the sovereign as her head, and that it does not impair the essential conditions of her constitution.

6. Now this function in respect to church laws is negative. The sovereign claims under our constitution a *veto* on church canons, and his permission is required for the meeting of convocation, but he does not claim the right of making by his sole authority the laws of the church. Indeed a question may, we believe, be raised whether it is or is not competent to the church of England to meet in *synod* even without the royal authority, especially when we consider that this right undoubtedly exists in Ireland. The whole of this subject is most important, and requires to be fully considered. It is enough here to observe that if anything has been done of late years in the way either of anomaly or of usurpation, it has been done by the collective legislature in its capacity of political omnipotence, making use of the occasion while the church organs are in abeyance, but it does not bind or commit the church, which is not a consenting party, and which is only bound to show that in the regal headship, as acknowledged by her, which claims a negative upon all church acts and upon all sentences in mixed matter, there is nothing unscriptural or unecclesiastical.

7. For, in point of fact, it is the indispensable condition of any such alliance, that the church should consent to enter into joint action with the state. To this action there is required the concurrence of two wills; and the concurrence of the will of the state was thought to be most naturally expressed through the sovereign's ecclesiastical supremacy. But the church is still independ-

ent, because it retains its right to separate; it is independent without exercising the right of separate action; independent as two watches are independent, while indicating the same hour, and going at the same rate; or as two men are independent, who become companions on a journey, reserving their right to part when the roads which they have to follow shall diverge.

8. It is impossible, in point of fact, that any other basis could be adopted than one which gives the state a *veto* on changes in the church. The church allies herself with the state in consideration of advantages accorded to her, which are accorded in respect of her peculiar constitution as a church, and which would cease to be due if she violated that constitution; therefore the state must have the means of observing all her movements, judging what change is violation, and interposing the *veto*, which means simply, "If you do so, you must no longer enjoy civil advantages." But the converse argument does not hold as arising from the alliance, that the church should have a *veto* on projected alterations in the state, because that which she renders to the state, the teaching of obedience, and the promotion of piety and virtue, she owes to it simply as the appointed government of the country, whatever changes its constitution may undergo.

9. The alliance, then, is one *durante bene placito* of *both* the contracting parties. And if the conscience of the church of England should, by its constituted rulers, require any law, or any meeting to make laws, as essential to its well-being, and such law, or the license of such meeting, should be permanently refused, it would then be her duty to resign her civil privileges,

and act in her free spiritual capacity; a contingency as improbable, we trust, as it would be deplorable, but one which, opening this extreme remedy, testifies to the real, though dormant and reserved, independence of the church. It must be added, that, although an extreme, it is not a visionary or an impracticable resort, which is here supposed, but one which has been actually realised in our history. Twice partially, (in citing the fact it is quite unnecessary to determine the merits,) in the cases, namely, of Mary, (when, according to Bishop Burnet, three thousand clergy were expelled,) and of the nonjuring bishops: once generally, when eight thousand were ejected under the Long Parliament and Cromwell.

10. It is very necessary, however, to the clear understanding of this subject, that we should continually bear in mind a distinction of the power, the right, and the law, as severally affecting it. As respects the *power*, the civil legislature is, by the first condition of all naturally constituted polities, taken to be omnipotent; but as, if it enacted that individuals should sacrifice to idols, they would probably disobey, so the church would be able to refuse compliance if an infraction of her divinely established constitution should be attempted.

11. As respects the *right*, we may or may not think that the church is hardly used, and requires a more free and effective organisation; but before determining that by not insisting specifically on its being conceded to her, she has forfeited her spiritual character, we should inquire, first, whether anything essential to her constitution has been or is to be violated; and, secondly, whether

she has surrendered the right to pass into her state of separate freedom. For example, it is a part of our ecclesiastical law, that if any archbishop or bishop shall refuse, after due notice given, to confirm and consecrate a bishop elect, within a limited time, they and their abettors shall incur a præmunire.* But the proctor of the dean and chapter must certify the election, in order to the confirmation, and in this point among others, "that the person elected is sufficiently qualified by age, knowledge, learning, orders, sobriety, condition, fidelity to the king, and piety."† Of course the governors of the church would be bound to incur the civil penalty, rather than confirm or consecrate, should a person ecclesiastically incompetent be presented to them. And the questions which alone we are here required to consider are, not whether the law be consistent in theory with ecclesiastical freedom, but whether in practice that freedom has been essentially invaded; and if not, then also whether, in the event of its being so invaded, there be not a remedy provided for a contingency so deplorable.

12. As respects the actual *law* of the case regarding the royal headship, we may gather its general principle sufficiently from the doctrine of Blackstone,‡ who sums up the duties of the monarch to his people thus: "To govern according to law; to execute judgment in mercy; and to *maintain* the established religion." And from the coronation oath; in which the promise is, "to *maintain* the laws of God, the true profession of the gospel, and the Protestant reformed religion established by the law:" and to "*preserve* unto the bishops and

* Burn, I, 210. † Burn, I, 206. ‡ Book I. chap. 6.

clergy of this realm, and to the churches committed to their charge, all such rights and privileges as by law do or shall appertain unto them, or any of them:" terms which imply a power somewhere to change the ecclesiastical laws, but which describe the royal duty as generally a duty to maintain, to preserve, not to modify or innovate.

13. As respects the appointment of bishops, it is unnecessary to enter into any detailed consideration of this prerogative. It is analogous to ordinary lay patronage in the lower order of the priesthood. It was long and indisputably in the hands of sovereigns, at a period many centuries before the reformation. But the crown does not make a bishop; it can merely propose him to be made; and the amount of concession made by the church is, consent to a law that no bishop shall be made during the alliance, except such as shall have been designated for that function by the sovereign. Even where the canonical election of the bishop is not interposed, still it is the consecration, not the appointment, from which, and which alone, he derives his episcopal character.

14. The duty, then, of the sovereign towards the church, in virtue of the ecclesiastical supremacy, seems to consist mainly of the *executive* duty of defending it under the existing laws; the *judicial* duty of determining all questions which arise, in mixed subject matter, out of the relations between the church and state; and the *negative* duty of permitting the church to enter, from time to time, upon the consideration of matters of her own internal government, to be subsequently proposed to the great council of the nation, that its members may

have the opportunity of judging how they affect the compact, and that the church may know, by their assent, that it continues unimpaired: and if, in reference to the anomalies of modern legislation, this shall appear to be theory, let a fair consideration of our whole history declare whether it does not express the ancient practice and the general spirit of the constitution better than precedents drawn from periods of indifference or oppression, or both.*

15. At the same time we would observe, that the government of England has ever been distinguished in civil matters less by accuracy of adhesion to any dogmatic and determinate theory, than by the skilful use of natural influences, and a general healthiness of tone and harmony of operation, resulting from a happy and providential fusion of elements, rather than from deliberately entertained intention. If this has been the case in civil matters; if our constitution, as viewed by the crude speculatist, consist of a mass of anomalies, threatening perpetual contradiction and collision; if it has wrought rather by provision for the avoidance of such issues, than for their subsequent remedy; so also it has been with the church, whose relations with the state had for very many years proceeded rather upon a mutually friendly understanding, than upon precise definitions of rights; and therefore we cannot expect to exhibit a theory which will bear throughout a critical analysis in this more than in any other department of our national government.

* Mr. Palmer (on the Church, Part V. ch. 6) gives an enumeration of the powers belonging to the ecclesiastical supremacy.

16. The Scottish establishment, we may remark by the way, claiming that divine authority which we deduce through the apostolical commission, has been extremely jealous of admitting the term or the idea of regal headship. In the "Second Book of Discipline," it is stated that "it is a title falsely usurped by antichrist, to call himself the head of the church." Of the three divisions of duty belonging to the ecclesiastical supremacy, which we have above described, the first, that of maintaining the church, is allowed, though not perhaps with consistency. The second is likely to be speedily brought to issue, under peculiar and interesting circumstances, in the probable sequel of what is termed the Auchterarder case; but the General Assembly of the Kirk, in its vote of the 23rd May, 1838, recognised "the exclusive jurisdiction of the civil courts, in regard to the civil rights and emoluments secured by law to the church." The third is placed in a peculiar position. Both the state and the church claim in Scotland the right to summon the General Assembly, and to authorise its proceeding to business. The king's commissioner declares, before the dissolution of any General Assembly, when and where the next shall be holden. The Moderator repeats it, but as of the Assembly's authority. The law of 1567, however, authorises the Assembly to appoint, in case neither the king nor his commissioner be present.

CHAPTER V.

THE REFORMATION, AS CONNECTED WITH THE USE AND ABUSE OF PRIVATE JUDGMENT.

Sequere viam Catholicæ disciplinæ, quæ ab ipso Christo per Apostolos ad nos usque manavit, et abhinc ad posteros manatura est.
S. Aug. de Utilitate Credendi, c. viii.

1. Sketch of the subjects of V. and VI. 2. We must go far back. 3. The use and abuse of private judgment stated. 4—24. How treated before the reformation. 25—31. Views of Luther, to be distinguished from the consequences of the events connected with the foreign reformation. 32—37. Prevailing abuse. 38—40. Case of the English reformation. 41—57. Anglican doctrine of private judgment stated and defended. 58—60. The free diffusion of the Scriptures does not contradict it. 61—67. The foregoing view historically illustrated.

1. THE influences which at the present time are either actually operating or, so far as appears, about to operate, in an unfavourable manner, upon the principle of union between the constituted religious and political societies of this country, are connected with the doctrine of private judgment, as the doctrine of private judgment, again, is connected with the events of the reformation. In order, therefore, to the elucidation of our subject, we must state *how private judgment, which is an ecclesiastical principle, stands related to the re-*

formation generally, as a reaction from previous abuse of an opposite kind; and to the English church in particular; respecting which we are desirous to show, that it was not chargeable, as has sometimes been urged against us, with any inconsistency, in reforming itself against the judgment of the existing Roman communion, and yet claiming to maintain an authority quite distinct from private opinion, and an union with the state. And besides this retrospective relation of private judgment to the reformation, we must examine* *its bearings prospectively on the other hand, upon the connection of church and state: first, under the form of the political doctrine of toleration: secondly, as independent of that doctrine and beyond it.*

2. To comprehend fully the strength of the doctrine of private judgment, we must measure the whole space which lies between its state before the reformation, when its infant struggles here and there were hardly perceptible upon the face of human society, and its position at this moment, when it threatens to disorganise kingdoms, to throw back the church into its condition before the time of Constantine, and to desecrate and degrade the whole function of political government. At first resisted and overborne by a gigantic power unscrupulously and tyrannously used, it gathered strength and elasticity in silence, and waited the season, not of release alone, but of revenge. In the time of Luther it threw off the yoke by a mighty effort. It spoke for a while in gentle phrase, and did not at once claim to be emancipated from truth as well as error, from God as well as man:

* Vide Chap. VI.

but it has now fearfully developed its individualising tendencies, and they operate with an intensity and continuity which we must explain by reference to the length of that course of centuries through which it was held in sullen thraldom.

3. But the so-called "right of private judgment" has two very opposite senses, in one of which it is a right, in the other a monstrous abuse. It is a right, on the part, whether of nations or of individuals, as against human coercion, and it is also, of course, a duty, of learning and apprehending *the truth*. It is a monstrous abuse, when it is understood to imply that the conscience of the individual is acquitted, so soon as he has assented to some doctrinal system chosen at his pleasure, as coming from Scripture and constituting religion: when it is supposed to absolve him from the duty of being of one body and one spirit with the catholic church of Christ. In the first sense we believe it will appear that religious liberty was the legitimate principle of the English reformation as regarded the nation, and its result as regarded individuals. In the second and abusive sense, that it sprang from the abusive proceedings in some other countries, less of the reformers than their successors, and less of their successors than their opponents, which broke the chain of the ministry in the church, and thus destroyed the doctrine of its visibility and continuity, and its consequent competency to bear a witness for the sense of the sacred word, superior in moral credibility to the unsupported deductions of individuals.

4. In the centuries preceding the reformation, it may be almost said, there was no formal theory on the subject

of private judgment, nor for some time after it; yet there has always been a certain relation between the *individuality* of man and his position and functions as a member of the church, in which relation the subject of private judgment is essentially involved. To this then let us apply our attention.

5. If we contemplate the operation of the Roman Catholic system upon its members, whether in the present or in an earlier day, but, as might be expected, more especially in those times when her sway was almost unbounded and her fears not yet awakened, we shall perhaps find that the aim of her distinctive doctrines and practices cannot in few words be described with more fairness, than if we say that it was to limit the free agency of the mass of her individual members, and almost to bar all active exercise of their mental faculties upon religion. These terms, indeed, at least the idea of absorption, as applied to the liberty of the human mind in a large mass of men, must be understood in a qualified sense: because it is scarcely possible that such a process should take strict and full effect except under peculiar circumstances of rare occurrence, from its utter contrariety to the first laws of our being. But, so far as human nature would admit, in a matter involving not only the highest interests, but of right also the most powerful and durable emotions that belong to it, the tendency and the aim of Romish institutions was to nullify the principle of free agency in man as respected his direct relations towards God.

6. If we regard separately each of her peculiar insti-

tutions we shall find not one which is not capable of reference to this general and pervading idea. Let us then (for the sake of convenient division) endeavour to ascertain by what means and with what effect she strove to supersede individual action in the several departments of the rule of faith, the regulation of discipline, and the private practice of life. Now the rule of faith, however its subject-matter might, according to Roman doctrine, be variously developed, was avowedly and invariably immutable; matter of discipline, on the contrary, was, by common confession, subject to change; matter of practice, must often fall under the cognisance of the individual alone, and yet in all alike, though under conditions so different, the Romish religion came nearer than might antecedently have been supposed possible, to the accomplishment of the wonderful purpose of imposing entire silence and inaction upon the faculties of the private person, otherwise than as simple recipients of the dicta of the church.

7. In one sense, indeed, there is a power of judgment left to every living creature by the first necessities of its constitution. The animal employed in draught must interpret the voice of its driver, and must to this extent enjoy an actual though not a licensed freedom; that is, there is a penalty accruing upon misapprehension, but there is no power brought to bear upon the faculties which will certainly enable them to avoid it. Under all circumstances, therefore, it was for the individual Romanist to supply the last link in the chain which attached his practical conscience to the sovereign autho-

rity of the church. It was not in the nature of will to be forced, or of moral conviction to be stamped upon the mind by a power purely extrinsic, and without consent from within, as on inert matter. But thus much the church did; she enabled, she encouraged, nay she commanded, and doubtless had it been other than an impossibility, she would have compelled each person to set aside his own free agency, except as regarded that last and formal transmission of her injunctions in which the mental faculties were no more than passive; and where the command was not obeyed, a temporal infliction followed.

8. First as to the rule of faith. Not only was she infallible, for this singly would not have been enough. It is evidently possible that there might be on earth a man or an incorporation possessed of certain truth, and yet not having the means of irresistibly communicating it; that is, of conveying it home with demonstrative evidence of its infallibility accompanying it. And thus we, who believe in the perpetuity of a church holding vitally to its head, may also believe that this institution, preserved by a Divine power in its spiritual life, has not necessarily a reflected consciousness co-extensive with that life, and has not therefore the means of defining exactly and infallibly the amount of fundamental and certain truth, *quoad* which we believe her to be free from error. But it was not thus with the theory of Romanism. Not only was the church infallible, but she possessed, commensurate with the infallibility itself, a power of declaring it to her members with conclusive

evidence. She was unerring, not only in vital matter of doctrine, but in all matter of doctrine—perceptibly and legibly infallible; so that the private man, born or brought within her communion, had no work of inquiry reserved for his own mind; he was not to try or prove any particular allegation: in short, there was no mental act upon matters of faith, but simply a reception; unless, indeed, that definite and palpable one of general submission to whatever the church should enjoin.

9. Thus the agency of the man as regarded the investigation and reception of his faith, the range for an operation of his will, the possibility of exercising a choice, were reduced avowedly to a single opportunity; and, while upon that issue of obedience to the church he might undoubtedly in theory be said to discharge the function of assent as a free agent, we must not omit to observe the particular manner in which the alternatives were made to present themselves to him. Upon the one hand he was promised absolute assurance from the mouth of the church, against which he would have nothing to set, upon looking to the resources of his own mind, except the abstract love of truth, or self-will (as the case might be) veiling itself under that sacred form, and these damped and cowed by the want of all facilities for inquiry as well as by the sense of mental deficiency. Upon the other alternative, that of dissent, was suspended not merely the loss of the promised security, but a more affirmatively deterring spectacle in the shape of the severest penal inflictions. When the hopes and fears of these rewards and punishments respectively

co-operated with natural indolence and the reluctance of the carnal heart to entertain the conscientious and laborious consideration of spiritual things, can we wonder that the ordinary result was a voluntary and tacit surrender of free mental action in matters of religion: of that free mental action which is indeed our highest privilege, but which also entails our heaviest responsibility? There was in the common opinion of those times a culpable deadness to the privilege, with a serious and a pious sense of the responsibility, as there is with us on the other hand a conceit in the privilege which absorbs all sense of the burden.

10. A question might be raised how far the idle acquiescence, with which most men would, under such circumstances, be content, was entitled to be called belief. We perceive, among ourselves, how little of private judgment is really brought into practical exercise; at least, how little of the mental investigation upon which alone any result worthy of being termed a judgment can be founded. The labour of performance is declined, while the right to undergo that labour is jealously and extravagantly asserted—asserted, under the notion of its being a valuable possession tending to self-respect, and in utter forgetfulness of the accompanying toil. But when that toil was actually, and on principle, discouraged, when the command of the apostle to Christians in general, "prove all things," was reversed, would not religious truth be, as it were, swallowed, without being tasted, received in sound, without reference to the sense; in quantity, without reference to

quality? For there was no recognition of any intrinsic difference in sense or in quality; and, therefore, to the mass of men, who always seek the shortest way of bringing their religious concerns to what seems in their eyes a settlement, the operation would become purely mechanical; and a service sadly degraded indeed, when considered as the offering of a spiritual creature, redeemed by Christ, to his Father in heaven. Not, indeed, that doubts and misgivings, or even questionings in any form, are the essential antecedents of a sound and worthy faith; not that intellectual investigation is the only way to that great acquisition: but that, as the religion of the Redeemer is destined to occupy the whole man, so it ought to be actively grasped by the understanding, as well as implicitly received into the affections and the will.

11. To those minds which felt a vital interest in the matter, which fixedly contemplated what they received as being truth, for the truth's sake, there might indeed, providentially be a spiritual benefit arising out of the very act of their submission contrary to their individual bias. The sacrifice of their prepossessions, or of their impressions, even of their reasonable impressions, hostile to the fictions of the church of Rome, might, in God's appointment, be made a fruitful part of their earthly discipline; but this is good wrought by Divine Wisdom out of evil, tending in no way to the justification of that evil; and it is, besides, obviously applicable only to a small class of persons, forming, as compared with mankind in general, the exception, and not the

rule. With the mass, as has been said before, when the exercise of the mental powers in the "proof" of the doctrines of religion was not only not inculcated as a duty, but denounced or treated as an offence, that which was termed belief could be little more than a mechanical reception.

12. Next as regarded matter of discipline. In this department, as immutability was not professed, it might be hastily conjectured that more scope was given to the free judgment of individuals; but it was not so. It did not follow, because the church might change in matter of discipline, that she could err in it. The very perfection of her agency, the very proof of her infallibility, might lie in the successive adaptation of her discipline to the changing circumstances of successive periods. But in truth, as discipline is for the most part secondary in its nature, yet necessary wherever men are combined for collective purposes, since there must be unity of rule in order to render co-operation possible and effective, and as in general neither the negative nor the affirmative upon a matter of discipline involve (antecedently to the sentence of competent authority) religious principle or duty, we may be of opinion that private judgment has naturally little place in this department, and that there is little to surrender, because there is little to exact. Yet here the church of Rome advanced the most extravagant pretensions, and enforced the most exorbitant demands. It was a law of discipline that took the cup from the laity; an act of robbery, in which we see the wantonness of spiritual des-

potism in its extremest stage, exercising oppressive power, as it would appear, simply for its own sake.

13. But how were the particular doctrines of the Romish church calculated to influence private tempers and conduct in a manner relevant to our present inquiry? For at first sight it would seem that, granting the duty of absolute acquiescence in discipline for the uniformity and harmony of the body of the church; granting the propriety of mere recipiency in doctrine, in deference to her high spiritual privilege of dispensing from God His truth in certainty and perfection: yet still, in that largest portion of the religious life of the individual which is naturally and necessarily private, and in the general application of the system of rules delivered into his hands to his daily practice, there must be left abundant room for the exercise of faith, diligence, discrimination, and all the active qualities of the mind; and, therefore, an ample field provided for the free development of character. For here, a glance inwards will surely remind us, that a great portion of moral facts, and those the most material, because they are the class connected with the formation and elucidation of motives, are known in the first instance to the individual alone. Perhaps we may go further and say, there is much in the varied workings of the mind of each, which must be known to him of all men exclusively. Many of its tints and colours, many of its initial and intercepted movements, many of its combinations of feeling and motive defying verbal exposition, yet not altogether inaccessible to reflective analysis: much, in short, of what most essentially con-

stitutes our life in the sight of God, can never be otherwise than very imperfectly explained through the medium of outward signs, and must therefore remain for the most part between Him and ourselves.

14. Yet it is here that the peculiar genius of Romanism is most wonderful and conspicuous. Everywhere it seems to interpose itself between the man and his God, a dimly transparent medium, allowing only a measured and limited quantity of His light to pierce through the curtain which it spreads. And now let us review in series those distinctive tenets which it professed, and see whether they do not tend towards this object as their common point of union; namely, the drawing out from the mind of the individual those processes which concern his salvation, and making him extrinsically dependent on something above himself, yet below God, by removing the control of them from his own command. We would, however, state, once for all, we must be content to look at Romanism in the form which it naturally takes among masses of men, and not merely in the logical definitions of its theology.

15. First, then: to this would tend the crowd of mediators, wrongfully interposed between man and the one Mediator. The view of Christ as a mediator does not tend to suppress the activity of inward religion, because our final salvation depends upon union with Him, union with Him upon assimilation to Him, assimilation to Him upon the reality and effect of our daily discipline on earth. But mediators who are men or angels only, and with whom we have no special relations, do but come in as substitutes, falsely proclaimed to do for us

what we are bound to do for ourselves, when their intercession comes to be contemplated, which practically it too often does, as our proper channel of access to our Lord. This is widely different from contemplating them as examples, which does really and legitimately tend to quicken our spiritual discipline. And the mediation of which we speak means much more than intercession such as man may practise: only partially avowed, perhaps, in the theory of the Romish church, but even now too generally legible in her practice.

16. Towards the same end would operate the doctrine of purgatory: adjourning till after death that work of purification through suffering, which, along with the work of probation through love, enjoyment, hope, fear, and other affections and emotions, God has appointed to be done before death.

> "Quæ quis apud superos, furto lætatus inani,
> Distulit in seram commissa piacula mortem." *

A reflective man may indeed feel so deeply his own actual sinfulness, that he may long for a more extended period than earth affords, as seeming absolutely necessary for its eradication. But such is not the common view; and the idea of purgatory in fact removes from practical contemplation much of the real purpose of our earthly being, and leads in the same proportion to carelessness about the inward discipline of religion, so large a portion of whose office it has transplanted into a distant region.

17. In the doctrine of relics, again, we trace a similar

* Virgil, Æn. vi. 568.

tendency. In them the Romish church lodges a virtue, the practical effect of which is, we do not say to extinguish, but to limit, free mental action in religion, because it substitutes that which is external for that which is inward;—not in theory—for, doubtless, faith ought to be exercised upon the relic; but in practice, because it is too manifest, that the multiplication of these instrumental *media* in religion gives a facility to the corrupt inclination of man, enabling him to imagine that a mere outward act on his part, joined to the intrinsic virtue on theirs, is sufficient. Doubtless, there are Christian ordinances of intrinsic virtue, and most necessary are they to repress the opposite danger from an unbalanced and unawed mental action on the part of man; but the commanded acts of pure worship supply a constant exhortation to men to pray with all their hearts, and all the strength of their best faculties, and these exercises, it is the effect of Romanism, as it operates on the mass, to impair by the crowd of fictitious helps which it professes systematically to afford.

18. Now let us look to pilgrimages: to the preference of a saint or image at one place over the same saint under his or her image at another; to the public advertisement of accounts of purgatorial remission for specified external acts; to the very prayers which we find in their churches, headed with the promise that such and such religious advantages shall be given to all who devoutly recite them; to the (I think) ten spiritual, with some other number of temporal, benefits which may be found posted in some churches at Rome, as

resulting from the use of holy water. Do not one and all of these suggest these observations: that they *tend* to the substitution of outward and formal, for inward and spiritual, acts; and that this so immediate juxtaposition of acts and their rewards is going out of the line and the analogy of God's dispensations, and is rendering our discipline less moral and more mechanical, shortening the arm and the reach of faith, and substituting for it those immediate expectations which belong to sense, and in which even the inferior animals largely participate?

19. But the grand exemplification of the influence of Romanism upon individual agency in religion is to be perceived in a combined view of the doctrines of supererogatory works — indulgences — auricular confession —penance—and absolution. The branches are to bear fruit unto the vine: but the first of these doctrines supplies us with an excuse for fruitlessness, if the love of other men to Christ has already so far exceeded measure, that it is ready to supply our short-comings— what a temptation to creatures, whose besetting danger is not excess of zeal! Then of indulgences: they are, it is said, remissions of temporal penalties due to sin. Now, we know of no temporal penalty which is not also corrective, and employed for discipline: indulgences are, then, a remission or abrogation of our discipline, of the lessons by which we are to be educated for heaven; and thus they are just taking so much from the range of our spiritual life on earth.

20. And how do the remaining doctrines, as they are blended in the church of Rome, bear upon that pri-

mary and most essential exercise of all, that continual pardon which the soul requires, in order to render any acceptable service? The tide of sin flows back upon us the moment it has been repelled: and to be delivered from its flood—to be washed from day to day—to have our justification renewed and restored in the perpetual cleansing of the blood of our Lord—this is the very pre-condition of all acceptable and Christian service. Here the Roman arts have infused a poison. St. Augustine calls the Lord's prayer *quotidiana purgatio nostra,* showing how he regarded this striving and supplication for pardon as a work incessantly required, and depending on the exercise of the soul in confession and prayer before God. But what routine are men permitted, in the Roman discipline, to substitute? I do not say that she teaches so, but that so the mass of human nature will be found to use it. They will make confession at distant intervals to a priest, discharge the acts of penance which he enjoins, and receive his absolution; and a sacramental character has been given to these acts; acts, none of them blameworthy, but the reverse; acts, however, taken out of their place by the Roman doctrine. They are taken to be sacramental: but our daily prayers are not sacramental, nor taken to be so. Does it not follow, that our attention and desire will be concentrated on the former? that the mass of men, ever anxious to discharge religious duties at a minimum of trouble, will be detached in no small degree from the unseen and wholly inward and continual acts of prayer, not always bringing any palpable reward, and will substitute for them the confession, which recurs

but at rare intervals, and the penance and absolution, which deepen spiritual torpor, by an assurance of pardon from without?

21. It is to be feared that the profoundest and most solemn exercises of the soul thus became matter of arithmetical calculation; were merely weighed against the external penance which would commute them, and ceased to be regarded in the awful character of sin: that the spiritual relations of men towards God were viewed as a debtor and creditor account, on which men might run up a score, in the intention of paying it off by penance. Not that this was the deliberate view of the Roman church; but we cannot look even to her formal doctrines on the subject, without seeing that she grievously tampered with singleness and sincerity of motive, and left room for reservations where they ought, of all things, to be avoided. It is of the effect of such doctrines on the mass of men that we speak; and we cannot but see in it the substitution of sensual, formal, mechanical relations between God and man, for those inward works of confession and prayer, self-inspection and self-government, which are appointed to be our habitual exercise, and the means of ensuring an earnestness and activity of the faculties of the mind in the matter of religion, and to which external confession appears in the main to be properly subsidiary.

22. It has not here been attempted to enumerate the whole of the Romish peculiarities, but such only as have a specific bearing on the subject of these pages. For example, nothing has been said of the distinction of mortal and venial sin, as taught by Romanists; nor of

the doctrines of probability and reservation, which have however a real connection with the foregoing argument; nor, for a different reason, of the *sale* of indulgences, which would add immensely to its force. This last was the extravagance, almost the caricature of iniquity. It did not limit, but destroyed, where it prevailed, the spirituality, that is, the whole subjective reality, of religion. But we believe the general argument is sufficiently made out, without resort to this abuse, from the acknowledged system of Romanism itself, as tending to deaden that inward action which is the life and soul of religion.

23. There were two classes who cannot be included in the scope of these observations. One, that of the intellectual men, who found a sharpening discipline for all their mental powers, in harmonising the intricacies and the subtleties of the highly-artificial dogmatism, which prevailed so extensively in the Roman church. The other, that of the holy men, to whom confession would, indeed, be the most intense and solemn exercise; whose tender consciences would not be satisfied until they had exhausted every effort to rid themselves of the burden of their most secret sins. The holy men of Romanism have been great lights of Christianity. Penance with them would be a kind of thank-offering; a beseeching God, as it were, to accept their humble and feeble efforts at self-discipline; absolution, a comfort which they would receive with trembling; and pain and shame would co-operate with love to keep them stedfast in their allegiance.

24. But it is for the very reason that confession is a work so arduous and severe, nay, so impossible to be fully

discharged through words—for there must always remain the prayer to God to look at the *whole* heart with an eye far more searching than our own, and to detect and cure all its iniquity—it is for this very reason that it is also a work which ought not to be made to depend upon a mere verbal exposition before one who cannot see the heart, and which, when it is made so dependent, will degenerate with the mass into a cold, formal, perfunctory act, endured as it was before the Reformation, but now, we believe, to a great extent, discontinued in Roman Catholic countries by the upper classes and the male sex in general. When exhibited as the imperative and almost the exclusive means of access to pardon, it obviously harmonised with a system in which the most solemn concerns of the soul were taken away from itself, and placed in the hands of the priest, and the scope of individual agency in religion was proportionably reduced.

25. Such was the state of the world, in reference to liberty and activity of individual judgment, at the period when Luther and Zwinglius blew the first blasts of the trumpet. We come now to consider the views of the Reformers with regard to this subject; and together with their intentions, the natural, yet very different and unforeseen results of the transactions in which they bore a part, considered in the aggregate. But it will be necessary to examine the case, as it respects our own country, more in detail; and to trace there both the intent of the Reformation, in the actual subsisting doctrine of the Anglican church upon the subject, and the spirit and tendency of the acts by which that reformation was achieved.

26. At the period of the Reformation, the object con-

templated by its authors was not, primarily, the establishment of any abstract principle, but the removal of positive and palpable abuse. The practice of private judgment preceded its theory; and it is difficult indeed to say when, in its specific sense, it commenced; when the general protest of the Reformation began to differ in principle from the demands of Saint Bernard, and others, for the removal of abuses in the church. It was as the work advanced, and the number of detected corruptions was increased, and the efforts for their maintenance came into collision with those for their removal, that the men directly engaged, and their successors in the contest, found themselves compelled to fall back upon a general principle applicable to all the changes they proposed, and coextensive with the objections they had to meet on the part of the papists; who, instead of being satisfied to join issue with them upon their arguments, rather denied their right to argue, and drove them first to the practical exercise of that right, then to a scrutiny into its nature, and, last of all, to its avowed maintenance as a principle *.

27. Thus we find, first, on the part of Luther, a free appeal to the pope from his ministers; the act of an unsuspicious mind, following the truth according to its light, confiding in its power, and in the disposition of others to acknowledge that power, and ratify it in the

* The high authority of Mr. Hallam appears to corroborate this view. "Literature of Europe," ch. iv., 60, 61. For a detail of facts evincing the intentions of the continental reformers, see "Palmer on the Church," part I., ch. xii.

face of men by their assent. Next comes an appeal from the pope to a general council, a proceeding not heretical nor contumacious, but conformable with the views authoritatively declared at the council of Constance. We perceive here a reference to what was held to be the fair exponent of the general mind of the church; and we are still within limits compatible with devoted Romanism. Perhaps Luther did not doubt the infallibility of a general council at the time, in which case he went the whole length of the Cisalpine school. At least he recognised the propriety of submitting to it his own individual judgment; and this is quite enough to show how far he was removed from the licentious opinions, which men in modern times have not only adopted for themselves, but have also ascribed to the Reformers.

28. And the course which Luther did pursue was that which we might naturally have expected would be taken. When the sale of indulgences suggested itself to his view as a monstrous abuse, and when he failed in his first and immediate resort to the executive ecclesiastical authorities for its redress, the Divine Word would next occur as the readiest and most proper standard of appeal, the most certain and most fixed. To elicit the authentic expression of the mind of the church in its most solemn form, conveyable, according to the views then prevalent in Germany, through an œcumenical council alone,—was an aim too remote, and requiring by far too great an apparatus of means, in order to its attainment, for the satisfaction of a mind

earnestly contemplating a practical purpose, and that purpose the removal of a mischief not only most extensively spread, but of daily and hourly recurrence. In such a case even the pope was distant enough. Nor was the case like one where the voice of Scripture might have appeared to render an uncertain sound: no proposition could seem, at first sight, of easier deduction, than that no warrant was afforded by it for the sale of indulgences; and therefore, under these circumstances, Luther appears hardly chargeable with inconsistency in appealing immediately to Scripture against the doctrine of venal justification, and at the same time referring his views to the ultimate arbitrament of the organs of the church. Why should he doubt the meaning of Scripture, on a Roman Catholic principle, more than that of any decree of a council, until some positive reason for such doubt were supplied, by a condemnation of his view from authority?

29. In short, if we inquire generally into the acts and intentions of the foreign reformers, we shall find that they neither meant to separate, nor actually did separate themselves, from the communion of the church. They were excommunicated by the pope, and the sentence was accepted and enforced by their bishops. But they were passive in the matter: they appealed to church authority for a period (at least in the case of the Lutherans) of forty or fifty years*: they continued generally to maintain the doctrine of one body: they continually referred to the mind of the fathers and of the primitive church: they had no idea of the system of

* Palmer on the Church, part IV., ch. i. (Vol. II. p. 101.)

"denominations." Even in Scotland, where the Reformation was late and exasperated, and where alone there seems to have been anything like a wilful rejection of the apostolical succession, they broke indeed the link of connection with the previous church; but they were not logically inconsistent, however wrong in matter of fact; for they denied the Romish communion to be a church, and they maintained their own to be *the* one body, and would not allow of any other; holding the doctrine of unity while they surrendered that of perpetual visibility. At first, indeed, they recognised the Anglican church; but then they were holding apparent though limited and questionable communion with it. Generally speaking, it appears sufficiently evident, that the first generation of reformers were not voluntary separatists; we cannot say so much perhaps, without qualification, of the second and the third. The state of separation gave rise to new and fictitious theories intended to hide its own defects, but really calculated to aggravate and perpetuate them. Far be it, however, from us to sit in judgment on the men who, by the tyranny of Rome, were thrown into circumstances so cruel.

30. But of the circumstances we are bound to judge. They were destructive in some of their most important results: destructive in ultimately blighting even the doctrinal systems which it was the great aim of the reformers to rectify; but more specifically and rapidly destructive in their bearing on the unity of the faith, and on the authority of the church, appointed to be a bulwark of true doctrine. The overthrow of that authority left truths which were dear to Luther, Me-

lancthon, and Calvin, open to utter devastation through private licence, as we learn from the theology now so prevalent in Germany and in Geneva. The great misfortune was, that the continental reformation did not carry with it the bishops of the church, whence it failed to preserve the succession of the ministry. Thus the idea of authority was destroyed, and there remained in its stead mere opinion. True opinion in great measure it was, but it was stripped of a great part of the strength of truth, its divine attestation by a personal descent from the apostles and from Christ. When men set up new institutions with new governments, they did acts which were certain to be referred to the tribunal of common opinion, because it was only opinion that could be pleaded in their favour. Not then from asserting private judgment; not from denying authority at the outset; but from losing the succession of the ministry, they became unable to point any longer to an organ really authoritative, as having the witness of tradition and the known commission of Christ. The doctrine was deprived of its legitimate and hereditary defenders, the bishops and clergy; it remained naked and exposed, and became, for the most part, a shadow and an unprofitable name. The evil grew with the lapse of time. The consequences of the loss were felt in the decaying piety and increasing pride of Protestantism, the gradual corruption of the true doctrines of the church and church government, the growth of private licence, and, subsequently, in grievous deflections from the fundamental truths of the gospel. Who were the persons responsible for these results is not here the question;

my object simply is, to trace out in cause and effect the mysterious dispensations of God*.

31. Although, therefore, upon a general view we must admit that an abuse of religious freedom was the spontaneous, not the immediate, growth of the circumstances attending the continental reformation, yet, on the other hand, we must allow that the first reformers themselves were contemplating objects strictly practical and legitimate. Of necessity they, by implication, assumed to themselves, in a greater or less degree, the liberty of private judgment, but they did not assume it as such, nor for its own sake, nor was it a private judgment irreconcilable with the authority committed to the church. This assumption lay between them and their grand object, the re-assertion and re-establishment of the truth, which they saw groaning and oppressed beneath fictions and superstitions, whereof they wished to rid it, never doubting of the right, and trusting in a power better than their own. And, in fact, they simply discharged a primary function of human nature, in restoring to it the free agency of which it had so long been deprived. It was not mere liberty that they sought or worshipped, but that which liberty was needful to procure, namely, truth. But as the existing mischiefs and abuses were great, so the power and the effort needed to destroy them were great also. According to the common but the melancholy law of our fallen nature, the pride of that effort and of its success (speaking not of individuals but of bodies) contami-

* See the Rev. C. Smith on National Religion, Letter VI. (Rivington, 1833.)

nated those who made it; power corrupted its possessors, and there began to be a delight experienced in its exercise, and a love of it for the sake of that delight, and an increased admiration of self as holding the keys of that delight, and an indulgence in the exercise of that power irrespective of its uses, its objects, its responsibilities. Hence, whereas it was first employed simply as a means to an end, in process of time men, dallying with the instrument, forgot the purpose for which it was designed. Reception of the truth, freely if it might be, but if not, then by compulsion, was the maxim of the Romish church. Freedom of assent, as a necessary condition of the right reception of the truth, was not the motto, but the latent and gradually developed law, and the legitimate fruit, of the Reformation. Freedom of assent, without reference to the substantive and objective nature of truth, has been its besetting sin.

32. And why has private judgment been the fruitful parent of nonconformity, and thereby of permanent aberration and laxity? Because, as the Romanists on the one hand had identified it with error, so on the other, men living under generalised protestantism have been too apt to identify it with truth; or, at least, to go the length of supposing that what is judged by the individual to be true is truth to him, and sufficient for the purposes of the gospel. Men were provoked by the long-continued oppression of their liberty not only to struggle the more vigorously for its re-establishment, but, in the length and tenacity of that struggle, to view with too partial an estimate the immediate object for

which they were contending, and to regard it as an end rather than as a means. Their first movement was not for the assertion of liberty essentially or primarily, but for the recovery of truth; it was met on the Roman Catholic side, rather by the denial of freedom than by the refutation of falsehood; the natural consequence has been an undue share of attention to the assertion of freedom, and a comparative laxity with regard to the claims of truth. And now, instead of fixing the mind steadily on the concurrence of these two conditions, truth and freedom, on both as essential, but the latter as subservient, we seem to have absorbed the conception of the paramount in that of the secondary object, studious only to respect liberty, but resting with infatuated indifference in that state of division, which testifies against us that the Christians of this day are not fulfilling all the mind of the Redeemer respecting his church.

33. And thus we may sometimes read* in the popular productions of the day, that it is vain to look for uniformity in religious opinion, except when the human mind is in a state of stagnation, and that our divisions are our homage to the truth. O melancholy and miserable avowal! Then error is the condition of our mental activity, and we can only hold truth by holding it not as truth, by holding it mechanically and not rationally, by compulsion and not by option! Who shall choose between such wretched alternatives? And yet to lose our right is better than to abuse it. And we do abuse it, because we rest content with a state

* Miss Martineau on America; Chapter on Religion.

of facts where schism is manifestly chargeable upon some one, without making it the subject of supplication and of effort, that the church may again be one body, as it was when St. Paul wrote to the Hebrews. We do abuse it, because we acquiesce in differences of doctrine upon points ever taught by the church, and deal with them as matters of unconcern. But no truth clearly revealed is matter of unconcern. The main demonstration of our unhealthy condition is in this, that while we know that unity must be a condition of truth, we are so little moved by the manifest want of unity, and by the conclusion which that want of unity establishes.

34. For let it not be said, in the face of common sense, that the obscurity of the things themselves is the real cause of our differences. I indeed readily admit, that were every one called upon to exercise his private judgment to the extent of an intellectual analysis of every proposition in our creeds, there would be so extreme a disparity between such a task and the competency of men, such as on the average they have been, to perform it, that many differences must be the result. But this is not the case. It requires little of intellectual power to read and understand, that the church was ordained to be one body and one spirit. It is quite as clear that our present "denominations" witness of us unequivocally that we are not one body. Here was a precept plain as an axiom of Euclid; and for men to differ on it was not less absurd, than it would be if varieties of opinion were maintained in reference to those axioms, and

vindicated by a reference to the supposed peculiarities of individual minds.

35. At what point have we now arrived, or, at least, to what goal do we approach? Freedom of assent, simply, is the one thing needful, according to the spirit of modern theories: according to what is now their spirit, and what may soon be their letter. Yes; for in freedom of assent the human pride is fed and gratified, whatever the matter to which assent is given; nay, the inflated understanding has often more delight in assenting to what is false than to what is true, because the voice of truth is imperative and calls only for submission, but the web of sophistry is our own work; we are not mere recipients, but almost creators of its fictions; and we more proudly adhere to the creature of our own mind than to a truth extrinsic to us, and independent of us, neither owning nor owing to us any obligation.

36. And thus we forget that there is a substantive, changeless truth of God revealed, for which we ought ever to be striving, and of which unity is the essential condition, as well as freedom. Unity is the essential condition of that truth in itself. Free assent is the essential condition of its satisfactory reception, of its reasonable indwelling in us. The Roman Catholic church suppressed, in her tyranny, the latter of these great laws. The spirit of infidelity, assuming the name and the colours of Protestantism, has equally set aside the former. And now, instead of mourning over our divisions, and labouring and praying them away, we treat them as matters of no moment; we deal with truth as

if it had no prototype, but were a mere image, deriving its origin from each individual mind, and having no higher existence beyond it: we rest in our own defective approximations, or capricious caricatures, as if they were indeed that which God had revealed.

37. Now of these two dangers, it may be true that that embodied in the practice of the Roman Catholic church had made more progress towards its consummation than the other has as yet achieved. But is it not equally true, that the consummation of that other will be far more terrible? For better is it to divest man of his attributes, and to prostrate him even as a machine before the throne of his God, however the service rendered to that God be thereby lowered and curtailed, than to educate and expand these attributes for the purpose of turning them, in their maturity and their strength, against Him who gave them, and who can take them away, or can render them as fruitful of torment, in their abuse, as they would have been, while used in His service, of permanent delight. In the first supposition we perceive a diminished benefit; but, in the second, there is a creation of positive evil, entirely supplanting and expelling the gracious gift of Christianity.

38. In England, to which we must now direct our regard, the case was widely different from that of the Continent. Her reformation did not destroy, but successfully maintained, the unity and succession of the church in her apostolical ministry. We have, therefore, still among us the ordained, hereditary witnesses of the truth, conveying it to us through an unbroken series, from our Lord Jesus Christ and his apostles.

This is to us the ordinary voice of authority; of authority equally reasonable and equally true, whether we will hear or whether we will forbear; of authority which does not supersede either the exercise of private judgment, or the sense of the church at large, or the supremacy of Scripture; but assists the first, locally applies the second, and publicly witnesses to the last.

39. The efforts of the church to reform herself must not be assumed to imply the abrogation of the supreme power in her, the channel of vitality, through which it is derived to all the members. Men may be tempted to argue, that as a political society, abrogating its government and instituting a new one, does not cease to be the same society, however wrongful the act may have been, so the church did not undergo any rupture of her visible continuity, because a new government was instituted, and the fountain-head of the old one stopped. Suppose we admit the truth of the fact adduced in illustration, the vital difference, and the failure of the analogy, is here—that while any aggregation of men may become a political society, they cannot become a Christian church of their own will. The being of the church depends upon gifts; those gifts cannot be had without the sacraments and the teaching of the church, and they have been committed, by One whose acts we cannot annul, to the custody of the Christian ministry.

40. As respects the first part of the inquiry into the Anglican doctrine of private judgment, we shall find it easy to show that our church never taught that men were free to frame any religion from Scripture which they

pleased, or to form a diversity of communions. But were the *acts* of her reformation such as to destroy the effect of her doctrine of catholic consent? The acts of her reformation established the claim of the nation to be free from external control of any living power in matter of religion, but not from catholic consent. It is a mere fiction to say that the English reformation was grounded on the doctrine of private judgment. It asserted merely this, that the nation was ecclesiastically independent, and this, not of catholic consent, but of foreign authority. Subsequently, indeed, her Reformation wrought out the result of freeing the individual also from the control of the nation by its physical power as a nation; but it never ceased to recognise the principle of religious authority binding on the conscience, which remains enshrined in her Twentieth Article, and in the canon of 1571. The opinions of some of the individuals instrumental in our reformation were, perhaps, nearly the same as those originally professed by continental Protestants; but in England they took more of permanent effect, because the organisation of the church, through God's peculiar mercy, was still preserved to us. Let us now turn, first to the doctrinal, and subsequently to the historical, elucidation of our subject.

41. Even in the heat of the reformation, and its political accompaniments, indeed at the very time when the pope had issued his deposing bull, and the Romanists of England had just seceded from the church, the church of England most authoritatively declared, by the canon of 1571, its adhesion to the principle of catholic consent, as establishing the right interpretation of Scripture in

all cases where this consent is unequivocally declared. She there, in further development of her Article, enunciates the principle that Scripture contains all things necessary for salvation; but in determining the further question, what are the things which it contains? she requires that we should look to the sense of primitive antiquity, as affording, wherever it has been declared, the most legitimate and probable method of ascertaining the doctrine of the Bible. These are its memorable words:—"*Imprimis videbunt concionatores, ne quid unquam doceant pro concione, quod a populo religiosè teneri et credi velint, nisi quod consentaneum sit doctrinæ Veteris aut Novi Testamenti,* QUODQUE *ex illâ ipsâ doctrinâ Catholici patres et veteres Episcopi collegerint**." Canon XIX. A. D. 1571. Doubtless to very many readers this canon will appear as a startling novelty; yet did it express the indubitable, the uniform doctrine, of our great Reformers; and even those among them who were partially affected by the strong sympathetic influences of the period to recede from Roman doctrine without sufficient grounds (I may mention the venerable names of Archbishop Cranmer and Bishop Jewel), remained firm and undoubting whether in the closet, from the pulpit, or at the stake, in the doctrine of catholic consent.

* See for proof in detail, Palmer on the Church, Part II. ch. vi. See also Faber's postscript to the preface in "The Primitive Doctrine of Justification," pp. xxxiv.—xli. This opinion will be unsuspected, and will deservedly carry great weight. Reference has been made elsewhere to the dispassionate and philosophical testimony of Mr. Hallam, "Literature of Modern Europe," vol. I. ch. iv. pp. 60, 61. In No. 78 of the publication entitled "Tracts for the Times," will be found a collection of Anglican testimonies on the subject.

42. There is an irreconcilable hostility between this view of the rule of faith and the modern idea of private judgment, according to which it is a kind of impiety to suffer the intervention of any middle authority between the sacred Scripture and a man's own mind. A man is to ask himself the question, Does this appear so to me? but where the matter has appeared differently to the universal church, is he not also to ask himself the further question, Is it more probable that I or that they should be right? And yet, what should we think of one who had never quitted his native place, and who should interpret the customs of a foreign or ancient nation according to his own antecedent notions of propriety and probability, rather than by the direct testimony of travellers and eye-witnesses, or of antiquarians and students? It will be said that there is a divine illuminating grace given to the individual believer; so there was and is to the church, and this great truth, if it alters the relative authority at all, alters it in favour of the church, and against the private person.

43. Without holding an infallibility in the church, except as to fundamental truths; and aware of no test by which fundamental truths can be infallibly ascertained; we find that the law of probable evidence is as binding on a rational agent as that which we term demonstrative; not to mention that there must, in the case of human beings, always, even on the Roman theory, be one link in which the infallibility fails to be transmitted, namely, the last, by which the truth has its access to the mind of the individual, through his own perceptions. This law of

probable evidence then we are called upon to examine, to appreciate, and to follow; and we may think the dictate of reason will be, that we should prefer adopting the *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*, to our own conclusions from the sacred text, where they are at issue with the catholic interpretation.

44. Upon which, however, it is necessary to make these observations:—We do not in such a principle disparage divine grace, and the efficacy of prayer. In truth, our prayers are best approved and answered by our being directed to adopt the likeliest means of ascertaining the Christian verity; and, if the witness of the universal church *be* the most probable criterion of truth, then in adopting it we shall have the greatest reason to recognise a divine answer to our supplications. The early church prayed more and more fervently than we do. In addition it had the character and competency of a witness to matters of fact. The doctrines it heard from its founders were matters of fact, contradistinguished from matters of opinion, in that sense in which alone such a distinction ever can be fairly taken. Even granting that the private Christian prays with the whole heart, and maintaining that such prayer will generally bring an easy concurrence in catholic faith, yet, in the cases where the single and the general mind are at issue, we have on each side the fact of prayer, but with the church in its function of a witness, and its opportunities as such, and further, the accumulated strength of a concurrence among many witnesses.

And again, this is a question wholly independent of that other, What is the voice of the church? We do

not say—nor does the Romanist say—that upon all points that voice has been clearly and unequivocally uttered; but we say that, where there has been such utterance, there we are in reason and duty bound, inwardly bound, to hearken and follow. That there are such cases there is no doubt. The creeds are examples. There are other intermediate cases where it is presumable, but not clear, what was the testimony of the church. In all such instances, of course, the argument suffers in its cogency; but it retains a force varying according to the probability that the consenting suffrage of Christian antiquity is given this way or that.

46. Do we then reduce private judgment to a mere name or shadow? By no means. First, we have Scripture paramount over all. Next, we have the witness of the church, never superseding Scripture, but only assisting in the interpretation of it. Thirdly, we have the judgment of private persons, which is by each according to his means to be *actively exercised* upon Christian truth. Now is this incompatible with unity? Is it blowing hot and cold in succession, to teach the unity of objective truth in Christianity, and the office of private judgment? Then is the apostle open to this reproach, who said, "*prove* all things"—exercise your private judgment—but who also said, "hold fast that which is good"—rest in the one authentic, real, and not merely apparent, conclusion.

47. Let us look at the case of mathematical inquiry. I give a *free* assent to the propositions of Euclid; and yet there is no room for doubt upon them, and it would

be an offence against the laws of reason* to come to any conclusion but one. Yet that conclusion may be perfectly free. Freedom is opposed to force, not to certainty, nor to unity. Otherwise there were no freedom in the universe except where there is ignorance and doubt, and with the increase of our knowledge our liberty would be diminished. Now why is it that no man hesitates to accede to the propositions of Euclid, while many hesitate to adopt the doctrines of the gospel? Not because the latter are less certain; but because we view the one with an incorrupt and the other with a corrupted faculty. While the freedom of the investigation depends upon the absence of external force, its right issue depends upon underanged machinery within; and it is the most miserable of all our human delusions, that we actually require discrepancy of opinion—require and demand error, falsehood, blindness, and plume ourselves upon such discrepancy as attesting a freedom, which is only valuable when used for *unity in the truth*. If, however, on the other hand, the obscurity of religious truth be pleaded as an excuse for differences, it is clear that this plea does but aggravate the fault of those who follow their own worse-informed judgment as preferable to the better-informed and cumulative judgment of others.

48. But even if we set aside these considerations, at

* In the 13th century, when men's intellects were indulged in every kind of speculation, there were *heresies* in grammar and logic as well as in theology. Archbishop Peckham, for example, had to restrain the doctrine, at Oxford, that "Ego curr*it*" was as good Latin as "Ego curr*o*." Wood. Annals, A. D. 1284.

least no man will deny thus much, that the human understanding is actively exercised upon mathematical truths; they are then referred to private judgment; private judgment is called upon to perceive and appreciate every step in the process, and to make the whole its own. And, further, we should say, that he who learns them by rote, he who accepts them in the mass, he who does not ascertain the continuity and connection of the parts, has done them and himself but imperfect justice. But the more accurately and carefully he scrutinises each, the more justice he does to them and himself, and the less is it probable that he should entertain a doubt upon any of them. Thus the activity of private judgment, and the unity and strength of conviction in mathematics, vary directly as each other.

49. The purpose for which we have adduced the exact sciences as an illustration is, not to assume that the same degree of certainty is attainable by each of us upon each of the points of religion as in those sciences; but that the association we have most of us formed, under the influence of vicious habit, of these two ideas, activity of inquiry, and variety of conclusion, is a fallacious one. It is owing to our infirmity and vice, wherever such an effect flows from such a cause. Saint Paul did not allow that it was meant to be so in theology, or he surely would not have desired Christians to prove all things,* if the obscurity of the subject-matter were such that many of them must in consequence fail of holding fast that which was good. Better to receive the truth

* 1 Thess. v. 21; compare 1 John iv. 1.

without reasoning at all, than by false reasoning to lose it: but best of all, to receive, and, by reasoning, to approve and appropriate it.

50. The Christian man, then, although he receives the truth on trust as to its details, and is most blessed in the continuance of a simple and a childlike spirit, and the voluntary abasement of his own self-will through life, yet is to exercise his private judgment in a degree proportioned to the general capacity and development of his understanding, not merely in order to determine whether there is sufficient evidence of a revelation from God, but also in order to be the more fully assured what are the matters contained in that revelation. He is assisted in his inquiries by the doctrine on which the church of England acts, like the early fathers, that of the sufficiency of Scripture for salvation; so that he is not liable to have matter of faith imposed upon him from any other source. Tradition is not *a co-ordinate authority*. But it is a witness to the facts of the case, and he, acting in the character of a judge upon his own religious belief, is bound to hear that witness, and to judge, according to the balance of probabilities, whether it is not more likely to convey in a disputed point the mind of God, than his own single impressions, which (by hypothesis) are either altogether new, or, where formerly promulgated, have been authoritatively or practically disavowed. That upon every point, small and great, he must surrender, it is not necessary for the general purpose to contend; but where he finds antiquity and universality combined with fundament-

ality, the conclusion is inevitable, and, in proportion as he finds the evidence of each of those three conditions, is it plainly legitimate.

51. But perhaps those who love unity may ridicule the whole notion of encouraging a general spirit of inquiry into the ground of the doctrines of religion, and at the same time teaching the duty of unity, of arriving at one conclusion, and that one the ancient catholic creed, with any anticipation that that duty will be observed. And they may point to the state of this country and ask how much unity exists among us. It is a sore question. Our unity is very little. The abusive and irreverent exercise of private judgment, the forgetfulness of the supremacy and oneness of truth among us, is grievous. We have almost ceased not only to contemplate unity as an object, but to remember it as a duty. The mind of God then is unfulfilled in respect of this great duty. May our case soon be otherwise!

52. But is it not so with all His dispensations? Is not their bloom wasted upon the thankless winds, and their seed upon the barren ground? Was not Christ incarnate for us all; and did He not declare that the many would still walk in the broad paths of destruction? Why then should we murmur, or why be amazed, that, while His universal redemption takes not full effect in the purpose of saving souls, so that part of His will which enjoins unity should remain a law precious indeed but despised? None of the other moral duties of man—for the cognisance of truth is a moral duty—are adequately fulfilled; and yet no one would

think of meeting this evil by substituting for a genuine code of ethics, which is necessarily indeterminate, a set of mechanical regulations.

53. We are to remember that He has commanded unity, but not unity alone. He has commanded truth, and proof of the truth: the vigorous application of the intellect to the dogmas, the blessed dogmas, of theology, and their firm, tenacious embrace upon the ground of laborious experience and intimate personal conviction. Now we may fairly ask our brethren in the Roman church, whether they think the duty of "proving all things" is adequately taught or practised in their church? Whether a mechanical and superficial unity has not been substituted for that unity which has the guarantee of conviction, deep and solid? Whether in fear of the abuse they have not greatly limited the use of the human faculties? Whether the free agency of man is suitably considered and provided for in their method of administering the word of God to the people? Whether, in the fear of its irreverent and controversial handling, they do not deprive the mass of believers of much of that sincere milk which they would receive in innocence and simplicity without wandering into the thorny ways of pride and of discussion?

54. We adopt, then, in connection these great principles: the unity of the church, and of the faith whereof the church is a part; and the free subjection of that faith to private scrutiny. It is true that their junction looks like paradox. But it is the paradox of Saint Paul. And though we may not seek paradox for ourselves, we

may not refuse revealed truth when to our imperfect view it seems to bear that aspect.

55. It will, however, be objected: of what use is it thus to simplify the operations of private judgment by directing the minds of men to the duty of remaining at all events in one communion; when there are now many claimants for the title of the church more or less exclusive, so that, in order to decide in which of the bodies he finds the nearest representation of the true church, a man must go into the details of all the particular questions contested between them? No doubt there is a great difficulty here; but who ever heard of a state of neglected duty and of obstinacy in sin, which was to be escaped without difficulty? Perhaps the very uneasiness which the contemplation of that difficulty creates is the first step towards a remedy.

56. But however that may be, it is irrelevant to the present purpose, which is to show that there is a precept, plain, broad, and unequivocal, such as none could mistake, which if men had preserved, thus applying obedience to what was manifest, and waiting in faith for the elucidation of what was obscure, they would have remained in the way of God's commandments, and in the train of His blessing and illumination. So that private judgment alone was not that upon which our differences are chargeable, but its neglectful and irreverent use; nay, in many cases, its disuse, and the following of mere caprice and passion under the shelter of its name.

57. Our first step then is to inquire whether the mind of God declared in his word manifestly be that the

church should be one body. It is a subsequent examination, whether the present state of disruption be chargeable on one, or on all; or in what proportions on different communions; and how we should set about any remedy. That first step we allege will establish a broad truth, which truth will be a natural basis for further operations. In the mean time let us recollect, that the difficulty did not commence with Protestantism. It began, at least, with the Greek separation. The divisions of the church, before the Reformation, though fewer, and leaving more points undisputed, were as unquestionable as they now are, and had accordingly the same connection with the apostolic doctrine of "one body, one spirit."

58. It may, however, be thought that a contradiction to these views of the spirit of the English Reformation is practically found in the circumstance that the Scriptures were freely given to the people by our reformers; for it may be urged, that easy access to them would naturally beget diversity of opinions, and that these again must raise schisms in the church. Now as to the free circulation of the Holy Bible, there is no doubt (God be thanked) of the fact, that it was the first religious movement of our Reformation in England to place the Scriptures in a position of accessibility to the mass of the community. And further, at a time when the pressure of Puritanism had begun to be felt, and stringent measures to be taken for repressing a tendency to excess in religious change, we still find no jealousy existing on this head. In the Articles of Metropolitical Visitation, dated 1567,

one of the points to be inquired into is, whether any of the ministers (of the cathedral and collegiate churches) "do, either privily or openly, teach any unwholesome, erroneous, seditious doctrine; or discourage any man from the reading of the Holy Scriptures soberly for his edifying." * But lest any should draw hence an unwarranted inference, I quote a subsequent passage, which denounces those who maintain, "that it is not lawful for any particular church or province to alter the rites and ceremonies publicly used to better edification;" or "*that any man may or ought, by his private authority, to do the same.*"

59. Thus we perceive that there is nowhere any idea involved of alteration in the faith itself; and that, therefore, neither the church nor individuals are viewed as having any power to do more than receive and transmit the one immutable truth with their best fidelity; while, in matters of discipline, a power of alteration is asserted for the church, to which the natural functions of an organised body must belong, but expressly denied to the individual members of that body. And yet, simultaneously herewith, there was a provision intended to secure for the people the use of the Scriptures. To some this may appear a gross inconsistency. In my view it is far otherwise; and the conduct of our then ecclesiastical rulers in this very matter was the brightest page in the history of the Reformation. They were not responsible for the abuse of a gift which God had bestowed on man, and

* Strype's Life of Parker, Appendix, No. LIII.

which they thought themselves bound, according to their power, to secure to him. They contemplated the Scriptures as food appointed for the universal people of God, and the critical examination of them as the accident, and not the essence, of their relation to us. They saw the truth in its simplicity, and legislated on the supposition that others would see it also, and prize it and hold it for itself, and anxiously separate from it anything of private whim or notion, and endeavour to ascertain their own soundness in the faith by assuring themselves that their creed was conformable to that of the catholic church of Christ.

60. At least it may be said, their supposed doctrine of catholic consent has failed to preserve unity,—witness our actual state in religion. It is too true, that the principle has not exercised an universal sway, and may even be unknown to many, who deem themselves attached and intelligent members of the Anglican church; but it is by no means clear that this was chargeable upon our Reformation. It seems more fairly attributable to these circumstances: the remembered excesses of Romanism through its long dominion, which engendered a jealousy of everything bearing its resemblance; the banishments and contact with Geneva under queen Mary; the papal bulls, which engendered recusancy under queen Elizabeth; the association of Puritanism in the seventeenth century with the movement in favour of popular freedom; the political influences of the Revolution of 1688; and, generally, the grand twofold division of Europe, which forbade the existence of a

purely intermediate class, and the prevalent sympathy of the general idea and interests of Protestantism.

61. As respects the *history* of our Reformation, it was the establishment, as we have said, of a national exemption from external restraint in matters of religion. The question between the nation, either through its church or its state, and the individual, was of subsequent growth: and providentially, no doubt, it was so ordered. Doubtless there was a deep design of God in that arbitrary and capricious temper of Henry VIII., which tended to tyranny in religious matters over the conscience of the subject. It was requisite in order to *educate* us. Men had been so long accustomed to look upwards to a visible authority, superseding, in great measure, the exercise of their own faculties, and destroying the idea of their responsibility for everything but obedience to its commands, that they had lost, as it were, the capacity of private judgment while the right was in abeyance: like children, placed for the first time on their feet, they could not walk at once, and required a guiding hand. Strange and monstrous as it may appear, in reference to individuals more advanced in their mental education than the mass, it was a natural, perhaps a necessary, accompaniment of the then state of the public mind,—perhaps an essential condition of satisfactory change,—that, after the transmarine authority of the pope had been abjured, there should still have remained within view a power claiming little less than an equal degree of sanctity or of absolutism. And thus, in gradual relaxation, we see that a very high doctrine of regal headship prevailed in the reigns of Edward VI.,

Elizabeth, and James I.; not, indeed, as estimated by the terms of the Articles of Religion, but as understood from the current sentiments and practice of the times.

62. The first assertion, then, of religious liberty was for the nation, as against what lay beyond the nation, and not for the private individual as against all but himself. And the doctrine grew imperceptibly by unconscious and progressive deflections from the rule of arbitrary power. But, however it be true that the doctrine of private judgment was not matured in a single day or by a single effort, it remains strictly and demonstrably true, that it was born at the dawn of the Reformation, and grew with its growth. Its *primary* origin is to be traced to the assertion of a national liberty; which established the idea of a nation as a free agent in the acceptance of its religion, as an individual in the family of nations, responsible only to the great Head of that family.

63. In order to illustrate these views, let us look to some facts in the first stages of the Reformation among ourselves.

The Act 24 Henry VIII. c. 12, which released the Church of England from papal supremacy, commences by setting forth the integrity of the realm of England, as proved from ancient documents, in its several and proper parts, "compact of all sorts and degrees of people, divided in terms, and by names of Spiritualty and Temporalty;" and it proceeds: "*the body Spiritual whereof having power, when any cause of the law divine happened to come in question,* or of spiritual learning, then it was declared, interpreted, and showed, by that part of the said body politic, called the Spi-

ritualty, now being usually called the English Church, which always hath been reputed and found of that sort, that both for knowledge, integrity, and sufficiency of number, *it hath always been thought, and is also at this hour, sufficient and meet of itself, without the intermeddling of any exterior person or persons, to declare and determine all such doubts, and to administer all such offices and duties, as to their rooms spiritual doth appertain.*"

64. We have here a clear view of the notion under which separation took place. The nation of England said: We are an organised and integral whole, both in secular and spiritual matters, capable of self-government and self-direction. But in thus establishing the independence and integrality of the nation as a collective body, there is no trace of any regard whatever to the private judgment of the individuals composing that nation in a separate and personal capacity. Extrinsic control was repudiated in terms bearing evident reference to the pope, but the question was not even mooted, whether internal differences should be tolerated. It was assumed, that the unity of the nation would provide means for its own maintenance, with reference to spiritual matters, as it had always done with reference to temporal matters, and sometimes, nor upon unimportant occasions, even in subjects relating to ecclesiastical arrangements.

65. Nor let it be thought that the Romish party were behind those inclined to Protestantism in their recognition of a paramount spiritual authority within the bounds of the nation itself, when unable to enforce the papal claims. In the Act for the Six Articles, dated

1543, it is enacted, that the simple declaration of the king shall be absolute upon matters of religion; and the penalties due to heresy are denounced against all who shall impugn it. Now this most tyrannical Act, this most absolute assertion of a regal infallibility in matters of religion, was carried under the influence of Gardiner and the Romanists, and in the teeth of the most determined opposition on the part of archbishop Cranmer.

66. It is due to truth that observation should be attentively fixed upon the fact, that in England the question of private judgment was more remote from the immediate subject-matter of the Reformation than abroad. With us the question lay simply between the nation and the pope of Rome, and its first form as a religious question had reference purely to his supremacy. Thus the individual was not at all brought into the foreground, nor impelled to any distinct line in doctrinal matters. But in the cases of Luther and Zuinglius respectively, the first quarrel was upon matter of doctrine: as regards the former, and still more as regards the latter, this quarrel had continued for some space of time before the papal supremacy came to issue with the rebellious movement. And then it came to issue not primarily with a nation claiming freedom, but with the religious opinions of individuals. True, they were supported by the communities in which they respectively lived; but in England the question was first national, and then became doctrinal and personal: in Germany and Switzerland it was first doctrinal and private, and then became national, or rather, indeed, political. The idea of religious division must obviously

have been much earlier suggested to individuals in the latter cases than in the former.

67. All the further stages of the growth of private judgment in England belong to the history of toleration. Authority here was not abolished, but it was fixed in the national organs, both civil and religious, the former acting on behalf of the latter. The state still attempted to maintain for the church the unlawful principle of external physical control, though with immediate and progressive advances towards the renunciation of that false doctrine. It has long been repudiated; and there now remains for the maintenance and recovery of unity, in the interpretation of the sacred Scriptures, only that spiritual sanction of religious truth, which is termed catholic consent. It has been shown, we trust, that the English Reformation is responsible for the abolition of constraint from without in matter of religion, but is not responsible for the neglect of the inward obligation to hold, instead of ever-shifting opinion, that body of truth which we have inherited from our Lord and his apostles. I have deemed it strictly relevant thus to state and vindicate the Anglican doctrine in respect to private judgment, in order to distinguish it from that abusive and more recent theory with which the Reformers are unjustly charged, and which now unfolds from day to day its disorganising tendencies in immediate relation to our subject: and, having done so, I proceed to consider the specific manner in which the growth of private judgment in its two successive senses has affected, does affect, and may hereafter yet further affect, the connection between the church and the state.

CHAPTER VI.

THE USE AND ABUSE OF PRIVATE JUDGMENT AS CONNECTED WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF UNION BETWEEN THE CHURCH AND THE STATE.

1—13. Of toleration, and how it is related to liberty of conscience and to private judgment. 14—18. Subject indicated, and forms of European state policy with respect to private opinion in religion classified. 19—26. Nationality a leading feature of the English Reformation. 27, 28. A vicious influence subsequently developed. 29—48. An historical sketch of the policy of the state respecting religious differences down to the Revolution of 1688. 49—60. A similar outline from the Revolution of 1688 to the present day. 61—72. Steps by which a state may progressively advance from the toleration of different religions, or forms of religion, to a recognition of their perfect equality, by the indiscriminate admission of their professors to office, and by affording to them a common support. 73, 74. Nor is it likely to rest there. 75, 76. Our own position. 77. A retrospect of the argument. 78—83. A parallel and co-operating political influence.

1. WE have fully considered* the reasons which appear to give religion a place among the ends and the conditions of good government; and it requires no lengthened argument to demonstrate, that if it is properly to be included among them at all, then its inclusion in a right manner must be of transcendent importance.

2. Previously to the Reformation, this theory was carried out simply and easily into practice. There was a general recognition of the law of external unity in religion,

* Chap. II.

and of civil penalties as amongst the appropriate sanctions of that law. Upon this maxim (destitute as it appears to us of support from Scripture) the whole powers of the government became at once applicable to the prevention of schism; it was regarded like an infraction of the public peace; and the secular magistrate afforded to the church his forcible but heterogeneous guarantees for a security too dearly purchased by a sacrifice of truth and duty, in the supersession of our functions as rational beings with reference to the trying and proving of religious doctrine.

3. But so long as this principle was maintained in its vigour, the general preservation of the external unity remained a natural result; and so long as the external unity was very generally preserved, no serious impediment could arise to prevent governors from recognising their obvious duty, and no less obvious interest in the maintenance and advancement of religion, embodied as it was, so as to render it yet more apt for their purpose, in the conspicuous and permanent institutions of the Christian church.

4. But at the Reformation we enter upon an era altogether new, in respect of the present subject. Here we find springing up by slow degrees two new principles: the first, that of liberty of conscience, or, as it has otherwise been called, the right of private judgment; the second, that of toleration, which has also been designated by the phrase, "liberty of conscience," for it has rarely been attempted to treat of the matter now before us with much precision of thought or language. Each

of them has, we believe, a distinct province, a legitimate meaning, in which they indicate what is both right and expedient; and a hazard of attendant or consequent excess, which we now see in no small degree attaining its realization, and which ultimately involves results the most destructive both to our individual and our social welfare.

5. Each of them has a distinct province. The question of private judgment respects our religious position exclusively, while that of toleration has its subject matter in the region of civil politics. The question of private judgment depends, as has been shown, upon the right or duty of the individual (they are correlative) to try or prove, according to his capacity, the religious doctrines presented to him, and to pronounce upon them for himself. The question of toleration regards the right or duty of the state to assume the function of a judge in matter of religion, and to coerce or incommode individuals on account of the variations in opinion incident to the exercise of this right of private judgment. The former must evidently be decided by a reference to the principles upon which we are *constituted* in the church of Christ. The latter inquires whether the state has any, and what concern in the answer to be given to the former question. But the principle of toleration is evidently and naturally consequent upon that of private judgment. For where private judgment is established, the individual chooses for himself; but where toleration is denied, the state, *pro tanto*, extinguishes his free agency and supersedes his choice.

6. Each of them has a legitimate sense. The doctrine of private judgment is a noble principle, while it is understood to assert our *obligation* individually, and according to our individual opportunities and capacities, to exercise our minds upon the topics of divine revelation, and strive to *assure* and realise to ourselves the inestimable blessing of the truth in each and all its parts. It then constitutes in fact, as we have seen, a simple exhibition of the apostolic precept, addressed to the believers of Thessalonica in the mass;* "prove all things, hold fast that which is good." Those few but pregnant words both fully state and effectually guard the doctrine.

7. The principle of toleration is likewise in itself of pure and untainted origin. It rests, I apprehend, upon some such ground as this. We, as fallible creatures, have no right, from any bare speculations of our own, to administer pains and penalties to our fellow creatures, whether on social or on religious grounds. We have the right to enforce the laws of the land by such pains and penalties, because it is expressly given by Him who has declared that the civil rulers are to bear the sword for the punishment of evil doers, and for the encouragement of them that do well. And so in things spiritual, had it pleased God to give to the church or the state this power, to be permanently exercised over their members, or mankind at large, we should have the right to use it; but it does not appear to have been so

* 1 Thess. v. 21.

received, and, consequently, it should not be exercised. The Church appears to have afforded a very general attestation to this truth as regards herself, by delegating to the civil power, in most cases at least, the office of performing the most sanguinary decrees of punishment for offences ecclesiastical. Now the principle of toleration simply affirms for the state what the church has in practice generally affirmed for herself—an exemption from that painful office, by disclaiming the right to punish in loss of goods, liberty, or life, for error or heresy in religion.

8. It is not, therefore, because we believe civil rights to be more important than religious doctrines, that we would use a power for the defence of the one which we decline to employ for the propagation of the other; although too often some such vicious inference is drawn by persons reasoning ill or not at all, from such a conduct on the part of the state. But it is because God has seen fit to authorise that employment of force in the one case, and not in the other; for it was with regard to chastisement inflicted by the sword, for an insult offered to himself, that the Redeemer declared his kingdom not to be of this world, meaning apparently, in an especial manner, that it should be otherwise than after this world's fashion, in respect to the sanctions by which its laws should be maintained.

9. Further, each of the phrases now before us had an abusive sense, and an attendant hazard. Private judgment, as has been shown, becomes a gross delusion, when in proving or pretending to prove all things,

we forget the end of that preparatory duty, namely, to hold fast that which is good. Good; but how? good in itself, or good for us? good in itself, and therefore good for us; if not for us as we are, yet for us as we ought to be, and as, if we receive the truth into our bosoms, we shall be. We are miserably deluded when we forget that the office of private judgment is not, after all, an exclusively or even mainly intellectual office, and that it essentially depends for its right discharge less upon the understanding than the conscience.

10. And the theory of toleration too, however pure in itself, has been associated with a series of consequences not less abusive nor less pernicious. When, from the duty of forbearance on the part of governments with regard to the repression of religious error through civil penalties, men have gone on to infer that the state should refrain from the use of due and appropriate, as well as of undue because unauthorised means for that purpose; and when thus unlawfully arguing from a particular forbearance to general inaction, they further connect with inaction indifference, and with indifference incapacity on the part of government to aid the advancement of religion by public means: then indeed the doctrine of toleration becomes not in itself a falsehood, but yet involved with a series of falsehoods so subtle as to be, without great care and pains, inextricably interwoven with them in the common apprehensions of men. This confusion, however, is likely, within no long period, to terminate; for some among the modern advocates of latitudinarian principles have, both in and out

of Parliament, begun of late years to treat with contempt the notion and the phrase of toleration as wholly inadequate to carry out their real schemes, while it is no longer needed to conceal them.

11. We most observe, however, yet more specifically, that two very different classes of subjects have been treated, the one erroneously, and the other correctly, as belonging to the question of toleration. The principle of toleration is this, in its proper form, that civil penalty or prohibition be not employed to punish or to preclude a man's acting on his own religious opinions. In the largest extent which can properly be assigned to it, it requires that no privilege or benefit which he is capable of receiving rightly and beneficially be withheld on account of religious opinions from the party professing them. All matters falling within these sets of conditions belong to the first class of subjects, and to the pure question of toleration.

12. But if penalties be inflicted upon the holders of certain religious opinions on account of the safety of the state, and because those religious opinions are believed hostile to it, here there may be an error in judgment, or there may be in humanity, with a thousand other faults, but there is no intentional infringement of the principle of toleration. Much less is it contravened when privilege or office is withheld, because it is believed that there are in the creed of the excluded person faults of omission and commission, which of themselves disqualify him from rightly exercising the privilege or filling the office. All cases of these

latter descriptions (and our history furnishes them in abundance) are inaccurately treated as belonging to the question of toleration.

13. They may, however, intermix with the former classes; punishment may be inflicted, or exclusion enforced, from a complex regard to the proscribed creed, partly as a deviation from truth, and partly as a cause of incapacity in the person, and danger to the state. In whatever degree the former element may have prevailed, the question becomes one of toleration. Where the latter considerations were predominant, we fall back upon the questions, how far civil government is in its best and proper state a religious function, requiring religious motives and observances, and proposing religious ends; and how far the epithet religious, in order to be practical in its meaning, must be attached to some particular mode or modes of belief or of communion? If we find that government is essentially religious, then we are not guilty of intolerance in shutting out from it those who deny to it that character, either expressly, or by assigning to the term a vague and impalpable signification; while undoubtedly we are open to that charge, if the question on the nature of government be otherwise decided.

14. The subject of private judgment, as an ecclesiastical principle, has already been sufficiently examined; it remains to regard its operations as they affect the Church, not directly by influencing the religious character of its members, but indirectly by their bearing on the particular question of connection between the Church and the State: to observe how they lead us,

through truth, by successive stages into latitudinarianism and infidelity, connecting all along even their worst results with the name and pretence of protestantism. It has been already shown how the first effect of the Reformation was to establish the national spiritualty in independence, by calling home a duty, which had been delegated to a foreign see, and grossly perverted by it. We must now consider the co-ordinate influences of that period in their ulterior operations, and their gradual modification of the union between the church and the state, first by progressively evolving the principles and practice of toleration, and then through the abusive inferences which men have unwarrantably drawn, and which tend to dissociate the principles of government and of religion. We shall see in succession a long series of changes, each very subtly and invisibly, yet most really, connected, but involving a transition from positive good towards equally positive evil; and all bearing the marks of the most comprehensive forecast and design, of intimate relation to the development of the most weighty results upon human character and destiny. Let us trust that the ominous phenomena have been projected before their time by a merciful Wisdom, in order to arouse us ere we reach that period when the government shall have been *made* as well as *deemed* equally incapable in the matter of religion, with the most incapable of its component parts; when political science shall have become deliberately false to its first principles; when the state shall be first theologically, then morally; first collectively, then in its component parts,

without a conscience. Now is the time when men should halt in their forward march, and consider where they stand, and whither their road will lead them.

15. And we shall derive much instruction from further finding how the later among the above-mentioned processes are blended with a progressive relaxation in the theory of civil government; and how each advance made in the one facilitates a corresponding step in the other; thus affording the most solemn and judicial attestation to the reality and permanency of those religious principles of government for which we are contending, and showing us how vainly we strive, by devices of our own, against the fixed laws and tendencies of nature, and of the God of nature, vindicating himself in our disappointment when we have overlooked His immutable commands.

16. We may embody, in the following forms, the principles of conduct which modern governments have, under different circumstances, adopted, or which have been proposed for their adoption, with regard to the support of religion and to the treatment of varieties in its profession.*

(1.) The first and most comprehensive position is, that uniformity in the Christian religion is absolutely essential to citizenship.

(2.) The next, that uniformity on all points of the Christian religion is desirable for citizenship, and essential to offices of political trust and privilege; and that, even for citizenship, unanimity in fundamentals cannot be dispensed with.

* See a statement of this kind in Mr. Hallam's Constitutional History, vol. i. ch. iii. p. 180, 4to.

(3.) Contemporaneous with this modification is the growth of a third opinion, which views heresy less as an antecedent disqualification, poisoning, as it were, the characters of men, than as a probable cause of overt acts directly injurious to the state, through fear of which overt acts, means are used to exact disclaimers and abjurations, and the heretical worship generally is discouraged and repressed.

(4.) A fourth form is, that separatism should be stifled by prevention of its assemblies, rather than followed by absolute penalties.

(5.) A fifth stage of government policy is this: that every citizen should hold those principles of what is (perversely) termed natural religion, which have an immediate bearing on the safety of civil society; and that he is a legitimate object of banishment or other penalty if he do not. This theory however has not been tested experimentally.

(6.) That Christianity under some form is essential to office, but that all religious creeds which are *primâ facie* serious and sincere, or even unbelief, if appearing under the same aspect, are to be tolerated, is a sixth and later form, under which we now live in England.

(7.) That all forms of religion, or of professed Christianity, should receive active and pecuniary support from the State.

(8). That all should alike be refused it.

17. Together with most of these has coexisted, among us, the active assistance of the state to a national form of religion; and, though with partial exceptions, its generally exclusive assistance. At this stage, the sole reli-

gious limitation on the possession of power is the name of Christianity: and experience shows that this barrier is not one likely to be the most tenaciously defended, nor adequate to secure any sort of religious homogeneity in those whom it permits to enter; while at the same time in theory it is one of the most plausible. All sects being now recognised as legally competent to serve the state, it begins to be a common inquiry why the state is to render its reciprocal service to one form of religion only? They protest against national exactions for the church of a portion of the nation; they confound the inherited church with the invented sects; they claim the indiscriminate aid of the government; they destroy its conscience and personality; they reduce it to a mechanical representative of popular inclinations, first, in reference to religion, but with the view, secondly, and not remotely, of universalising the principle of sovereignty from below, and of cutting off entirely that homage to Religion, which, by repudiating her unity, has already been so enfeebled and disgraced.

18. In a more summary view there are four great divisions in the history of the subject. The first, in which heresy and schism were visited with civil penalty *pro salute animæ*, for the cure of the individual. This, we may almost say, terminated with the Reformation, and depended very much, though not wholly, on the idea of the infallibility of the church. The second, in which they were similarly visited, but chiefly in the view of preventing the infection of the society within whose limits they had appeared. This rather depended on the

right of self-preservation belonging to society. It terminated practically with the Revolution of 1688, or even earlier, as regarded Protestant Non-Conformists; but remained as an opinion in the works of various writers. The third, in which disqualifications of a civil kind are imposed instead of penalties. The idea in these is different, and merely aims at keeping all power to injure the established institutions out of hands which are assumed to be inimical to it. This period reaches, we may say, to 1829. The fourth is that in which all forms of religion claim from government a precisely equal regard, as respects either civil privileges or positive assistance.

19. To speak of the influence of Protestantism as such upon the principle of union between the church and the state, to some may appear visionary or unintelligible —under many circumstances it may have been latent; but upon examination we shall find it to have been both direct and very substantial. Its character has indeed, at different stages, been very different: at first it would seem to have operated in England very favourably to this principle; and we may find that more strict regard has been paid to it, in some instances at least, by Protestant than by Romish governments. But at the point where Protestantism becomes vicious, where it receives the first tinge of latitudinarianism, and begins to join hands with infidelity, by superseding the belief of an immutable objective truth in religion necessary for salvation, at that very spot it likewise assumes an aspect of hostility to the union of church and state.

20. The English reformation did not aim at or necessitate any breach in the unity of the church; in the unity, that is to say, of the visible church, or what is in modern days disparagingly, and without any advantage on the score of accuracy, called uniformity. But, since it did not find that a visible headship was comprised in the teaching of the Apostles, or attested by the ancient church as having come from them, it rejected that headship as being full of obstinately-defended abuse. We may be of opinion that in some conceivable forms it might not have been deemed objectionable; as we find that Melancthon did not find in the mere existence of the papacy an insuperable obstacle to reconciliation. And as the ecclesiastical law of some modern nations (Austria, for example) appears to afford sufficient proof that, did no other obstacle exist, a bishop of Rome might occupy a harmless, or even possibly beneficial primacy in the universal church, without oppressing and nullifying the general jurisdiction of bishops, or absorbing their authority into itself.*

21. The fault, however, and the weakness of the Anglican reformation appears not to have lain in its rejection of the visible headship extrinsic to the nation. It was rather faulty in allowing the transfer of too considerable a proportion of the prerogatives which Rome had enjoyed, to the sovereign. The doctrine has been ascribed to Cranmer, that the king bore both swords, and could create a bishop as well as a civil functionary;

* See the translation of the Austrian Ecclesiastical Laws into English by the Count dal Pozzo. Murray.

but, although that eminent benefactor to his church and country appears at one time to have fallen into a confusion of this kind, yet it is certain, from works which at a later period he himself composed, that he clearly distinguished the spiritual from the civil character. At the time of the accession of Edward the Sixth, "it was his judgment," says Strype, "that the exercise of all episcopal jurisdiction depended upon the prince.*" It does not however follow that even then he conceived, that ordination derived its virtue from the law; but yet, from whomsoever it emanated, there was embodied in the practice of our ecclesiastical polity too much of dependence on the throne, while its theory was eminently reasonable. Elsewhere we have considered, whether this may not have been, so to speak, a condition necessary in order to effecting with safety the great transition which was to be made; whether, if the idea of visible headship had been wholly discarded, or refined at once into its more subtle form, we might not have lost along with it, as was the case in other Protestant countries, the visible continuity of the church and the apostolical succession.

22. That the question of the English reformation was eminently and specially national; that it was raised as between this island of the free on the one hand, and an "Italian priest" on the other, is a remarkable truth which derives equally remarkable illustrations from our history. The main subject of contention between the

* Strype's Cranmer, p. 141. See Palmer on the Church (Part II. ch. 8), for a general vindication of Cranmer's conduct.

state and the Romanists, or recusants, as they were called, was not their adhesion to this or that popish doctrine, but their acknowledgment of an unnational and anti-national head. To meet this case, the oath of supremacy was framed. Paradoxical as it may seem, the British rulers appear either to have thought, or to have acted as if they thought, that they were not requiring of Romanists anything which should do violence to their conscience in religion when they attempted to enforce this oath.

23. Now let us observe both the fact, and the natural inferences. The British Government required of its subjects the renunciation, not of Romish doctrines, but of the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Pope. We must suppose the abjuration of this particular tenet to have been thus exclusively required, because it was supposed to indicate either a political or a religious alienation on the part of those by whom it might be entertained. If the former supposition be accurate, then it was not the existing church as a religious institution, but the secular ambition of the papal see, against which security was sought by renouncing its jurisdiction; and we perceive the more clearly how far the idea of our reformers was from anything like alteration of essence, or the overthrow of an old church, and the erection of a new one. But if, on the other hand, the foreign headship was assailed as a religious error, connected with other religious evils and corruptions, then the rulers of the nation could only make its renunciation a test of competency for citizenship, because they strongly

believed in the bearing of our religious creed upon our social conduct, and in the union of a religious with a political character in government. For why should a *spiritual* allegiance to the Pope be inconsistent with a patriotic allegiance to the Crown? Only upon the supposition of a natural and indivisible connection between the two supremacies; in which case it was consistent and logically consequent to make the ecclesiastical unity an essential condition of that which is civil. Thus then we find the first movements of Protestantism in our own country to have been towards the fuller development and the stricter application of the principle of a religious conscience in Government, not towards its relaxation.

24. But contemplating the English reformation on either side; looking either to the entire rejection of a foreign headship, and the jealous care with which this rejection was enforced in the oath of supremacy; or looking, on the other hand, to that partial colouring of Erastianism, that disposition to wear the harness of the state, and to fall into a complete unity of action with it, which we must all discern in the history of our church at those times, we perceive that there is a point in which these different sentiments coincide, and that point is the strict and absolute nationality of the church—a doctrine not inconsistent with its catholicity. The latter consisted in its unity of doctrine and sacraments, and (as I conceive is included) of its ministry, with the universal church, not of the moment, but of all time; the former had reference to its natural and divinely appointed

boundaries, within which a common administrative power and a common agency should prevail.

25. And thus we may interpret into languge the acts of the English reformation: "We find the nation like the family, an institution manifestly divine; we find in it a personality of its own, a collective power, a collective responsibility. In its oneness of organisation and of sympathy pervading its whole framework, we recognise, as it were, the religious integral fitted for independent, though not discordant action; independent, for we do not find that God has appointed any arbiter over nations, as in nations he has appointed an arbiter over individuals. We go therefore as far as He has gone; we stop at the point where He has stopped; we take the nation as, humanly speaking, free and irresponsible in religion, therefore we reject the doctrine which makes our church dependent on a foreign head for the exercise of her essential functions. But, on the other hand, within the limits of each nation we recognise a regular combination of rulers and ruled, as in a family, and to this collective being, as such, we conceive that a religion must attach; on its head naturally devolves the chief care of that religion, and thus the sacred trust of the sovereign power becomes much more definite, and much more illustrious from the retrenching all those prerogatives which the papal see exercised over us, and which had their seat abroad. At the same time, while we assert such an independence as is here described, the church as being Anglican does not renounce the communion of the Catholic body, but, sympathising with all other

nations and their churches, freely acknowledges the laws which are binding in common upon all."

26. Thus, then, both because the religion was recognised as properly belonging to the nation, did it especially become the care of the head of that nation, who previously was, though with some distinctions and exceptions, one of many members, all extrinsically ruled; and also because the crown stood as heir-general to the pope in most of the prerogatives which he had so abusively exercised, did the sovereign become, in an ample sense of the term, at the outset of our Reformation, the visible head of the church of England. At the commencement of the reign of Elizabeth, there was a wise and well-timed abatement in the royal style, but a great substantial power remained; and it is but just to say, that, during four reigns, those of Edward VI., of Elizabeth, of James I., and of Charles I., the duties of that office were discharged, if not with an unvarying purity or wisdom, yet, at least, as it appears to me, under a general conviction that the active care of the Church was among the most momentous duties of the sovereign, as well as in dignity the first; and with a disposition to regard her welfare as second to no secular object. Headship ascribed to the sovereign went to render the duty of interposition with the religion of the people, on the part of the government, more determinate, and to concentrate as well as to exhibit the obligation.

27. And had not Protestantism, in other shapes, made further advances; had men been content with vindicating the truth, by the joint appeal to Scripture for authority,

and to antiquity for attestation; and had they been able to join with this vindication the sound doctrine of toleration; this lively and intimate relationship between the sovereign and the church of the nation might have remained effectual for all the purposes of good, and shorn of those tendencies to excess which were bequeathed to it as remnants of the antecedent slavery of the national church under a Roman head. But that which began well, by restoring man to the condition of a free agent in spiritual things, and thus bringing him up to the level of his responsibilities as a spiritual creature, ran out into excess when it dwelt so much on private liberty, that, without asserting propositions directly false, it nevertheless engendered a temperament most favourable to falsehood, by fixing men's attention on the possession rather than the end of freedom.

28. Now we may doubt concerning such evils as were mixed with the greatly preponderating blessings of our Reformation, whether they are chargeable on those who promoted, or on those who opposed, after having provoked it; or in what proportions the responsibility ought to be divided between each; but we cannot deny that, upon the removal of the tyranny then prevalent, there came to us, along with the good thus effected, an element of mischief, opening the way to multiplied divisions of opinion in religion, not by the establishment of the Scriptures as the sole foundation, but because men abused their freedom, and overlooked the reasonable and religious helps which they ought to have employed in studying the sacred word. We are not now to in-

vestigate the manner of this influence, but to take the fact which is undoubted; to trace it through history, and to follow it out into its results upon the union between church and state.

29. In this country, we are to observe, the period of reformation was not the period of schism. We had, indeed, denied the recognition of papal authority to be a condition of Christian unity, under Henry VIII. But are we, or the maintainers of the opposite affirmative, chargeable with the resulting division? At least, it is historically clear, that England rejected not the communion but the jurisdiction of Rome, and in doing so that she maintained the national unity unbroken. There were defections of individuals, but there was no organisation of a rival church in England until the twelfth year of Elizabeth, when the Pope, Pius V., had published his deposing bull: then began the state of schism in this country. The professing church was no longer one body, but divided itself into those who held with the nation, and those who held with the Pope. But the latter were not cast out; they went at the call of the Roman see. As for the internal schism in the Protestant body, it was hardly perceptible till the reign of Charles the First and the great rebellion.

30. From the twelfth year, therefore, of Queen Elizabeth, we must consider the fractional state of the Christian church in England, the parallel existence of different forms, not only of opinion, but of religious institution, as an unquestionable fact. Our rulers went to war with this

fact; by the suppression of the rival worship, by the infliction of fine and imprisonment, and the imposition of the oath of supremacy. But they were using weapons unsuited to their character and position, and not upon the clear and broad, though false, principle of the Romish proceedings against heresy. They did not *so* go to war with schism, as did the papal power with the reformation of Italy or Spain. We do not find that they ever adopted the *unlimited* maxim of persecution for religious opinion. It is the mere cant of controversy, or dogmatism of ignorance, to say that Protestants and Romanists persecuted *alike*, as each got the upper hand. It would, on the other hand, be grossly illiberal to deny that Romanists could better palliate persecutions on their principles, than we on ours.

31. In proof, however, of the fact, that the principle of persecution was soon shaken, and then progressively relaxed, I appeal to the very case which has often been quoted on the opposite side, the case of Joan Boucher, who was burnt as an anabaptist, by the authority of Edward the Sixth, and at the instance of Archbishop Cranmer. Even in the proceedings on the case of this unhappy woman, I assert that we may discover that a distinct approximation had already, though, perhaps, unwittingly, been made towards the right of private judgment. For the ground on which she was put to death was, that, disbelieving the advent of the Redeemer in the flesh, or the doctrine of the Incarnation, she had thereby apostatised from the fundamentals of the Christian faith.

32. Of course it is not meant to adduce such a cir-

cumstance as a vindication of the conduct of Archbishop Cranmer; but it is very worthy of remark, that, thus early in the history of Protestantism, penal infliction for the sake of religious opinions, affecting life, should have been limited, at least by implication, to cases where a denial of fundamental truth is involved, and not maintained to be applicable upon the simple ground of disobedience to the declaration of the church as a positive law, whatever the magnitude or minuteness of the subject. Thus the range of persecution was at once very greatly narrowed, a stage preparatory to its ultimate disavowal and discontinuance. And we find here that disposition to make unity more a matter of moral and less of positive obligation (to use the terms in the sense of Bishop Butler), to refer more to the substance of the truth itself, and relatively less to the voice of the church as its visible organ, removing all that is intermediate between the objects of faith and man as its recipient; which has all along been so characteristic of Protestantism, and which in its later stages has passed into gross excess.

33. The same remarks will apply to two more persons who were committed to the flames under Queen Elizabeth, and also to the cases of two Unitarians,* one of whom likewise declared himself to be the Holy Spirit, and who were burned under James I. in 1612. A third was condemned to a similar fate; but the king confined him for life instead of executing the original sentence. These instances must be set side by side with

* Lingard, VI., 156 (4to), chap. III.

the practice under Romanism in order to institute a correct comparison. Now, a recent historian, Dr. Russell, records that a Scotchman, named Straiton, was burned in 1534, for denying the right of ecclesiastics to tithes.* The law, indeed, was mitigated more tardily than the practice under it and the general opinion. It was only by a statute of the twenty-ninth year of Charles the Second, that the writ *de hæretico comburendo* was abolished.

34. Taking, then, the establishment of national liberty in religion as the first step towards the establishment of our personal freedom of conscience; and the restriction of capital punishment to cases of dereliction from the faith in points universally held by the church to be essential, as the second, we soon find indications of further progress. When, under the persecution of Mary, a portion of our reformers had imbibed on the Continent those peculiar views of discipline which distinctively characterised the Swiss reformation; and when this temper, exaggerated as it was by national tenacity (for the opinions of Martyr and Bucer, representing the continental reformers, had been in favour of conformity), manifested itself in a determined resistance to the habits appointed for the clergy under Elizabeth; provision was made, as is well known, for the enforcement of the obnoxious regulations, and after much vacillation they were adhered to and established. Now it is quite true that civil penalties followed upon the disobedience of the ministers to ecclesiastical regulations. The secular

* History of the Church in Scotland, Vol. I., p. 141.

arm was still invoked, and its aid was afforded to church authority. But while the imposition itself remained arbitrary, as it had been in the days of Romanism, and the right to coerce was asserted and even exercised, yet it underwent an essential change by shifting its ground. It was now no longer, by an authority immediately and necessarily divine, that matters of discipline or otherwise were adjusted in the church, but by royal command, with ecclesiastical assent for the sake of order and expediency, with a view to present circumstances.

35. In the "ordinances" or "advertisements" of the year 1564* (though even these were deemed too stringent for enforcement in the then temper of the Queen's council), we find the following passage:—

"Not yet prescribinge the rules as lawes equivalent with the eternall worde of God, and as of necessitie to bynde the consciences of her subjects in the nature of the said lawes, considered in themselves; or as that theye shoulde adde enye efficacie of more holynes to the mynystration of praier and sacraments, but as constitutions meere ecclesiastical, without anye vaine superstition, as positive lawes in discipline, concernynge decency, distinction, and order for the tyme."

Thus, while the right to enforce was still asserted, it was not only deprived of the aid of superstition, and divested of its sacred character, but it lost first its moral authority, then excited continually increasing resistance, and at last was surrendered as an impracticable notion.

36. Our third step is, therefore, the descent from a

* Strype's Parker, Appendix.

religious to a civil sanction in respect of ecclesiastical regulations; not that there was here necessarily involved on the part of the church any dereliction of her appropriate authority. It was competent to her to enact laws of church discipline, as a church; but, as a national establishment, she required the edict of the sovereign to give them force. The difference, however, was obvious in the face of the country, and it was a descent from higher to lower ground; a descent less conspicuous at the time when it took place, from the severe and arbitrary tone of civil government during the reigns of the Tudors, than it afterwards became. But the authority of such rules having been once ascribed to a power mainly political, of course became subject to deterioration as the idea entertained of that power became lower and more familiar.

37. But the reign of Elizabeth furnishes us with a fourth and a more remarkable kind of testimony to the intimate connection between Protestantism and toleration or the liberty of private judgment, which two latter, in reason and equity, imply one another. The great Lord Burleigh himself wrote a treatise, in 1583, expressly for the purpose of disclaiming the character of religious persecution, for the severities, nay cruelties, exercised against the Roman recusants.* He declared that the punishments inflicted on them for their religion were inflicted not for its doctrinal character, but for its social results; the religion being taken simply as the index of the disposition, from

* Mr. Hallam's Constitutional History, Chap. III. (Vol. I., p. 160, 4to), and Chap. IV. (Vol. I., p. 244, note, 4to.)

which those social results were produced. Walsingham wrote a letter in 1580 to a similar effect. And even were it granted (which it is not), that the allegation was untrue, the circumstance would in no degree be weakened as a pregnant evidence of the temper of the age. The doctrine of religious toleration in high places, in the mouth of a dominant party, was a sight alike novel and remarkable, and whether sincere or assumed, it indicates that there existed *somewhere* an opinion in favour of freedom of conscience, which has no parallel in preceding times. If it was the view of Lord Burleigh and the court in the exercise of its power, how new the circumstance of an association between such a position and such a sentiment! If it was the public feeling forced upon the government (a far less probable supposition), how different from that same feeling either in a previous generation, or in countries then beneath the sway of the rival church! The fair question suggested by the case is this: would any minister have held the same doctrine in former times, or under a Roman Catholic government at that time? And if not, how are we to account for the difference?

38. We find, in addition, an authentic evidence, in the very Act of the 5th Elizabeth, chap. 1, sect. 17, of the principle on which the oath of supremacy was taken. The passage runs thus:—"Provided always, that forasmuch as the queen's majesty is otherwise sufficiently assured of the faith and loyalty of the temporal lords of her high court of parliament," therefore the oath of supremacy shall not be required of them, nor shall they

be subject to penalties for refusing it. Thus their religion was left free, their allegiance being deemed secure. It is right to add, that the inferences from Mr. Butler's historical details of the persecution in his "Lives,"* when carefully weighed, support both the allegations of Lord Burleigh and of Walsingham, and the tenor of the above-cited passage.

39. The history of Ireland, where the state of things *before* the rebellions is very much misunderstood, affords us a peculiarly instructive contemporary testimony, telling precisely to the same effect.

Deputy Mountjoy writes to the council of Elizabeth, in the end of her reign, in conformity with the tenor of the directions he had received from them:—

"Not that I think too great preciseness can be used in the reforming of ourselves, the abuses of our own clergy, church livings, or discipline; nor that the truth of the gospel can with too great vehemency or industry be set forward, in all places, and by all ordinary means most proper unto itself, that was first set forth and spread in meekness; nor that I think any corporal prosecution or punishment can be too severe for such as shall be found seditious instruments of foreign or inward practices, nor that I think it fit that any principal magistrates should be chosen without taking the oath of obedience, nor tolerated in absenting themselves from public divine service; but that we may be advised how we do punish in their bodies or goods any such only for religion, as do profess to be faithful subjects to her

* Vol. I. See also Southey's Book of the Church, chap. XV.

majesty; and against whom the contrary cannot be proved."*

Accordingly is was the complaint of the Irish recusants in the rebellion of 1641, that the penal laws had lately begun to be put into execution against them from puritanical influence, having before been in a dormant state.

40. It is curious, and should be observed in passing, that the peculiar theory of church and state, which, as given in the eighth book of Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity, seems to have grown out of the circumstances of the English reformation, had a natural tendency, taken alone, to support the doctrine of persecution. The view of church and state as being merely *one* *society*, though under different aspects, seemed to preclude the idea of any essential distinction of the powers which might be legitimately employed for the maintenance of order and authority in each; more especially as schism is an overt act, if not necessarily, yet ordinarily and naturally. Now it is singular to observe that Hooker's theory, which admits the use of the civil sword, appears to have been actually put in practice under the Stuarts, and all ecclesiastical irregularities within the church made the subjects of temporal penalty by the court of high commission. Thus the general tendency of the Reformation, and the particular circumstances of that change in England, were in opposite directions. The former, as might be expected, finally prevailed. And it is remarkable, that the Presbyterian body retained the

* Leland, ii. 383, note.

doctrine of persecution longer and more distinctly than their Episcopalian neighbours, although the authors of the Scottish reformation had so prominently taught the distinctness of the Church and her powers.

41. It is likewise material, in order to a right apprehension of the ecclesiastical policy under James I. and Charles I., to distinguish the punishments which were inflicted by the Star Chamber from those of the High Commission Court; inasmuch as while the latter was ecclesiastical, the former was a civil tribunal, in which prelates appeared as privy councillors, or in virtue of other offices of state which they happened to fill. The High Commission Court, it is but just to state, while acting upon the tyrannical principles which lay involved in the theory of the eighth book of the Ecclesiastical Polity, was firm and impartial in the repression of vice, exacting public penance alike from high and low.* The point, however, here to be chiefly observed is, that the object of this court was to punish ecclesiastical offences. At present, when the legitimate correctional powers of the church have become dormant, it is difficult for us to appreciate, in a moral sense, the character of such a tribunal, and the real difficulty of drawing the line between that which is within the discipline of the Church over her members, and that which is beyond its province. But, however severe the tone of the day, it is clear that persecution, properly so called, was not the principle, but the abuse of the High Commission Court.

42. The capital punishments of Romish priests con-

* Lingard, VI., 324, (4to) ch. V.

tinued in the reign of James I. From 1607 to 1618, sixteen were put to death as traitors for the exercise of their functions. During the great rebellion they suffered under the parliament to the amount on an average of three anually:* the increased excitement and the predominance of puritanism operating more against them than the lapse of time, and the general progress of an opinion unfavourable to capital persecution.

43. Thus far we have seen the principle of private judgment in individuals emerging into life, and scarcely permitted on any terms to differ from the established institutions in religion. We have now to consider the gradual relaxation of those terms, the progress from a partial to a complete toleration. Under Charles I. a greater connivance was allowed to the English recusants, but they were not recognised. Those of Ireland, however, succeeded in obtaining a recognition from the Marquis of Ormond,† who, in his treaty of 1646 with the Romish insurgents, allowed the oath of *allegiance* to be substituted for the oath of supremacy. The stipulation was, that they might take this oath, giving security, at the same time, for their political allegiance, without renouncing the foreign jurisdiction in spirituals. This was a great step. Religious uniformity was no longer to be a condition of citizenship for ordinary purposes.

44. In the English house of peers, indeed, indulgence had from the first proceeded much further, and Roman

* Lingard, VI., 154 and 500, (4to) chap. III. and VII.

† Leland, Book V., chap. VII.

Catholic lords enjoyed their seats until the act of the 30th of Charles II. But this appears to have been rather an exception, permitted from its necessarily narrow range of practical application, than the distinct allowance of a principle. And so it may be observed of the Marquis of Ormond's treaty, that the concession was made under the extreme necessities of war, and did not represent what in the opinions of any Protestant party of the time it would have been, *per se*, wise or desirable to grant.

45. Again, the Independent General Ireton, in his reply to the plea of Browne, one of the Irish insurgents, laid down the following position: "That touching the point of religion there was a wide difference also between us; we only contending to preserve our natural right therein, without imposing our opinions upon other men; whereas they would not be contented, unless they might have power to compel all others to submit to their imposition on pain of death."*

Practically indeed we find this profession illustrated in a singular manner by the ejection of 8000 of the clergy of England; but the fact still remains, that the theory had arisen, and was gradually to work itself out.

46. The reign of Charles II. was not distinguished by the relaxation of the principle of connection between the church and the state. The dread of Romanism at that period defended it on one side, and the recollection of the years 1648—1660, on the other. Accordingly, the corporation act was passed in 1661, to replace

* Leland's Ireland, Vol. III., page 390, note.

churchmen in the possession of municipal offices, by imposing the sacramental test; and the Protestant separation, which now assumed a definite form, did not obtain legal toleration, though the king coquetted with it, and at two periods issued declarations of indulgence, (1662 and 1672) which in deference to his parliament he withdrew. These were disliked, it would appear, by the commons, partly on account of the assumption of prerogative involved in them; partly because their intention was suspected to be that of relieving not the Protestant but the Popish nonconformists. In 1673, the test act was passed. It imposed three restrictions; the oaths of supremacy and allegiance, the *test* of having received the communion in the church, and the abjuration of transubstantiation. Thus it shut the door of all public office against both Romanists and Dissenters, while the former were its special objects, and the Roman Catholic peers were deprived of their hereditary privilege of legislation by the act of 1678.

47. During the very short period of eleven years, from this time to the toleration act in 1689, the church of England had exclusive possession of the precincts of parliament. But the crown was Roman Catholic, really through the whole time up to 1688, and avowedly from the accession of James II. At *no* time, therefore, in strictness of speech, was the whole legislature in *bonâ fide* communion with the church: yet as Charles was a professed churchman, we may, perhaps, set down the last years of his reign as affording a naked exemplification of the principle, too short-lived, how-

ever, and complicated with too many extraneous circumstances, in particular with a denial of toleration, to allow any fair deductions to be drawn.

48. We find, however, a curious fact in the Irish history of reign of Charles II. It was then that the Earl of Granard procured for the puritans of Ireland a pension of 500*l.* annually from government.* Was this the first grant to the professors of a faith not established, excepting such as had reference thereby to what are termed vested interests, like the allowances to the ejected ministers in England? If so, it is very important as the commencement of an actual aid afforded by the government to a form of religion differing from its own; and is to be distinguished, in this point of view, from the concession of Charles I., who agreed to an experiment of Presbyterian government in the church for the period of three years.

49. The suspension of the penal laws by James II., having been illegal, it established no principle and requires here no comment. In 1689 the Toleration Act was passed. It exempted all who should subscribe the declaration of 1678 (that, namely, against transubstantiation) from penalties for holding open religious assemblies; and the indulgence likewise embraced their teachers, on condition of the signing their declaration, taking the oaths, and subscribingthe articles of religion, except part of the 20th, the 34th, 35th, and 36th. But the reign of William III. was otherwise, and more un-

* Leland, Vol. III, p. 490.

favourably distinguished. Influenced apparently by political motives alone, he set the example of allying the crown of Great Britain, by the formal compact of that Act of Parliament which re-established Presbyterian government in Scotland, with two churches. It is true that in the early part of James I.'s reign it stood nearly in the same perdicament, but the anomaly was then felt and removed. In 1690 it was re-established.

50. This reign also supplies us with another instance of assistance given by government to a religion differing from that established; but we should remember that acts so minute as these were probably little more than eleemosynary in their original character.

King William, in the summer of 1690, having landed in Ireland, allowed 1200*l.* per annum to the dissenting ministers in the northern province, who, says Leland,* "had shared deeply in the distresses of war." This pension was afterwards inserted in the civil list, and made payable from the exchequer.

51. The Act of Union with Scotland (May, 1707) further complicated the question with reference to the connection of church and state. By it the nation was involved in the religious anomaly which had formerly belonged to the sovereign alone, and the church of Scotland was incorporated with the constitution of the two united kingdoms upon the same footing, in the most essential respects, with the church of England. Doubtless it was under the belief, however questionable its

* III., p. 559.

foundation, that the differences between the two churches were unimportant, and that unity was not substantially violated by the change. Subsequently to the rebellion of 1745, the episcopalians of Scotland were subjected to a legal suppression of their worship with fine and imprisonment, and their ministers to the penalty of transportation, for exercising beyond the border the very religion which the government protected by tests on this side of it. It was upon political grounds that this conduct was adopted; conduct which may serve to show how delicate is the subject-matter of the question with which we are dealing, and how necessary is a clear comprehension of the principles which should govern the relations between the church and the state.

52. It is not a part of the object of the present pages to furnish a distinct and detailed history of the laws affecting religious nonconformity. The general description of the system of the eighteenth century may be comprised under these few heads:—1. Joint establishment of the Episcopal and Presbyterian forms. 2. Proscription of the Roman Catholic religion generally, on political grounds, and of the Episcopalian religion on the same grounds in Scotland alone. 3. Relaxation as respected the Roman Catholics, and entire relief as regarded the Episcopalians, during the latter part of the century, when danger from the house of Stuart had ceased to be apprehended. 4. Protection of the Established Church of England in office, and the Legislature, by the sacramental test, with an indulgence to Dissenters,

intended to admit them without recognising them as such.

53. The history of the Roman Catholic question should, however, be marked by its chief eras. In 1778 the Roman Catholics of Ireland were empowered by law to hold landed property. In 1791 many professional and other disabilities were removed. In 1793 the elective franchise was given them. And, to pass into the next century, in 1829 the bar to their entrance into the legislature was removed, by their exemption from taking the usual oaths and declaration, and the construction of one to meet their case, by which they engage as follows:—"I do hereby disclaim, disavow, and solemnly abjure any intention to subvert the present church establishment as settled by law within this realm; and I do solemnly swear that I never will exercise any privilege to which I am or may become entitled, to disturb or weaken the Protestant religion or Protestant government in the United Kingdom." The terms of this oath appear to imply, that if Roman Catholics legislate in matters affecting the church for good or for evil, they must do it in the *bonâ fide* intention that it shall be for good; and the great difficulty which it seems to raise is this, that the state exacts from them an obligation, binding them to follow a course as good legislators, which I apprehend, as good Roman Catholics, they are forbidden to take. At the period of this change, the great bulk of the Roman Catholic freeholders were disfranchised. Again they were much increased, and the facility of access to Parliament greatly enlarged, by the Reform Act in 1832.

54. Of the resistance to the Roman Catholic claims it may be said that it intended rather than exhibited a noble and true principle, the pure union of church and state. But the principle was already become a dream of other days. The presence of dissent was already legalised in every form but that of Romanism; and no ground is less tenable than that which defines competency for political office by that mere negation which the term Protestantism is frequently used to designate, and accepts it as a guarantee for something like effective Christianity; a credulity the more strange when exhibited, as is sometimes the case, in company with the cruel and false opinion that, as Protestantism and Christianity are inseparable, so Romanism and Christianity are incompatible.

55. In the year 1828 all Protestant nonconformists obtained a legal recognition of their fitness for Parliament and civil office, by the removal of the sacramental test. The remaining restriction is, that in its place they are required to declare *upon the faith of a Christian*. The definition of Christianity it is left to each individual to determine for himself. Is has been already many times attempted to abolish this declaration; and in the year 1834 a bill reached the House of Lords, which would have left all public offices, with the sole exception, under the crown, of the chancellorship, alike open to men of all religions, or of none.

56. It only remains to notice the gradual expiration of the doctrine of persecution, or civil punishment for religious opinions. The opinions which alone it is now

ever attempted to bring under the notice of the law are not religious, or rather they are not opinions, but mere appeals in contempt of the understanding to the grossest parts of human nature. Perhaps the last case of actual punishment was the separation of Mr. Shelley's children from their father by Lord Eldon as chancellor, and that was incidental, the object being, not the punishment of atheism, but the due education of the children. We find the opinion of the lawfulness of civil penalties on account of religion, under, perhaps, its last forms, in Mr. Locke, and in Bishop Warburton. Mr. Locke teaches, in his work on Toleration, that the man who does not believe in a future life cannot be regarded as a competent citizen, because the state has no security for his good conduct. Bishop Warburton* teaches, that the Quaker, the Anabaptist, the Papist, and the Atheist are all in different degrees the proper object of restraining or penal law; but the Quaker's measure is merely this: that, as he believes war unlawful, he should not be allowed, on the continent, to reside in a frontier town.

57. To prevent misunderstanding it may be well to notice a distinct class of civil penalties, to which members of the church are amenable for certain infractions of its laws.† The general principle of these enactments is, I apprehend, capable of being understood (whatever its historical origin), upon a principle quit disti nct from

* Alliance of Church and State, B. III. Works, Vol. VII., p. 255.

† Enumerated by Mr. Palmer, "On the Church," Part V., Chap. VIII

that of persecution. The question belonging to this place is not one of degree, whether the particular punishments which, for example, a clergyman may suffer for rejecting the use of the Common Prayer be too great or too small, but whether they involve the principle of persecution. It is submitted that they do not. The church, having temporal endowments, may require, in order to guard her internal discipline, the aid of temporal power, that, where the temptations to intrusion and disorder are increased, the means of repressing them may be increased likewise. But whether she might or might not do well to rely more on her intrinsic powers, it is clear that the state may fairly urge the necessity of guarding these endowments as a reason for the enactment of temporal penalties, to follow upon the infringement of the conditions upon which they are held. Such infringement is a violation of the conditions of the compact with the state, and therefore an offence against the state, quite apart from the consideration, that it is also an offence against the apostolic precept of order as interpreted and applied in the existing arrangements.

58. As respects, however, the law of the greater excommunication, which is, *ex vi termini*, applicable only to those who are already out of the church, it still enacts (under 53 Geo. III. cap. 127), that a person* excommunicated for an offence of spiritual cognisance may be

* Burn II., 243; and Blackstone III., 101.

imprisoned for any term not exceeding six months. The temporal judges may see whether the spiritual court had proper cognisance of the cause, and whether the excommunication be according to law, and, if it be not, may direct the absolution of the party. It should be observed, that the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts is mainly conversant with the mixed matters which are connected with wills, and with a particular class of crimes.* In the Act 29 Car. II., cap. 9, sect. 2, the penalty for excommunication, of course with its civil consequences, is, however, reserved in case of proved heresy. The proceeding is undoubtedly antiquated; and it is doubtful whether a law, which for so long a series of years has not been brought into operation, should or should not be considered as expressing the mind of the legislature.

59. But how singular is the perverseness of human nature—apparently the only rule to which it clings amidst every variety of fluctuation. There is no period of our history which exhibits a full and consistent development of a satisfactory system of principles. When our legislature was bound to take all its members from the church, we were intolerant. When toleration was established, we relaxed the principle of the unity of the national religion. By the time each successive truth was established, new falsehoods had sprung up to replace those which were exploded. Thus it is that, in

* "Matrimony, bastardy, adultery, and the rest."—*Burn* II., 31.

the mixed combinations of worldly affairs, even the most needful, and, on the whole, beneficial changes, bear within them the seeds of disorganisation.

60. Taking our stand then at the point where the *civil* right of private judgment may be considered as having received full and absolute recognition by the legal establishment of entire toleration, we find that it there begins to operate in a manner which, if its acts be translated into words, would be somewhat as follows:—"In vain it is pretended to give me, a private individual, the liberty of forming my own opinion, if secular advantages are to be attached to the profession of other and different opinions, in which mine is not to participate: since every such advantage will manifestly act as in the nature of a comparative discouragement on the one side, and inducement on the other, creating, therefore, a bias in the minds of men, and impairing the freedom of their judgment." To which, in certain cases, may be added the yet more palpable charge that money is taken from the individual to support the doctrines which he denies. I. is now not proposed to refute these fallacious allegations, but, having shown their connection with private judgment, to trace their influence on the relations of the state with the church.

61. The discharge of civil office is in its first aspect a duty, but it also partakes of the nature of a reward. Its emoluments in part, but more than these its powers and distinctions, render it to the majority of men, in their several stations, an object ardently desired. So long as theological opinion was in profession one and

the same, no objection could be made against one individual as a canditate for civil office, nor any preference awarded to another, on the ground of religious belief as such. But when different sentiments in religion were permitted to exist without legal animadversion, the case was materially changed. The individual who found that his creed was the obstacle to his enjoyment of office, and who was irritated by exclusion, argued with plausibility, that matters of belief ought not to exclude him from duties whose obvious bearing was upon subjects of a distinct nature. And these considerations would gain force progressively, as the simple principles of early society became complicated in its advance, by the immense multiplication of human enjoyments, and of human wants, and the consequently augmented proportion which temporal interests bore in the science and practice of government to the higher portions of its subject-matter.

62. But public offices were the organs of the national life. In them the personality of the nation had its province and means of action. And the supreme government had received, from the order of things established at the Reformation, the especial charge of impregnating the whole of that national life with the spirit and energy of the national religion. Hence the struggle in this country, incited by contemporaneous causes from opposing quarters, between the established church for the retention of civil office, and the Dissenters and Romanists on the other hand for a share in its possession.

It may, indeed, have been mere human selfishness which prompted the attack on the one hand, and sustained the resistance on the other. But, sometimes predominating over this degrading motive, and ever parallel with it, there was a movement and a counter-movement of a distinct nature. The movement was that towards a dissolution of the union between church and state: the counter-movement, or resistance, was that of instinctive aversion to the first stages of such a proceeding. Not that all those of the movement contemplated, or were bound in reason to contemplate, its termination: not that there are not between its two extremities rational and tenable positions: not that we venture to pronounce an opinion upon the merits; but that, clearly, admission to civil office without religious distinction shortened the road over which men had to travel towards that consummation which is now coming into view.

63. Although the first plea of the Romanist and the Dissenter may be considered as no more than this, that their differences from us in religious belief did not absolutely disqualify them from the discharge of public functions ostensibly secular; yet, when once they were opened, nothing remained to refute the idea of an absolutely equal competency in them to fulfil the general purposes of government with that of persons belonging to the church. If the oath taken by Roman Catholic members be an exception to the state of facts assumed by this observation, yet let us remark how much soreness has been evinced under the pressure of that oath;

how much regret at its original enactment, how much desire for its repeal. And it is difficult and invidious for A to say to B, or for a class A to say to a class B, our fitness is superior to yours, when the legal recognition is the same. Thus we have, first, a state of circumstances facilitating religious differences; then, because men will not willingly resign objects of desire, we have the effort to separate all consideration of such differences from that of the requisites to civil office. And next, here is first insinuated, and finally affirmed, the principle, that differences in religious opinion have no bearing upon the discharge of political and social duties, but that they may be fulfilled equally well by men of all creeds.

64. There is, however, a very important auxiliary cause which accelerates the arrival of a state at the terrific principle which has been just enunciated. We shall reach it by considering what is contained under the term *all* creeds. Now, when toleration was first conceded, and when the possession of civil office under the form of legislative station was laid open to Dissenters in this country, under annual acts of indemnity, it was assumed that the subjects of this indulgence agreed with us in the fundamental parts of our religion, and only differed in things unimportant. We have examples of a somewhat similar kind in the case of the subscription to thirty-five articles, and part of a thirty-sixth, out of the thirty-nine, which was required in the Toleration Act; and in the establishment of Presbyterianism in Scotland, which we may well believe would not have

been dreamt of, had there not been a concurrence between it and the national church of England in the most prominent doctrines of Christianity. And those, with whom our church had to deal as nonconformists in England, were persons professing to adhere to a creed the same as our own.

65. But however wise and salutary, for certain purposes, be the distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental truths in religion, the difficulty and the danger here incurred was this: that a government was an inconvenient judge of that distinction, not so much from want of the means to discern where it might be admitted, and where vital matters began to be called in question, as from incapacity to make its award intelligible to men, of whom the majority are apt to regard theological differences as visionary, or quibbling, or trivial; and yet without whose acquiescence it cannot permanently enforce its decisions. For instance, those who as Presbyterians might have taught with us what relates to the person and offices of the Redeemer, have sunk as a body, in England, into Socinianism, or what is worse. Thus the religious differences, of which our constitution has now agreed to take no account, are limited only by the assumption of the name of Christianity, not by adherence to any fixed institutions, or even creeds. I am not aware that this can be avoided. The ground on which public law is to stand and to act must be broad and palpable; and, having once left the intelligible position of our own national church, the reformed Catholic church in England, I know not where

we could have stopped, so as to have found a tenable resting-place, but at the name of Christianity, which indicates a distinction less broad, indeed, in itself, than the former one, but yet intelligible, and pointing out what is as yet, upon the whole, and in a great majority of cases, a very substantial difference.

66. And yet it remains unfortunately true, that religious systems the most entirely heterogeneous are comprised under that common denomination. This, however, is the misfortune, not the fault, of our constitution. Its intent is not to recognise Christianity as a name, but as a system which should be vitally operative upon human character. It wants, however, an adequate test, which would ascertain under what forms it is thus operative for good; and through this want it is obliged to be content with the name, as the only one that can be had. But yet we must not conceal from ourselves that all the elements of the vitality embodied in the church are hopelessly excluded from some of those systems of religion which, notwithstanding, cling to the Christian name. Yet their professors are recognised as equally qualified for the discharge of political functions with those whose possession of the Christian covenant, if it does not in all cases lead them to a corresponding holiness of life, is nevertheless the appointed, and the exclusively appointed, though not invariably successful means of generating that character. It remains, therefore, that, among us, men vitally at variance on matters of religion are held equally competent to be good citizens and officers of the state.

67. Doubtless the recognised admission of all Christian denominations into the legislature was not intended, by those who made the concession, in any degree to qualify the obligations of the state to a conscientious support of the Christian church. It was a calculation made in charitable error, that where different classes of Christians met in the state, and the creed of one was in long-established possession of the privileges of nationality, partly its prescriptive title, partly their being held to have common interests as Christians, more important than their points of difference as denominations, would ensure their harmonious co-operation in support of the great principle of national religion. But we might, at least, have hoped that, while using all fair means to modify the composition of the national church in their own sense, and thus amicably contending for the supremacy of truth, they would not have violated unity, its fundamental law, by promoting or permitting, as they now do, the legal support of all forms of religion, and thus altogether contravening the idea of a national conscience.

68. It would seem, at first sight, that little space remains between the present position and the dissolution of the union between the church and the state; but it is not quite so. The personal composition of a government does not immediately or invariably determine its public policy and principles, although it of course has a tendency to work these round into harmony with itself. We may have surrendered some of the defences and outworks of national religion, but we have main-

tained the principle: because all those who exercise office among us are, either by their membership churchmen, or, in the view of the law, assumed to be at worst indifferent, or, in the case of being Roman Catholics, and therefore having presumably a rival interest, by the specific obligations which they undertake, obliged to refrain from using any of their powers thus acquired to the detriment of the church establishment. But the citadel, not yet surrendered, is unequivocally beleaguered; and the tendency of that proud, ungodly spirit, which brands the forehead of the age, is not only to tolerate, in the occupant of civil office, a personal incapacity to discharge its obligations aright, so far as they bear upon the welfare of our religion, but to sever from that occupancy altogether any obligation to promote its purposes, or to respect its existence. And this spirit of the age it is which claims to be true and genuine Protestantism, just as Romanism assumes the honours of the Catholic church.

69. And now let us trace the workings of this principle, supposing for a moment that it should be unsuccessfully resisted, and should attain its full development. As regards the personal composition of the government and the legislature, it avows the desire to remove the remaining restriction, that of a profession of Christianity. If it gains this, it gains, probably, everything. For the anomaly of appointing persons who deny Christianity to legislate for its benefit, would be so palpable and glaring, it would so grate upon the average common sense of mankind, as speedily to bring the question to

issue, whether the support of Christianity be one of the proper objects of legislation, and powerfully to assist towards a fatal decision. But there would be an anterior question. We should first be called to do, in our law and policy, what has been already done in reference to personal qualifications for office; to generalise and relax our obligation; to contemplate, in what is deemed a liberal spirit, the advancement, not merely of the interests of the church, but of religion at large, under the different forms of it bearing the Christian name. Nay, already, in some departments of the empire, we have taken this step in advance; and the tendency is to make it the universal rule.

70. It would appear, furthermore, that such is a fair consequence of the great axiom, which the false philosophy of liberalism professes, that men of different religious creeds, whatever be that difference, are equally well fitted for the discharge of civil office. If this be so, it may reasonably be asked, why should the state support the church called national, in particular, when her religious system does not render to the state any peculiar benefit, greater than that which may be yielded by other religious bodies? How can the state, which is composed, and composed with equal propriety, of all sects, recognise a religious superiority in the church? The religious superiority of any system must be recognised by the adherents of that system: but the component parts of the state do not belong to that system more than to any other. There can be no support, therefore, on the ground of a conscientious adherence, by a state,

in which liberalism shall have worked out its will. And again, the churchman is no fitter for state purposes than the member of any sect: why, then, should the state, by endowing the church, attempt to make churchmen?

71. And this dangerous plausibility will further plead, that in the absence of any affirmative reason for a preference on the part of the state towards the church, there are very strong affirmative reasons in a contrary direction; namely, in the jealousy and the offence, the general disaffection and hindrance to the course of government which will ensue, if such a principle be persevered in. And thus flattering pictures will be drawn of the good will and peace that are to result when no religious preference is manifested by the government, but every sect shall share in its paternal bounty, by men forgetting all the while, or suppressing the fact, that the support of religion is not principally a boon to individuals, but a homage to truth, their only sure treasure and defence, and a public acknowledgment of our duty to seek it. To us, indeed, if our constitutional condition has been rightly estimated, such arguments ought to be of no avail; but we ought to press right onwards, bating no jot of heart or hope, and not relaxing the law of religious unity, but rather striving to bring men to a sense of the duty of compliance with its requisitions.

72. Here, then, is another in the chain of evils which have arisen out of human sinfulness, in the abuse of private judgment, first neglecting the truth, and then insulting it by placing upon the same level with it every

form of error; irritated, it may be, by a different form of that same sinfulness, which, working in another sphere and in another way, has omitted to carry out, in the appointed manner, the sanctifying influences of Christianity, and has employed secular rigour or political corruption in their stead. But what we have to observe is, how this class of mischiefs appears to be lineally descended from that bastard offspring of the Reformation, the irreverent abuse of private judgment. The Reformation itself was in the main a reassertion of truth; but this is a consecration of error. First, the multiplication of differences in belief; then, the denial of the relevancy of those differences to the competency of men for civil office; with the sliding out of an allowance of division in things indifferent, to one embracing fundamentals also. Then, when the state is indifferently composed of all creeds, it can have no conscientious obligation to one; and it will probably obtain some momentary and most delusive calm when it has placed all on the same footing of pecuniary countenance and support.

73. But will this last? It might be difficult to determine whether it be or be not desirable that it should. It involves either the destruction of anything like a true theory of government, or the eradication of conscience on the part of government. If a government be purely a mechanical contrivance for representing, in the same proportions in which they are entertained, the wishes of the people, in this view it may be desirable that all sects should have religious aid, and the govern-

ment would incur no guilt. But why? Because it is by the very supposition purely servile, and has no free agency of its own; no right to do otherwise than as the numerical majority of the people command. If it *has* a free agency, or a competency to act upon its own conviction and conscience in matters of religion, how can we wish that, by supporting all creeds, no matter what their amount of difference, it should confound together truth and falsehood, and feed heresy out of what ought to be the patrimony of the faith?

74. But again, will this system of indiscriminate support endure? It has only been once tried in juxtaposition, on an extensive scale, with real and independent democratic institutions. The case of Prussia is not in point. That government is not a natural, but an artificial formation. There is no free expansion of the tendencies of the several creeds which it rears up in local proximity. The iron hand of the law restrains free discussion. The penalty of imprisonment is denounced against controversial sermons!* But in America, a popular government quickly got rid of this hybrid method, and left every form of faith to its own resources. Whether because there was a suspicion of unfairness in distribution; or because it was thought that a machinery, avowed to be exclusively secular, ought not

* This circumstance was disclosed by a paper presented to Parliament during the Session of 1836, the apparent intention of which was, by an exhibition of the system of perfect toleration erroneously supposed to prevail in Prussia, to favour the progress of the measures then proposed in relation to the church of Ireland.

to become liable to suspicion from taking cognisance of religion at all; or because it seemed a circuitous and cumbrous method of applying men's money to their purposes, to take it from them to the government, and then pay it back; or because some minds painfully felt the monstrous evil of ascribing to all religions one and the same character; or because it was deemed that popular will, being the foundation of each religious system, ought also to be the measure of its support, and that some might wish, for the purity of their faith, an establishment more economical than according to the government quota it could have been; or because those who were determined to retrench altogether the expensive superfluity of a religious profession, resented, in the pride of private will, being laid under a tax, avowedly for benefit to themselves, of which benefit they denied the existence, and were willing to forego the use. Whether it be from any of these causes, or from all, or from others, the fact at least is unquestionable, that the system termed American has utterly vanished from the face of the land which gave it birth. May those who seem to be entering on a similar course look forward before it shall have become too late to look backward!

75. We are now within one stage of our conclusion. In those considerations which have just been suggested, backed as they are by such results as experience has under fair circumstances hitherto afforded, we may see abundant reasons to believe, that when the state shall have finally cast off its allegiance to and preference for

the church, and shall have substituted in its stead the practice of undistinguishing support to whatever terms itself religion, or even to professing Christianity in all its forms, it will soon be found the more convenient and natural course to withhold all interference with the pecuniary affairs of religious societies. The best and most natural basis for a government to adopt is, that Catholic church in which is realised the whole mind of God. An intelligible basis is that upon which we stand, and upon which is joined with the English establishment that northern one, which, although it has lost the Apostolical government and succession, nevertheless does embody a fixed and a definite form, if not a complete one, of religious truth, and a form, too, which we have seen by a long experience to be not without the blessing of God, and operative for good on human character. I do not say that such a position should have been taken; but that, having been taken, it may and should certainly be defended from further invasion.

76. The profession, however, of a religion by the legislature is less assailed than its propagation. We are not yet ready to acquiesce in the proposal which has found an organ but not an echo in the House of Commons, that acts of worship should be discontinued in the great council of the nation. So long as the worship is maintained, and as that worship is of the church, both the personality and the conscience of government are recognised. As to the duty of active pecuniary support to the national church, that must depend upon

our abilities. If we are absolutely precluded from its performance for the time, let it be considered as suspended. In that negative state with regard to *propagation*, so that we retain always the profession, we may acquiesce; but let us not be led into the fatal error of establishing all creeds, or affirm a false principle merely because we want power to carry out the true one. When the propagation has been generalised, can the unity of profession be long maintained?

77. Thus it has been attempted, in part by speculation from the past, but more from its actual records, to connect certain existing phenomena indicative of evil, with the workings of the principle of Protestantism when it is carried out into a vicious excess, uncontemplated by its authors; and to trace those phenomena to their final effects, upon the principle of connection between church and state. We have seen it tend first to multiply differences; then to raise a question upon the relevancy of those differences to the competency for civil office; to decide that question in the negative; then to render the practice and principles of the state itself conformable to those of the individuals to whom has been given the civil right of bearing authority in it; to throw off, accordingly, as invidious and intolerant, the principle of preference for the church; and lastly, to discover what under such circumstances can hardly be denied, its own inaptitude for meddling with religion at all.

78. And all this we have ascribed, I believe with strict truth, to that principle of religious liberalism into which Protestantism is apt to degenerate. But there is

a parallel and concurrent action of political liberalism which aids in producing the same results. I do not stop to inquire how far political institutions are biassed towards democracy by the prevalence of a Protestant form of religion. But some might be inclined to rate that influence highly. That Romanists have been disaffected in Belgium or in Ireland, that they have been (according to the judgment testimony of M. de Tocqueville) antifederalists in America, does not make against this opinion. Let us see a state of such magnitude as to be really integral and independent, in which the church of Rome is effective and supreme, and where institutions are democratic, before we pronounce our definitive judgment. But for present purposes I assume a popular view of government, to be not the child nor even the twin brother of Protestantism, but simply a contemporary phenomenon: and it will probably appear, upon a very brief consideration, that when once we have surrendered the paternal theory of government, and made it an arbitrary or conventional institution, whether its form be monarchical or not, we have put the principle of a national establishment in imminent jeopardy.

79. While government, under whichever of its modes, is viewed in the light of a divine institution, not emanating from the mere will of the society over which it rules, there is nothing incongruous or offensive in ascribing to it rights independent of that will. Nay, they are not necessarily invalidated even by the fact of opposition to it, because will is not the ground of its tenure. But they must be in accordance with the real interests of

the body governed; since, whatever we may conceive of the historical or moral origin of government, there can be no doubt that it exceeds its rights when it acts in opposition to the true welfare of the people. In the purely popular form, however, it would seem that the will must be taken as the criterion of the interests. In the purely despotic form, there is a fatal vice in the want of any sufficient guarantee for a regard to the latter. But in the mixed form, with which we are blessed, so much of will is introduced as is deemed enough to secure attention to the interests; while at the same time government has not renounced its right to consult for the benefit of the community, even independently of its inclinations.

80. In such a state of things, no constitutional objection can be raised, if the state shall give its preference and support to that religion which it deems best for the country. It does not recognise a right of disposal in the people over all the funds dedicated to national purposes. It does not recognise their property in them, where they have become national, but their right to have them appropriated for the best advantage of the nation. We speak now not simply of money-votes from year to year, but of perpetual endowments. The state need not therefore determine by a process of mere enumeration what shall be its religion.

81. But when it is allowed that government is no more than the representative of the people, the exponent of its will, then all funds committed to the administration of the government are in fact submitted to the will of

the people; and all taxes legally allotted to and raised by the government still continue the property of the people; and government has no duty to perform other than accurately to realise and effectuate in the legislature and in the law the different forces of opinion which act upon it from the country: it has no right to express a preference of its own for any religion as being the wisest or the best; nor to offer a religion to the man who is without one, or a better one to the man who has a worse. And the subject, too, becomes restive. He imagines that the public funds are still *his*. He naturally objects to give *his* money to a form of faith which he does not approve. He calls this, and in certain cases may plausibly think it, a scruple of conscience. His objection would be valid if the money were his.

82. But the theory which teaches him that government is only the proportional index of the several wills of himself and his neighbour, teaches him that the money is his, and that his rights over it, and his responsibilities connected with it, continue even when it has passed from him by legal demand. Thus his jealousy and his sympathies are touched in the tenderest point. He exclaims against a law which renders him, he thinks, an actual participant in wrong. He agitates against such a law, and this whether in a majority or a minority; for he argues, and argues truly, that a majority has no right to make a minority do what is morally wrong. The obligations of personal duty are superior to those of the social compact.

83. If indeed a termination could be put to differences

of religious belief, then the popular theory of government need not, it would seem, cause a difficulty in maintaining the connection between church and state. No offence, real or supposed, would then be given to the conscience, because the payments would be in every case for the support of his own religion. In a Roman Catholic democracy, therefore, supposing it to exist under the conditions before mentioned, it does not appear why the church of Rome should not be recognised by the state. But where differences of creed are allowed, as in all Protestant states, and where with these there co-exists the democratic theory of government, who does not see that a train of motives and of actions is laid, threatening perpetual dissension, while the union of church and state is maintained? One alternative indeed will remove that dissension. When nothing is given to any form of religion whatever by the government, then no ground of complaint will be left, and not till then. Thus it is that the Protestant principle of religion and the popular principle of politics, each carried to excess, together bear their hostile influences against the principle of a connection between the church and the state, although the former, in its legitimate form, was highly favourable to that connection.

CHAPTER VII.

THE PRESENT CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE.

1. The subject is not *res integra*. 2. Certain distinctions to be taken. 3. Hypothetical standard of comparison. 4. Signs of the nationality of the church in England. 5. How far it is constitutionally distinguished from that of Scotland. 6—13. Case of the Scottish establishment argued. 14, 15. Illustrative facts. 16—21. Illustrative facts in England. Navy—Army—Prisons—Workhouses—Schools—Vote for Protestant Dissenters. 22—28. Illustrative facts in Ireland. College of Maynooth—Regium Donum—National System of Education—Chaplains in Gaols, in Workhouses. 29, 30. Case of the Colonies. 31—40. Illustrative facts in the North American Colonies. 41—53. Illustrative facts in the West Indian Colonies. 54—56. Illustrative facts in the Mediterranean Colonies. 57—64. Illustrative facts in the Australian Colonies. 65—67. Illustrative facts in the East Indies. 68—70. Concluding remarks.

1. THE portion of my task next in order is to exhibit, as clearly as reference to existing documents will enable me, the present singularly chequered practice of the state of Great Britain in its relations to religion under various forms. It is a great mistake to suppose, that the pure idea of church and state, as they ought to be, and would be, wedded, if the duty of Christian unity were properly recognised, remains unimpaired among us; either as regards the terms of the state's alliance with the church, which represents its own religious

conscience, or again as respects its adherence to the dictates of that conscience, in acting on the principle of which so much has recently been heard and declining to support a religion of which it does not approve. The former question is hardly within the view of these pages; as far as it is relevant to their object, it has been considered elsewhere; and it remains a matter for consideration and adjustment in detail, so long as the connection retains enough of substantial life to be worth contending for.

2. This then is the question. Does the relation between church and state still exist in the practice of our political institutions, in such a form as to be worth contending for? And this we must answer by a careful attention to all those numerous details which appear either to exemplify or to compromise the idea. In the consideration of them, we must distinguish between *definite* and *indefinite* deviation; between things done, and no longer within our free choice, and things referred to that free choice, by a proposal to do them; and lastly, between our home and our colonial administration; for it appears very difficult to maintain that such an identity of national life subsists between the United Kingdom and her dependencies abroad, as would enable us to carry out in them precisely the same principles of alliance between the church and the state, as those for which we contend at home.

3. We have seen that there has existed no period in our history which accurately exemplifies what we have put forward as the ideal perfection of the theory. Not

before Protestantism, nor in its early stages, namely, up to the twelfth year of the reign of Elizabeth, the era of the separation of the English Romanists from the church, because these differences of opinion were forcibly suppressed from without. Not from that time till 1678, because the legislature was not wholly of the church, and separatism was still forbidden and repressed by the civil power. Not from 1678 to 1689, because the latter of these reasons still continued in force. Not from 1689 onwards, because the crown had involved itself in serious compromise, by uniting with two churches not in Christian communion with each other. We may take, however, roughly, as the standard with which to compare our present state, these three notions:—a legislature composed exclusively of members of the church; pecuniary and legal support to the church alone; a free toleration.

4. If we are asked wherein now consists, or by what signs is attested, the nationality of the church in England, we answer thus:—

Firstly. By the necessity that the sovereign should be a member of it, and that his membership should be ascertained in the true, authentic manner, namely, through the act of communion.

Secondly. By the necessity that the Lord High Chancellor, the keeper of the sovereign's conscience, should likewise be of the church.

Thirdly. By the coronation service, both in the sense of its terms, and in the performance of its distinctive act by the Archbishop of Canterbury.

Fourthly. By the presence of the bishops in the House of Lords, on behalf of the national estate for religion.

Fifthly. By the presence of certain of them in the privy council, on the same behalf, officially.

Sixthly. By the summoning of the convocation along with the parliament under the royal writ.

Seventhly. By the terms in which the parliament itself is summoned, to deliberate *de arduis rebus ecclesiam et statum concernentibus.*

Eighthly. By the solemn daily worship with which the proceedings of both houses of parliament are commenced.

Ninthly. By the restrictions which the state has imposed upon the enactment of church laws, and which it could have no title to impose, except upon the supposition of the nationality of the church.

Tenthly. By her acknowledged subjection, in respect to *some* power of regulating her temporalities.

Eleventhly. By the oath of Roman Catholics, which disclaims all intention of using their political powers in parliament so as to be injurious to her.

Twelfthly. By the declaration which all holders of office are obliged to take.

Thirteenthly. By the act of union with Scotland.

Fourteenthly. By the act of union with Ireland. (These are selected, because they are, if the expression may be allowed, fundamental statutes.)

Fifteenthly. By the authority of the ecclesiastical courts.

Sixteenthly. By the possession of the tithes, whether we consider them as (to use the phrase of Mr. Coleridge) the *reserved nationality* for the purposes of religion, or as endowments attached to the persons of the clergy.

Seventeenthly. By the right to church-rates for the maintenance of the fabric and conduct of the service.

Eighteenthly. By the civil privileges conferred on the church universities.

Nineteenthly. We may place together some minor signs of recognition; as the opening of assizes by the judges with attendance at church; and the practice of the municipal bodies generally to resort thither, in smaller or greater numbers, but in their official capacity. Other particulars might be specified.

5. Upon a review of these articles we are forcibly struck with one great and very important distinction between the constitutional position of the English and the Scottish establishments. Although the latter has acquired by compact the legal possession of a portion of the empire, and a claim to pecuniary support, proportionably to her needs: yet the whole personal profession of religion in the state remains with the church of England. The church membership of the sovereign, the worship of the state in her solemn assemblies, the terms of the writ, the parallel summons of the convocation, the participation of the bishops in legislative powers, all seem to show that the state, so far as it is a moral being, is still, in some special sense, of the communion of the English church.

6. But the case of the Scottish church is isolated and peculiar, and appears to require a separate consideration. The general drift of our arguments has undoubtedly been to the effect that the state ought to have respect to separatism as well as to heterodoxy,—ought not only to support religion, but the church, as its appointed depositary; and if that church be one in body as well as in spirit, it may at first sight seem a proper consequence that the Scottish establishment should be disavowed or altered to a different constitution susceptible of union with our own; but that, if not, it destroys that principle of a personal religion in the state for which we have been contending.

7. The Scotch establishment has every feature that can mitigate the anomaly and evil of a case of separatism. It is, in the words of Mr. Smith,* the "national estate of religion" for that kingdom. It has fixity of creed. It is now rid of its ancient prejudices against the episcopal government, which is generally regarded with positive favour by its clergy. The character of that body is most exemplary. The administration of patronage is wonderfully pure. The temporalities of the church are husbanded so as to produce a great amount of beneficial agency from limited means. The operation of the system on the people tends to order, loyalty, and yet more to a general knowledge and fear of God, which those who have lived among the Scottish people will ever be glad and forward to acknowledge. Lastly,

* Letter VI. on National Religion.

some distinguished members of the body of the Scottish clergy are now arguing that they have the legitimate apostolical succession, through John Knox and his coadjutors as presbyters, and grounding their own title to the ministry on that foundation.* It should not be our desire to depreciate the praise which God has given. We should wish our own principles to be tried by the standard of truth, and it would be most iniquitous to suppress facts because they may appear to countenance deductions unfavourable to our purpose.

8. Now our principle is, that there is one revealed catholic church, of which the apostolical succession in the ministry is a condition, as well as truth of doctrine; one in body as well as in spirit, and having that succession as appertaining essentially to its body. This position is not shaken, however it may be shown that it has pleased God to work out His own wise purposes through different, though parallel channels, and to bring men back to His own blessed image in His Son by means other than those explicitly shown to us. It does not remain the less our duty to abide in that institution where we know that the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ is administered not merely from our *human judgment* of its results, but from the fact that our ministers have his historically attested command and commission.

9. If, then, unity be a principle of the church, and the church a part of religion, ought governments voluntarily

* See the Rev. J. Cumming's Apology for the Church of Scotland. London, 1837.

to surrender as unimportant any such part, however to fleshly perceptions it be separable from the essence? It would appear, certainly not. The great fact still remains applicable to the Scottish church and its participation in the connection with the state, that it involves a breach of the principle of unity in the body. How, then, it may be asked, are we justified in continuing to support it? in recognising its extension, both at home and throughout the colonies?

10. The difficulty is great, but the answer appears to me to be this:—It has become matter of law, and of compact and good faith by the law as such. To this extent it may be said, *fieri non debuit, factum valet.* As individuals, those who hold the unity of the body are bound to endeavour to restore the apostolical system in the national estate of religion for Scotland; and, for that end, to use every fair means of procuring the alteration of the law. But the Act of Union with Scotland recites an Act of the Scottish Parliament, establishing the church with its Presbyterian discipline, and requiring of the sovereign an oath to maintain it; and it makes the observance of this Act a fundamental and essential condition of the Union. Thus it has become a part of the nation's organic life, and, as a part thereof, still under the same contract, it claims that we shall fulfil, on its behalf, all that belongs to a national establishment.

11. When the church government was altered, and the succession abolished, the establishment still retained all its claims, in the view of the Scottish legislature, as the national estate of religion. It was not intended or

expressed that these claims should be foregone. On the contrary, the constitutional obligation which, before the Union, affected only Scotland and the Crown, was, by the Union, imparted to England, by a compact definitely expressed. The compact was virtually this: that the representatives of the Scottish nation, consenting to incorporate themselves, as a small minority, with the vastly greater number of Englishmen, in the British House of Commons, meant to retain their full power of acting for their church; and that, consequently, we are bound to take care that, within the limits of equitable proportion, their demands on behalf of their national estate of religion shall be allowed to take effect, and shall be accurately represented in the aggregate result of the deliberations and wills of the mixed body; and that our own free agency is tied down to afford them the means of carrying out their claims under the compact so understood.

12. One of those claims, in this sense, is for additional grants at home, in order to extend its ministrations to all those within the realm of Scotland who, through defect, whether of ability or of will, are without a religion. Another is, that when her Presbyterian children pass forth into the colonial dependencies of the empire, they shall still be entitled to share in the public aid afforded to religion. It seems to me difficult to read fairly the Act of Union without acknowledging the justice of this demand, as one of equity; and, therefore, in consenting to give effect to it by legislative acts, we do no more than discharge an obligation incumbent

upon us until the law is altered; just as we should be bound to discharge it if the Scotch church, instead of being Presbyterian, were Independent or Roman Catholic. It is obvious, that the members of the Anglican church might, by their votes in Parliament, overbear the representatives of Scotland and alter the Union; but it is not less clear, I think, that such an act would virtually be a breach of covenant; and, therefore, it is not option or discretion, but plighted faith, which entails upon us the support of the Scottish church: just as we have ever contended in England that Dissenters are bound to pay church-rates, irrespective of their approval or disapproval of that worship which such payments are intended to maintain.

13. As respects, however, the mass of persons, and the average of principle, now conversant with our civil affairs, the difficulty does not arise. There is little idea of religious unity among us, except a concurrence in certain doctrines, and outward separation is deemed a circumstance of trivial importance. Many persons of sincere piety do not object to consider themselves as members both of the English and of the Scottish church; according as they may happen to reside, at different seasons of the year, south or north of the Border. And no man can think that the personality of the state is more stringent, or entails straiter obligations, than that of the individual. We can hardly, therefore, expect any strong sense of the need of explanation upon this subject to be generally entertained; but there is every reason to believe that, as the minds

of men are drawn to the question at large, they will become more and more alive to the existing anomaly and its consequences.

14. Under the Act of Union the church of Scotland has been recognised as entitled to pecuniary assistance from the state, by actual grants during the present century, for the erection of churches, and for church schools, in which the Assembly's Catechisms are taught, as well as in a very general recognition through our colonies, and in certain regiments of the army presumed to belong to her communion. Further, in reference to some efforts, recently made by her ministers and members, especially her gifted professor of divinity in Edinburgh, Dr. Chalmers, it has been understood that her Majesty's government are disposed to devote the bishops' teinds, which are now state property, to the object of extending the Scottish church in country parishes where the means of pastoral care are insufficient for the existing population.

15. But she has a still more unequivocal support under the Acts 50 Geo. III. c. 84, and Geo. IV. c. 72, by which it is provided, that whenever the teinds fall short in any parish of the sum of £158 6*s*. 8*d*., (of which amount £8 6*s*. 8*d*. is allotted on account of the elements for the communion,) that sum shall be made up from the Exchequer. There are 196 parishes of Scotland which fall within the terms of these statutes, and they appear to receive aid to the amount of between £16,000 and £17,000 annually, which may be taken as representing a capital of nearly half a million. If we join

to this the grants for other ecclesiastical purposes, it would appear that the church of Scotland has received from the state, during the present century, in proportion to the extent of her communion, a considerably greater share of pecuniary assistance than the church of England.

16. In the British navy, we believe, there is no recognition of any other worship than that of the established church, and no permission, even to Roman Catholic sailors, to absent themselves from its habitual celebration on board ship. Isolation at sea has prevented any allowance to the men of leave to attend their own minister or sect, and any permission of absence would probably have been found incompatible with discipline. To determine accurately the merits of the present practice would require considerable discussion and detail; our present object is to note facts.

17. In the British army the practice is, it appears, somewhat more varied. Under the general orders of the service, Roman Catholic soldiers are everywhere exempted from attending the service of the church. In Ireland their officers resort to chapel with them, in order to prevent their being tampered with by political harangues; but the precaution hardly meets the supposed necessity, as the sermons are often in Irish. There is no similar exemption for dissenters; probably because no rule of their religious communities in general forbids their attendance at the worship of the establishment. At each military home station divine service is performed by local clergymen of the established churches

in England and Scotland respectively. Episcopalians and Roman Catholics are entitled, in Scotland, to repair to their respective churches. The troops stationed in the forts in Scotland are allowed the services of a Presbyterian clergyman at the public expense. Thus it would appear that the principle of the army is, a full toleration of the Roman Catholics, a recognition of the established church of Scotland in Scotland, of the church of England elsewhere.

18. To continue our review of public institutions: we are not aware that in any prisons or workhouses of this country persons have been, up to the present year (1838), entertained as officers belonging to the establishments in any spiritual capacity, except clergymen of the church of England. The ministers of other persuasions are admitted to attend those who desire their aid, with more or less freedom, according to the nature of the institution and its management. At Milbank Penitentiary, for instance, which is a prison, and a correctional one, Roman Catholic priests are allowed to attend Roman Catholic prisoners in the cases when a desire to that effect is expressed, but the same liberty is not given to Protestant dissenters. The Roman Catholic prisoners, however, in a large majority of cases, willingly and even gladly receive the instructions of the chaplain, attending the worship of the church, and even partake of the holy communion according to the liturgy. During the late session of Parliament, a clause was introduced, in the House of Commons, into a bill for the management of prisons, authorising the

appointment to gaols, under certain circumstances, of ministers not belonging to the church; but as the bill was lost at an early stage in the Upper House, there was no opportunity of ascertaining the full amount of specific objection entertained to this particular enactment.

19. The aid of the state is given in England to schools of two kinds, those in connection with the Incorporated National Society, and those under the British and Foreign School Society. The former follow Bell, the latter Lancaster. The former give a definitive *church* education, teaching the catechism, using prayer, and require attendance at the public worship of the church; the latter adopt the Bible as their basis of religious instruction, ostensibly renouncing exposition of a controversial, or what we should rather call a doctrinal kind; this line, however, is far from being accurately observed in practice. An Unitarian witness made complaints to that effect before a Parliamentary Committee in 1834. Upon the subject of the church, however, it is understood that they teach nothing affecting the differences that exist in this country, which may be termed nothing absolutely. They do not recognise distinctions of religious communion; nor, we believe, a form of prayer. There are schools in connexion with them, taught on Unitarian principles. The principle of this grant for schools is greatly short of a full church principle, and yet does not positively contravene it; first, because it absolutely disclaims all sectarian teaching; secondly, because schools are not so entirely appropriated to reli-

gion as to require the whole system of the church in the same degree with those institutions which have no other end, and are the paramount means for the attainment of that end. It is supposed that half the children in the British and Foreign Society's schools may be members of the church of England; they are instructed in a part only of what they should believe and know. It remains, however, indisputably true, that the only full scheme of teaching in religion recognised under the Parliamentary grant, is that of the National Society, which is likewise that of the church.

20. The next item which we have to notice is one which appears to be more decidedly a deviation from the church principle—a small vote taken in the estimates for the benefit of Protestant dissenting ministers, and of poor French refugee clergy. The latter part of this grant (which amounts for 1838 to £3,195) is so evidently charitable that it hardly raises a question. As regards the former, it is put in charge of trustees belonging to the several bodies entitled the Three Denominations, one of which is now really, though not professedly, Unitarian. It still retains the Presbyterian name. Recently there was a movement out of Parliament among some of the dissenters in favour of the discontinuance of this vote; the trustees immediately protested, and gave their reasons. From these it appeared that the vote operated rather by way of charity to the individuals than effective support to congregations. This plea, however, might be considered as terminating

with the lives of the present holders; but, in point of fact, it appears that the money given was originally a part of the private bounty of the crown, which Parliament inherits in virtue of the civil-list compact, and which therefore may stand rather in the light of a debt than of a spontaneous gift, with reference to those from whom at the present time it immediately proceeds. A small portion of the House of Commons divided against the grant this year, as an infringement of the voluntary principle; a very large majority passed it.

21. We have now mentioned the public acts and practices immediately bearing upon the question of church and state within the borders of England. Negatively, indeed, much more might be said. While such masses of our population lie in darkness, and without access to the ordinances of the church, it might well be argued that the government is sadly neglectful of its duty in not making the effort to supply that deficiency. Yet this neglect, however unfortunate or blameworthy, is distinct in its nature from positive acts done in contravention of church principles; and is also more easily reparable.

22. We now turn to the realm of Ireland, which is less easily disposed of, as presenting more serious anomalies. The points for consideration under this head are—the College of Maynooth; the Regium Donum; the National System of Education, together with a brief reference to the Kildare Place Society; the employment of chaplains in gaols; and the proposed arrangement in the new Poor Law scheme.

23. The support of the College of Maynooth was originally undertaken by the Protestant parliament of Ireland, in the anticipation, which has since proved miserably fallacious, that a more loyal class of priests would be produced by a home education than by a foreign one, and that a gradual mitigation in the features of Irish Romanism would be produced when her ministers were no longer familiarised with its condition in continental countries, where it remains the religion of the state. Instead of which it has been found that the facility of education at home has opened the priesthood to a lower and less cultivated class, and one more liable to the influence of secondary motives. It can hardly be denied that this is a well-merited disappointment. If the state gives anything of pecuniary support, it should, in consistency, give everything. Unless it is bound in conscience to maintain the national church as God's appointed vehicle of religious truth, it should adopt as its rule the numbers and the needs of the several classes of religionists; and in either aspect the claim of the Roman Catholics is infinitely the strongest. In amount this grant is niggardly and unworthy. In principle it is wholly vicious; and it will be a thorn in the side of the State of these countries so long as it is continued. When foreigners express their astonishment at finding that we support in Ireland the church of a small minority, we may tell them that we support it, on the high ground of conscientious necessity, for its truth; but how should we blush at the same time to support an institution, whose avowed and legitimate pur-

pose it is constantly to denounce that truth as falsehood! If indeed our faith be pledged to the college, by all means let us acquit ourselves of the obligation; but it is monstrous that we should be the voluntary feeders of an establishment which exhibits at once our jealous parsimony, our lax principles, and our erroneous calculations.

24. The Regium Donum is a gift annually voted in parliament for the partial support of Presbyterian ministers in Ireland; and a portion of the participators are represented as holding Arian and Socinian doctrines. This being the case it will in all probability be extensively confessed, that the grant, were it at our free discretion, is unjustifiable; while, in another point of view, having been originally given to those who believed in the Holy Trinity, it serves to illustrate the difficulty in which governments entangle themselves, when they covenant with arbitrary systems of opinion, and not with the church alone. The opinion passes away, but the gift remains. The fault was in affixing a condition whose fulfilment it did not sufficiently lie within the state's jurisdiction to enforce. But its name imports that this grant is one which was established by the sovereign, and is inherited by us under compact like that to the Protestant dissenting ministers of England.

25. We come next to the grants for the Kildare Place Society, and for the National System of Education in Ireland. The former was exactly analogous in principle to the grants now made to the British and Foreign School Society, the difference in detail being,

that the Kildare Place Society did not make the Bible the exclusive vehicle of religious instruction. They concurred, however, in the main point of precluding instruction in peculiar doctrines. As respects the latter, we are here concerned not with its practice, but its principles. Its original object was to encourage rather than to afford a joint education to children of all denominations in Ireland in moral and literary instruction. The former was to comprise as much of Scripture reading in the form of extracts as could be agreed on by a board composed from the several religious denominations. The funds voted were intended to build school-houses, supply requisites, and afford gratuities to deserving masters. The several classes were permitted to have the use of the school-houses for separate religious instruction. A certain portion of the week was to be set apart for that object. The Bible, or any catechisms, subject to the approbation of the members of the board professing each form respectively, might then be introduced. The idea does not appear to have been that the state should supply the people with a Roman Catholic education, so far as it can be collected from Lord Stanley's letter to the Duke of Leinster in 1831. There have been, however, practical departures from that letter, which was as it were the charter of the system, of a very important kind, over and above cases of glaring and punishable abuse. The plan now pursued is, to pay salaries instead of gratuities to the teachers; and the amount of fees and local subscriptions is, I apprehend, very small. The state, therefore,

is likely to become the paymaster for the whole instruction, and consequently responsible for the whole. The board have likewise authorised the introduction of the separate instruction during school hours—another very important deviation, intended probably to conciliate opponents, but not apparently at all removing the liability to serious objections in point of principle.

26. When the Irish Poor Law Bill of 1837 was under discussion, a division took place in the House of Commons against the clause which authorised the appointment of chaplains to the workhouses, either of the Established or of the Roman Catholic church, or belonging to some body of Dissenters. In the Act of the present year there is a clause, authorising the Commissioners to appoint in any workhouse one chaplain of the church, one of the Roman Catholic church, and one being a Protestant Dissenter.

27. By the Act 50 Geo. III., cap. 103, sect. 47, and again by the Act 7 Geo. IV., cap. 74, sect. 68, each and every grand jury may appoint, and are required to appoint, a chaplain of the established church of England and Ireland to the several gaols; and, if they are required by the court, to appoint also a Protestant dissenting chaplain; and likewise, if similarly required by the court, to appoint a Roman Catholic chaplain. This provision has been productive of serious difficulties in practice, which in one case have been brought under the notice of the public.

28. It is fair, however, to observe, that, whatever objection may fairly lie against either of the two last-cited

Acts in respect of the provisions to which allusion has been made, yet the cases of paupers confined in workhouses, and still more of prisoners immured in gaols, are not to be confounded with those of persons free to act for themselves. They have no pecuniary resources to assist in supporting a clergyman. They have no power of locomotion to resort to one. It is indeed possible to reply, that the latter objection may be met by giving access to a minister: the former would establish a similar claim on behalf of all the destitute throughout the kingdom. Still there remains behind a notion, that persons confined are not free agents—that they are not therefore competent to exercise an impartial judgment in matters of religion—and that it might be unfair, and in the nature of seduction rather than conversion, to take advantage of their dependent position for the purpose of bringing them over to the church. There is more of show than substance in such a charge. If no temporal favours follow the reception of the ordinances of the church, I see nothing to render it impure; but the foregoing remarks may show that if, in a spirit of indulgence, these enactments be made for workhouses and prisons, they do not establish a precedent from which general endowment can fairly be deduced.

29. We have now concluded our review of the practice of government throughout the United Kingdom, in regard to the duty of yielding its exclusive support to the church. And, chequered as is the picture it presents, we must next contemplate one of a colouring yet more unsatisfactory to the eye which dwells with desire on

the picture of religious unity, and on the authority and fixedness of public institutions, as among the human instruments of promoting it. We are to consider how, throughout the various colonial dependencies of the British Crown, their respective governments, and the corresponding departments at home, are now regulating their conduct with respect to the support and propagation of religion. We shall have to review the cases of the Canadas, of the diocese of Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward's Island in particular; of the West Indies, in respect both to church and to school establishments, and comprising within themselves many varieties; of the Australian colonies, where vicious principles have recently assumed the form of a system and obtained the sanction of law: and, lastly, of the East Indies under the Act of 1833.

30. We may, however, remark, that although the colonies are more spotted than the United Kingdom with the recognition of religious disunion in the ecclesiastical policy of the state; yet, on the other hand, we have not the same degree of responsibility to them which we have towards the people at home, because they are not placed in the same closeness of natural union and dependence. The relations in which we stand to the colonies are very various. The power of the state to retain them ... political connection with this country is much less, nay, the right is much more indeterminate, than those which it possesses over all persons residing within the natural limits of these realms. Those who repair to them often do it under such circumstances, and such a sense

of civil equality, and with such inadequate instruction respecting the church, that they do not brook the idea of what they wrongly deem a preference given to particular opinions for political purposes. In all which is now to be set down, there is no blame intended, generally speaking, to what has been merely *permitted*; but only where there has been a sacrifice of our own national conscience, by a participation in the doing of what it condemned.

31. Taking, first, the North American division of the British colonies, we find that in the colony of Upper Canada there are endowed rectories of the church of England, which were constituted by instruments under the great seal, to the number of fifty-six, during the administration of Sir John Colborne.* Glebes, averaging about four hundred acres of wild lands, were annexed to each. There are twenty-five clergymen of the Presbyterian body in connection with the church of Scotland, receiving allowances generally of 57*l.* each from government, under authority of Lord Aberdeen's despatch, 22nd February, 1835. There are twelve ministers of the united synod of Upper Canada, receiving government allowances of about 63*l.* each, under authority of Lord Ripon's despatch of 22nd Nov., 1832. There are thirty Roman Catholic ministers receiving 50*l.* each annually; and 100*l.* is paid to their bishop as a pension. The Wesleyan Methodists receive 700*l.* annually.

* Vide Parliamentary Paper, No. 391, of 1836; and the History of the Church in Upper Canada, by the Rev. W. Bettridge, Rector of Woodstock in that Colony. London, 1838.

32. The proceeds of the clergy reserves, for Upper Canada, appear to have been, in 1836, as follows:

Rents of leased clergy reserves . .	£2141
Interest on sales of ditto	2163
Dividends on proceeds of sales, vested in England	655
Total	£4959

The church expenditure, on account of these funds, was 5830*l.*; besides which we find a charge on the casual and territorial revenues of 2765*l.* This charge is to be diminished by deaths, and by any increase in the funds of the reserves.

We find, at the same time, the charges for other bodies standing thus:

For the Presbyterian clergy of the Scotch church	£1541
For the united synod	600
For the Roman Catholic Church, including 100*l.* paid as a pension to the bishop . .	1600
For the Wesleyans	700

33. In Upper Canada there is a feeling, among the democratic party, in favour of devoting the clergy reserves to purposes of education. A Bill, professedly for that purpose, was rejected, in 1835, by the council. In 1836, however, it was proposed in the Assembly to divide them among the churches of England, Scotland, Rome, the Wesleyans, and the Baptists. A strong opposition to this project was made on behalf of the church, and likewise from a sentiment, which appeared to obtain considerable prevalence, that the

reserves, should be made applicable to all Protestant religious communities, but that the church of Rome should not be allowed to participate in them. The scheme failed. In 1837 a suggestion of Lord Ripon's, that the reserves should be re-vested in the crown, was taken up, but was lost in the Assembly by a single vote. It had been proposed in 1832 and 1833, but without taking effect. The legislative council has declared a conviction that the question cannot arrive at a settlement in the province.

34. In the colony of Lower Canada, the Bishop of Montreal and certain rectors, in number about six or seven, are paid by annual vote of Parliament. From the same source a Roman Catholic bishop receives 1000*l.* annually. It is understood that the whole of these votes are to terminate with the lives of the existing holders. At the cession of the province the rights of the Roman Catholic church generally were confirmed, and it remains in possession of large and valuable landed property, and also of the tithe, subject to an exception where the occupier is a Protestant, in which case he is exempt.

35. By the Constitutional Act of 1791, in conformity with the tenor of ancient instructions to governors to make provision everywhere for the worship of the church, one seventh part of all wild lands were directed to be set apart, under the title of clergy reserves, as settlements should extend. As they were found to remain uncultivated, and thus to impede the general progress of the districts in which they were placed, a power has been

taken by Act 7 and 8 Geo. IV., chap. 62, of selling them, and holding the proceeds for the benefit, according to the terms of the Act of 1791, of a Protestant clergy. This provision extends to both the Canadas. There has been much controversy upon the question, whether this phrase includes the clergy of the church of Scotland. In conformity with an opinion given by the law officers of the crown at home in the year 1819, it has of late been held that they are so included: and a sum of 500*l.*, the interest of moneys arising out of the sale of clergy reserves in Lower Canada, has been applied to the support of Presbyterian ministers.

36. In Lower Canada a very large sum is charged for 1836, under the head of education, no less than 31,000*l.* There are no payments from colonial funds to any religious communion. The sales of reserves have produced 31,085*l.* (stock 3 per cents.), a portion of the interest of which is applied to the church of Scotland. About 400*l.* a-year still remains unappropriated, having been realised only within the last few months. The crown is precluded from assenting to any act which alters the disposition of the reserves, until copies of it shall have lain on the tables of both Houses of Parliament for forty days; and any address from either House during that interval is to render such assent unlawful. The whole subject has been referred by the colonial department to the local legislatures, with the understanding that they are to have the initiative in any measures for altering the present legal dispositions.

37. In the colony of Newfoundland the clergymen of

the church have no payments from the colony itself. The archdeacon is paid 300*l.* from the parliamentary estimate. The Roman Catholic bishop has 75*l.* from the same source. A grant of eight acres of land has lately been made for the erection of a Roman Catholic cathedral. It is stated, by parties connected with the colony, that the contributions of the Roman Catholics of Newfoundland to the support of their bishop and clergy amount in value to not less than 6000*l.* or 7000*l.* annually.

38. There is no ecclesiastical charge upon the colony of Prince Edward's Island, as appears by the returns of the year 1837. The missionaries of the church are paid by the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel. There is a vote of 100*l.* *per annum* from the British Parliament for a Presbyterian minister. There were in this colony certain church-lands, in the proportion of 130 acres to each township of 20,000. Instructions were sent from the Colonial Department during the secretaryship of Mr. Spring Rice, to the effect that a plan should be proposed for selling the lands. The Assembly and Council passed a bill not only directing the sale of the lands, but appropriating the proceeds to the purposes of general education. This bill was assented to at home in the year 1836. On a remonstrance from the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, the Society was informed that the Royal assent had been given under an erroneous impression, that the Colonial Act was in conformity with the instructions of the Colonial Department.

139. In the colony of New Brunswick the clergy of the church of England are paid by the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel; and those of the Scottish church mainly by their congregations. The Assembly gave in 1836 nearly 10,000*l.* for education; but there is no vote of any kind for religious purposes, except a payment of 50*l.* *per annum* on the recently granted civil list, for a Presbyterian minister.

There are lands in this colony set apart for purposes of religion, amounting to upwards of 50,000 acres; they are entirely unproductive, and no act, I believe, has been passed to permit them to be sold.

The archdeacon receives 300*l.* a-year, a grant which is included in the parliamentary estimate.

140. In the colony of Nova Scotia the public expenditure, taken for the year 1836, exhibits a charge of 7600*l.* under the head of the Ecclesiastical Department. Of this sum 6830*l.* consisted of salaries to the bishop and clergy, of which 6150*l.* was granted on the parliamentary estimate. One vote of 75*l.* is for a Presbyterian minister. The colony itself is at no public charge whatever.

Before the year 1831, the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel received, by annual vote of Parliament, 16,000*l.* for the support of the church in North America. In that year it was determined by the Colonial Department that the vote should be withdrawn at the rate of 25 per cent. annually; the effect of which would have been its total extinction in 1835. Lord Stanley, however, while Colonial Secretary, made

an arrangement for continuing the vote at the rate of 4000*l.* annually, subject only to gradual diminution as the missionaries in receipt of it might die or resign. For 1838 it amounts to 3500*l.*, which is applied, through the Society, entirely to the colony of Nova Scotia.

41. As respects the West Indian colonies, two bishops, and a certain number of clergy, are provided for them by an Act of the Imperial Parliament passed in the year 1825; and they are divided into two dioceses, under the sees of Jamaica and Barbadoes. No funds are voted by the Imperial Parliament in support of any other religious denomination for the West Indies. A vote, however, was taken in the year 1835, for the promotion of "moral and religious education on liberal and comprehensive principles," in compliance with the terms of the fifth parliamentary resolution for the abolition of slavery. The amount was at first 20,000*l.*, and it was distributed indifferently to the societies connected with the church of England, to those acting for different bodies of Protestant separatists, to the Presbyterians, and to the trustees of the Mico charity, who proceed upon the plan of the British and Foreign School Society in England. They have very large funds at their disposal, which have accumulated under a bequest more than a century old, given originally for the purpose of redeeming negro slaves. In the principle of this distribution the church has been placed on a level with all other religious bodies having organs with which the government could negociate. Its details have been such as considerably to limit her agency.

The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel offered in 1835 to expend 10,000*l.* on schools, to meet as much from the government fund. The dissenting societies only tendered one-third of the total expense to be incurred; yet the government took the worse terms, and thus produced by the 10,000*l.* a total outlay of 15,000*l.*, instead of 20,000*l.*, which it would have been, had the proposal of the Propagation Society been accepted.

42. In the colony of Jamaica, the charge of the ecclesiastical establishment, according to the returns of 1836, defrayed by the colony itself, is 14,220*l.*, currency, or between 8000*l.* and 9000*l.* sterling; 240*l.* currency was voted for a Scotch church, and 60*l.* for the Presbyterian institution. In the year 1837 a disposition was declared to extend considerably the pecuniary aid given to that church, and a Colonial act has passed, appointing commissioners who are authorised to prepare subdivisions of parishes, and to propose them to the Assembly as subjects for ecclesiastical endowment in connection with the church of England. It is not yet clear what amount of substantive results is likely to be realised.

43. In the island of Mauritius there is a joint endowment of the English and the Roman churches. The former appears to be supported to the extent of 1081*l.* (in 1836), and the latter receives 2520*l.* The ministers of the one class are termed "Civil Chaplains;" those of the other "Roman Catholic Clergy."

44. In the colony of British Guiana, district of Demerara, there is a public colonial provision for religion, amounting in the year 1836 to 2208*l.* There is a

division into parishes, some of which have ministers of the church of England, while some are connected with the Scotch church. There is also a payment to a Dutch minister in George Town. In the district of Berbice there is a parish-church, with several chapels. No notice appears to be taken of any religious community other than the church.

45. In the colony of Trinidad, there was expended (in the year 1835) 860*l.* on account of the church of England, and 2487*l.* on account of the church of Rome.

46. In the colony of St. Lucia, there are one English and three Roman Catholic churches. The rector receives 300*l.* per annum. Two of the Roman Catholic clergymen receive together 11,000 francs.

47. In the colony of Grenada, there is certain land belonging to the Roman Catholic church, and there was an endowment, remaining from the period when the French had possession of the colony, for a Roman Catholic priest, which, in consequence of an internal schism, has recently, I believe, been withdrawn.

48. In the colony of Antigua, there is a charge of 2555*l.* for the year 1836. It does not appear that any part of this sum is given to any communion other than the church.

49. In the colony of Barbadoes, there appears, for the year 1836, a charge for the established clergy (as they are denominated) of 3666*l.*, besides one of 533*l.* for the central school establishment, and payments to the chaplains of the council and house of assembly, and of the gaol, respectively.

50. In the colony of the Bermudas, the ecclesiastical expenditure for 1837 amounted to 1783*l.* Three hundred pounds is drawn from home for the archdeacon, of which 200*l.* is from the funds of the state. The colony expended in the year above cited 1533*l.* on five clergymen of the church, including the archdeacon. There is an allowance under the head of "miscellaneous civil services," to one Presbyterian minister.

51. In the colony of St. Christopher's, there are nine parishes, of which the rectors are variously paid; but I find no trace of any payment except to the church.

52. In the Bahamas, the charge for 1836 is 1915*l.* There is no account of any payment but to the church. The same appears to be the case with Honduras, St. Vincent, Montserrat, and Tobago.

53. In Dominica, there are some payments to the Roman Catholic clergy, but it does not appear whether they are from a colonial fund. There is a rector of the English church, who receives 260*l.* from that source.

The returns at present in this country are, as respects the West Indian colonies, for the most part extremely defective; but the facts, so far as they are cited above, are derived from the most authentic sources to which access can be had.

54. Our establishments in the Mediterranean require but a very brief notice. At Gibraltar, the chaplain receives 300*l.* from government, the vicar apostolic of the Roman church has 100*l.* The total charge is—church of England 465*l.*, church of Rome 196*l.* These amounts are for 1837.

55. In the island of Malta, the ancient Roman Catholic establishment remains. An allowance of 54*l.* is made by the government to a Roman Catholic garrison chaplain. In Valletta there is a clergyman of the church, with 380*l.* per annum. The name of Malta likewise suggests the question connected with the tributes of respect paid by the government to Roman Catholic festivals in the shape of military salutes; they appear to involve a principle the same in substance as that of direct pecuniary aid.

56. The Ionian islands are inhabited by a population of 200,000 natives and 12,000 strangers. The Greek church is considered the establishment of the islands. It has 2242 churches and chapels, and 898 priests (1837). Their salaries amount to 9926*l.* There are thirteen Latin churches, with salaries of 1010*l.* There are three English churches. The public charge of the islands for the ecclesiastical establishments amounts to 2179*l.*; of this the Roman and English churches partake. It may be right to mention that there have been at different times certain marks of communion between the Oriental churches and that of our own country.*

57. The still infant settlement of Western Australia is fed by a parliamentary vote, in which is comprised a provision for a colonial chaplain. In South Australia, which is governed under a Commission, constituted by Act in 1835, the voluntary system is alone

* Palmer on the Church, P. I, ch. ix, sect. 1.

contemplated. No part of the public resources is, or is to be, applied to religious purposes. This Act, it is right to observe, passed under the review, and received either the approval or the allowance, of several successive colonial secretaries. In the late project for colonising New Zealand, embodied during the session of 1838 in a bill, but now stifled or suspended in consequence of its rejection on the second reading, the principle of indiscriminate establishment was adopted, but with a special provision for the appointment of a bishop of the church of England. It is instructive to observe, amidst thickening gloom, the last flashes of a light once as abundant and generally recognised, as it is now stinted and despised.

58. Great numbers of Roman Catholic convicts were sent from the United Kingdom to the penal colonies of Australia. They had been furnished in Ireland with gaol chaplains at the expense of their counties; and it seemed a natural consequence, that a similar provision should be made for them after their transportation. It was made accordingly. But then this population was so mixed up with the free portion of the colonial communities, and so many individuals were daily passing from the one to the other, that the line of principle, which, as some may be inclined to think, separates the two kinds of support, was overlooked, and, several years ago, a claim began to be urged upon the Colonial Department for the endowment of Roman Catholic chaplains in proportion to the Roman Catholic population. It was recognised in principle as an en-

dowment. Arrangements were made while Mr. Spring Rice was Secretary of State for sending out four additional chaplains, and three catechists, of the Roman church. Lord Aberdeen found these arrangements matured, but not executed; they had his approbation, and took effect.

59. Measures of a more systematic description quickly followed.* The governor of New South Wales proposed to his council a scheme, which is embodied in an Act passed 29th July, 1836, "to promote the building of churches and chapels, and to provide for the ministers of religion, in New South Wales." It provides that, where a sum of at least 300*l.* has been raised by private contribution, and applied towards the building of a church or chapel, and where necessary a dwelling, a sum may be issued from the colonial funds not exceeding the amount of such private contribution, nor exceeding the sum of 1000*l.* A larger sum may, however, be applied by the governor, with the advice and consent of the legislative council.

60. Likewise where 100 adults subscribe a declaration of their desire to attend any proposed church or chapel, the governor may allow the minister 100*l.* a-year. If 200 shall subscribe, then 150*l.* a-year. If 500 shall subscribe the declaration, then 200*l.* a-year may be allowed. And there is a power of issuing 100*l.* a-year when less than 100 subscribe, given to the governor, subject to the consent of the executive council. Where

* A full account of them is contained in the Parliamentary Papers, No. 112 of Session 1837, and No. 75 of Session 1838.

there is no church or chapel the governor may issue any sum not exceeding 100*l.* a-year, to meet an equal amount of private contributions. The governor and executive council may withdraw the stipend, if they think that the minister's duties have been culpably or wilfully neglected. This Act draws no distinction whatever between any religious societies, except by the use of the terms, "Churches or Chapels," which probably would be understood to imply, that the body seeking the aid of the state must submit to the name, at least, of Christianity. Regulations were published in New South Wales, dated 4th October, 1836, setting forth the English, Scottish, and Romish churches, as the special objects of these provisions, but adding that applications from any other denomination of Christians will be taken into consideration, according to the special circumstances of each case.

61. The enactments of this measure appear to have been popular in New South Wales, so far as any evidence contained in the parliamentary papers will enable us to form a conclusion. A considerable number of clergymen have been settled, under its provisions, in connection with the church, the Presbyterian, and the Roman Catholic bodies. The ministers and elders of the Presbytery of New South Wales* "approach" Lord Glenelg, the Colonial Secretary (writing on the 27th July, 1837), "with *unmingled feelings of gratitude and joy*," to request that he will transmit their

* Papor, No. 75, 1838, p. 14.

thanks to the throne; and they trust that supremacy arising from a monopoly of state indulgences and appointments, expended on one church to the prejudice and depression of other churches, will no longer exist under these *judicious and impartial regulations*." And Dr. Lang, a Presbyterian minister, in his work on New South Wales, has warmly eulogised the above-mentioned measure.* Thus is the state establishment of the Roman Catholic church actively supported by a body which, in its origin, contended that it had lost the essence of a church, and, in consequence, broke off the channel through which the apostolical commission had been conveyed: and thus are the principles of the Reformation contravened by its professed admirers.

62. There has been considerable dissension in New South Wales respecting a school system; but as the question was, whether the government should establish, according to Sir Richard Bourke's wishes, that of the Dublin Board, or should afford indiscriminate aid to all communions, and since the latter was the ground taken by the Protestants of the colony, it is needless to pursue the details. There is no semblance, in any part of these arrangements, of a true and sound conception of the conscientious functions of government in matters of religion. For similar reasons, we need not detail the proceedings in Van Diemen's Land; they have been closely analagous in their general tendency to those of New South Wales, and the same principle

* Dr. Lang on Transportation and Colonization, p 241, note.

of indiscriminate recognition and assistance has been established; the governor not being, however, in this instance the prime mover, but a willing instrument. And the accounts from Van Diemen's Land present a remarkable testimony, which is extracted in the following passage from a dispatch of Colonel Arthur's,* dated 26th January, 1836:—

"The Roman Catholics have hitherto been a very inconsiderable body in this community, possessing one very rude chapel in Hobart Town, and a school in connection with it. The arrival of Dr. Polding, however, has excited a degree of energy which has given them a more influential appearance, and *has had the effect of recalling some persons* who had been in *the habit of attending the established church.*" Dr. Polding, it should be observed, was the Roman Catholic bishop sent out to New South Wales by the government.

63. Upon the other hand, there is some evidence which appears to show that it is want of information and reflection, rather than indifference, which we have to lament in the case before us. An address presented to the bishop of Australia in June, 1836, from many of the most influential persons of New South Wales, speak as follows:—†

"We look upon the *erection of these colonies into an episcopal see*, and the appointment of yourself to be the first bishop, as (an) additional proof of His Majesty's paternal watchfulness over the welfare of the remotest portions of his dominions, and of his determination to

* Paper 112, Session 1837, p. 70. † Ibid. p. 58.

uphold here those sacred principles to which England owes, under Providence, the pure and elevated tone of her morality, her civil freedom, the domestic peace she has so long enjoyed, and her pre-eminence among the nations of the earth."

Again, it is satisfactory to find the ministers and members of the Wesleyan Methodist body in New South Wales addressing the bishop of Australia, on his return to the colony in 1836, and declaring that,* "firmly and conscientiously attached, as a body, to the united church of England and Ireland, as by law established, we cannot but rejoice in every measure which promises to extend the usefulness and to increase the prosperity of that venerable hierarchy."

64. The whole tone of these addresses does the highest honour to those who have framed and subscribed them. It is likewise due to that distinguished person, Sir George Arthur, that in tracing the melancholy progress of false principles, following naturally upon the neglect and abuse of sound ones, we should observe, he does not appear to have believed that he was placing other religious communions on a footing with the church of England.† We have no fears for the church of England in her competition with the denominational bodies around her. It is for the State, for the political society of these colonies, that reasonable apprehensions may be entertained, when they are seen to assume radically false principles as their foundation.

65. Under the Act for the renewal of the East India

*Paper 112, 1837, p. 59. † Ibid. p. 69.

Company's Charter in 1833, there is specific legislation with regard to the church, and a provision is introduced allowing of the endowment or support of any body of Christians from the funds of the government. In a Parliamentary paper of August, 1836,* we have an account of the practice in the East Indies under this clause. It hence appears, that in the three presidencies a system of threefold endowment has been established: its objects are, the church, the church of Scotland, and the church of Rome. The expense incurred is as follows:—

	Church.	Presbyterians.	Roman Catholics.
Bengal (sicca rupees) .	457,116	22,414	4,800
Madras	206,562	21,944	5,922
Bombay	155,005	21,685	4,080
Singapore, Prince of Wales' Island, and Malacca	22,932	. .	1,895
	841,615	65,043	16,697

At 2*s.* the sicca rupee . . £84,161 10*s.* £6,504 6*s.* £1,669 14*s.*

66. This is certainly a melancholy picture. We find an ample allowance of the false principle on the part of the Indian executive; but an amount of funds dispensed to the established churches, as compared with those given to the church of Rome, are greatly out of proportion, it is conjectured, to the relative numbers attached to the several communions. And such an arrangement really gives plausibility to the charge often and unjustly made, that money and not principle is the object of solicitude

* Sess. 1836, No. 536.

with the friends of the connection between the church and the state.

67. There is another branch of the religious conduct of the British government in India, which involves matter of the highest importance—namely, its alleged participation in the idolatrous rites of the Hindoo worship, by the coerced attendance of its servants at their celebration, as well as a pecuniary concern in the management. The facts of this case are not yet fully in the possession of the public, but it seems to bear a melancholy and awful aspect.* It does not, however, enter into the scope of these remarks to deal fully with the merits, because if the allegations should be wholly substantiated, although a most heavy charge would lie against us, it would involve us rather in the sin of having acted against the light of our own principles than in that of having adopted others; for the only principles by which, as such, the maintenance of idolatry can be vindicated, are more monstrous than as yet, it may be hoped, we could bear to contemplate. It is highly gratifying to add, that, if a judgment may be formed from the recent declarations of the President of the Board of Control† and of the Prime Minister, in Parliament, a speedy and effectual termination is to be put to these ill-omened practices.

68. In summing up it may be observed, that there are

* See "The Connection of the East India Company's Government with the Superstitions, &c. of India." Hatchards. 1838.

† Speech of Sir John Hobhouse, July 26, 1838, and of Lord Melbourne, July 24, 1838.

some material distinctions to be taken with respect to the different relations of our colonies to the mother country. Some of them are the adopted children of the empire, which have been received into it when already adult, with their own fixed institutions, or at least with a prevalent religion different from that established at home. Such are, for example, Lower Canada, Trinidad, Mauritius, Malta, the Ionian Isles. To refrain from rooting up what we found enjoying an actual existence in law, is very different from encouraging or assisting that which is newly proposed. The secular rights of the Roman Catholic church in Lower Canada were a part of the original contract, in this case a real one. And this admission does not involve any answer to the inquiry, whether such a contract ought to have been framed. The distinction in principle will not apply, where we have given state assistance to the Roman Catholic church upon a *res integra*.

69. Upon the whole, the universal characteristic of these extremely varied cases, is *insufficiency* in the assistance afforded to religion by the state. No one of our colonies, properly so called, appears to have an *adequate* provision. The next feature is gross anomaly of principle in the distribution of that assistance; from which reproach only a portion of the West Indian colonies, especially the old English islands, appear to be exempted. In the West India colonies generally, the church is most favoured. Next to her, the Presbyterians. The only other participants are the Roman Catholics. If we except the case of South Australia alone, the diocese of Nova Scotia presents the least amount of

assistance from a colonial legislature. The Australian colonies have most broadly avowed the principle of indiscriminate establishment: but we should remember, that they have not yet obtained a popular government.

70. Again, however, let it be specified, we have stated no opinion as to the manner in which, under the difficult and peculiar circumstances of our colonies, the functions of government in respect to a state religion ought to be discharged, or the principles laid down in the foregoing inquiry saved. But thus much it is right to say: there ought not to be that positive contravention of such principles, that active participation in evil, which in some at least of these cases there unfortunately has been. It is one thing to mark wisely the limits of our real power, to disavow all compulsion, to aid that which we hold to be true, and for the rest, where we can do no more, under protest to permit; but it is another thing to confound the boundary lines of truth and falsehood, to concur in, to promote, to originate measures which may fall in with the inclinations of the day, but which being intrinsically vicious, though they may yield a harvest of present popularity, are also the seed of certain evil for the future. If the democratic characteristics and tendencies of these colonies, taken together with the religious differences of the inhabitants, prevent their enjoying the benefit of the nationality of the church, these circumstances may be resistless, but let us at least see and describe them as they are, and instead of hugging ourselves with a false theory, contrived to flatter our self-love, let us honestly recognise in the causes an evil, in the result a misfortune.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE ULTERIOR TENDENCIES OF THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS THE DISSOLUTION OF THE CONNECTION.

1—3. General sketch. 4, 5. Result on the science and art of government, as a declension from its nature. 6, 7. Form of the development. 8—16. It naturally terminates in social atheism. 17—23. Universality of primeval religion, its subsequent restriction, and reintroduction of universality with Christianity. 24—26. Abandonment of this universality appears consequent on the abandonment of nationality of religion. 27—33. Which also seems to prepare for the consummation of the human apostacy, and the destruction of social morality. 34. And disappoints the prophecies. 35, 36. Civil results on character. 37—49. Signs of the times bearing on our own particular case. 50—52. Existence of the church, independent of the connection. It is the state which demands our solicitude. 53, 54. Conclusion.

1. We have now only to institute an examination into some of the consequences likely to arise out of the general abandonment of the principle of union between the church and the state. The question is too large to admit of any thing more than a very partial inquiry. And what in the laxity of common language we are apt to term the consequences of such a change, might be more accurately described as the next following results of that temper and those tendencies by which it was itself produced. Their features are obvious and broadly marked; their bearing upon the

formation of human character in its fundamental principles, and in its entire figure and development, is indisputable; so that it ought to be possible to grasp as much as is necessary for an intelligible delineation, however large a portion of the subject may remain untraversed. Nor do we depend upon speculation alone. These tendencies have already had in part the opportunity of becoming practical; and from the child we may find some means of calculating the future dispositions of the full-grown man.

2. I know not whether it be presumptuous to say at the outset what we might more fully unfold in approaching towards the conclusion of the present chapter; that the changes which have appeared, and which are daily unfolding themselves, in connection with the movement towards the overthrow of national church establishments, seem as if they were gradually supplying what yet remained void in those fore-ordered dispensations of the Deity towards man, which are traced throughout the history of this wayward world. It is one thing to speculate through antecedent presumptions, or interpretations of those parts of the divine truth which are purposely wrapped in enigma, upon the times and features of the future destiny of our race.* And nothing can be farther from the province or intention of these pages. But it is quite another thing to study the signs of the times, by the endeavour to analyse and exhibit those great moral causes, most influential upon

* Compare Mark xiii. 32; and Matt. xvi. 2, 3.

human character and happiness, which everywhere force themselves upon our view, which pervade the masses of society, and which appear to be conducting towards its issue, by however circuitous a path, the ancient conflict between good and evil in the world.

3. We shall inquire, then, whether the relinquishment by governments of the care and propagation of religion prepares the way for that final gathering-in of the harvest of the Redeemer, which immediately attends upon the separation of the good from the wicked. Whether it implies, as it were, a retrogression of the Divine mercies, and consists in surrendering large masses of mankind to that which they term their freedom, but which is indeed their misery. Whether or not it practically involves the abandonment of the glorious enterprise to which the Christian church was commissioned to address herself, namely, the universal proclamation of the gospel. Whether by leaving a partial religion to be replaced by total irreligion, you do not remove from individual selfishness the great bar to its absolute and final development. Whether by taking out of public institutions their sanctifying principle, you do not give them over to become the depositories and manifestations in a collective and, as it were, authoritative and ultimate form of that selfishness and self-worship, wherein consists our apostacy from God, and in the completion of which is accordingly contained the consummation of that apostacy.

4. It is a less awful but still a very momentous consideration, whether, simultaneously with these terrible

results, you do not degrade the character of government to that of a machine, leaving as the function of those who are engaged in it, simply to ascertain and to obey a popular will, like the index of a clock worked by a pendulum. From the master-science it would in such case, we may fear, be degraded to the lowest of all arts; the lowest, not in an earthly but in a Christian sense. It might still, during its permitted time, wield masses of human power, which in our eyes appear great, and be the instrument of large results; but this abandonment of its highest duty is so essentially evil, that it must impart a taint of corruption to all its acts, and to the minds of those who are its instruments, and by desecrating their life, inflict a real degradation, far different from any which can ever attach to the humblest of duties, if performed, relatively to its best capabilities, for the glory of God.

5. It is a strange and appalling state of things, when the creatures of God fall away from the law and purpose of their several natures, even although that into which they degenerate do not to the fleshly eye appear to present any revolting features. Each of them, however apparently insignificant, has its own blessing in its own ordained constitution, and in the sphere determined for its action: whatsoever fulfils its functions is honourable before God and man. But so, on the other hand, does each, however lofty and imposing, lose that blessing and honour, when it forgets its instrumentality, and passes out of the place which has been given to it in the Divine economy into another which

is self-chosen. We should be shocked if we saw a man, even a man of indifferent appearance, and less than ordinary abilities, changed into the most beautiful, the most intelligent, the most faithful of animals; because he would have fallen from the rank in which his Maker placed him, from the work he gave him to do, from the capabilities of his constitution, from a higher to a lower essence. Now it is a case which ought similarly to shock us, when human beings, made and elected to be in the body of the Redeemer, partakers of the Divine nature, and to do all whatsoever they do in Him and for Him; when such beings, renouncing Him who is their permanent spiritual life, avail themselves of lower gifts which they hold, but which are not less His, to construct a new system of reciprocal relations among themselves, for their own presumed convenience and benefit, in which he has no part nor lot. As there is beauty even in God's lowest natural gifts, so there may be much in such a system that is fascinating and attractive: but viewed in relation to the true, the spiritual law of our nature, nothing can be more monstrous and loathsome than a change which should thus embody, in fixed institutions, and perpetuate so far as in us lies, our innate impiety, poisoning the very wells of water from which successive generations are to draw.

6. There is, however, a line of argument sometimes pursued in relation to this question, which I am about to notice, in order more distinctly to mark that I do not adopt it. Men have pointed to the horrible excesses

of the French Revolution, and have anticipated that atrocities similar in kind, though, perhaps, less in degree, must follow the overthrow, should it ever take place, of our national religion. There are many reasons which may disincline us, however, from anticipating such a result. Firstly, the extraordinary concurrence of political causes, and, above all, the immense abuses of the former system, which combined to embitter the popular mind of France before that revolution, is such as we are not led, however formidable some of our symptoms, to expect. Next, the Romish church in that country had much less, we believe, of the heart and life of religion to temper and to check the exasperations of the time, than England would now supply. But further; the spirits of anarchy have had a warning rather than an encouragement in the French Revolution. Its singularly chequered course has, we may conjecture, taught them that in order to work effectually they must be contented to work more slowly. They triumphed awhile, it is true, in bloodshed the most profuse, but the revelation of Satan was too naked and too hideous for the heart of man, as that heart then was, to behold, without shuddering, and a violent reaction, and an earnest determination to use every effort for quelling the monster, and banishing him again from the face of earth to the darkness of his home.

7. We may, therefore, more probably anticipate that the next attempt to constitute society without a God, and to erase his name from the world which His might and His beneficence have made, will be more crafty and

considerate, requiring time for its development, and a preparation consisting, not merely, like that in France, of suffering applied to exacerbate the heart, but embracing a thorough education of the understanding and expansion of its powers, and a circuitous, perhaps, but real application of them to the suppression of the best human sympathies, and the exhaustion of all the noble fountains of thought, emotion, and, above all, affection within us. Whenever upon this or any other basis a complete structure of hardened selfishness shall have been erected, to be the universal type of human character, it may be, that the day will have arrived for a tempest of woe and awful desolating crime, more fierce and more lasting than that under which but one generation groaned; yet all this devilish machinery may wear a very smooth appearance, drawing upon the "deceivableness of unrighteousness" for all its resources of illusion, and soothing us with the belief that we are but ridding the earth of bigotry and persecution, establishing human freedom, and therein rendering to God the most acceptable service, while we are in fact immolating the faith and the truth, and with them all our own hopes and destinies of good.

8. But some may honestly think, that there is nothing irreligious in dissolving the union between church and state, and taking from the government all power to express a preference in a matter of a religion. They may rather attach to such a change a contrary idea, and hail it as ridding the church of much impure and tyrannical handling, which it has in former times received

from the secular power. Certainly governments will no longer be able to abuse their religion when they have none; to come short of their obligations to it, when they are precluded from owning any. It is boldly argued by some that the amount of individual religion will be greater, should the connection be dissolved. This we deny. But even were it so, still it would not be enough. It is clear, that God has relations and reckonings with men in their national capacity. How are those relations to be conducted by a government which has not a religion? The law is not the act nor the voice of an individual, nor of a number of individuals as such; but it is a public instrument, proceeding from a public power, and that power the greatest upon earth; and yet, under the proposed system, that power will be without religion.

9. But really, when we contemplate in seriousness this argument from the abuse of religion by governments for its abandonment, it appears itself to be the greatest abuse of reason that men can imagine. For what is the whole history of religion in the mind of an individual? Does the individual man welcome religion from the first, provide for it in his breast a pure and holy home, use his powers to draw out all its benign influences over his whole character and conduct! No, it is a series of gross abuses; a series of conflicts between the natural and spiritual man; a series of violences done by us to our convictions, and to the Holy Spirit of God, as often as we sin; and thus so far of profanations offered to that divine in-dwelling presence, whereby

alone spiritual life is maintained in an alien atmosphere. But is the man therefore to desist from his work, or is he not rather to persevere until the purifying have overcome the delcterious influences, and his nature is impregnated throughout with the spirit of truth and love? Why, then, so it is with states, and they, like individuals, are to repent of their sins, and to strive earnestly for amendment, and for the increase of the knowledge and fear of God, until it pervade the whole body of the nation, and bless it for ever.

10. Will it however be said that the republic of America has not relinquished religious ordinances together with the principle of an establishment, and that prayers are regularly offered in her Congress by ministers belonging to her various denominations? It may be so. The day may however come when a vast portion of the American population will own no Christian name or ordinance whatever; they will return their representatives; they may be a majority, or a large and untractable minority. Talk not of the power of truth; it does not subdue those who wilfully and habitually reject it. It did not do so in the days of that primitive revelation which fell gradually into the most hideous corruptions. I know not why it should do so again in days of keener and more calculated and systematised self-love. These antichristians may claim not to be insulted by religious ordinances in which they cannot participate. But judge matters as they are, is that an acceptable service to God which proceeds upon the most opposite views of his nature? Is that government guiltless which one

day approaches him through Jesus, the Mediator of the new covenant, and another day in its own righteousness, and without the blood of sprinkling, which one day worships the Saviour as God, and the next in prayer by overlooking, if no more, denies his deity?

11. Of two creeds thus differing we may lay down these propositions—first, that one must be false: secondly, that the one which is false must be blasphemous; and yet this unhappy scheme deals with both alike, recognises both alike. The man, or the body of men adhering to either, may find consolation in the belief that the creed of its choice is the truth; but in adopting both, in placing both on the same level, the individual or the government is self-condemned; condemned of the fatal crime of wilfully confounding truth and error in the highest subject-matter, while its own best hope and function is but to establish truth, and discountenance error, in concerns of far less momentous import. The fact therefore remains that this service is not an intelligible, nor a reasonable, nor an acceptable service. It is contrary to the express denunciations of the Scripture against heresy; it is an impious mixture of all religions upon that ground which alone they occupy in common, namely, the possession of a certain amount of human assent, and by recognising religion only in virtue of that suffrage, they affirm the baneful proposition, that religion has no groundwork, or at least may be dealt with (which is in substance the same thing) as if it had no groundwork extrinsic to the human mind, thus depriving it of all relation to a God, and rendering

it a curse rather than a blessing, because leaving it to clothe the creations of human caprice and pride with a sacred and authoritative name. I hold, therefore, that when the connection of religion with the state has been destroyed, government becomes essentially godless.

12. But it may be thought chimerical to anticipate that the time ever can arrive when so simple, so reasonable a service as the acknowledgment of God in the public worship of the state, can be offensive to any large number of men. Would that it were so! But if these men have fallen out of Christianity and the recognition of it in their private capacity, will they retain it in their public one? If they can find a foundation other than the acknowledgment of His name for all the relations of their social and domestic position through life, why should they need it in the brief discharge of those political functions which we are told ought to be separated from all consideration of religious differences? If it was found impossible to continue the faith of *the church* in the state, the adoption of the apparently broader basis of *Christianity* has supplied no means of more determined resistance. If, to proceed one step further, all ministers of religion may come and pray; if theism be the only test, will this endure? Say, all you who believe in revelation, is then theism the one thing needful, and revelation subsidiary, or can theism be permanently recognised when the testimony and the sanction of revelation are separated therefrom? Doubtless it would be unreasonable, most unreasonable, to contend against the acknowledgment of God, but let those who

are willing to surrender every other test, show from the experience of history, or from the dictates of reason, that this one can on their principles endure.

13. Mr. Locke* contended that the acknowledgment of a future state was so necessary for civil order, that it should be required as a condition of citizenship. Let us then suppose that this dogma, and this alone, is established as the formulary of state religion, does this present in argument an unassailable position? It cannot be shown from revelation that the sanctions of social order depend on the recognition of this truth. The Apostles in commanding obedience to authorities, do not make it contingent on the belief of rulers in a future state; they do therefore recognise a possible form of human society, independently of any such belief. And who can doubt it? The principle of the day is, that a reasoning regard to self interest affords the best guarantee of good conduct; and this principle is at the bottom of Mr. Locke's rule; it is human, and not divine motive on which he rests.

14. Now if a regard to self interest, in the *less* enlightened and educated state of man, required the view of a future state to make the balance in favour of virtuous conduct clear, it does not follow that in a more advanced and cultivated state that doctrine will be equally required to produce the amount of order and restraint necessary for social purposes; for on the principles of Christianity, godliness hath "the

* Letters on Toleration.

promise of the life that *now is*,"* and on the principles of infidelity, virtue, upon the whole, promotes the worldly happiness of the individual. On neither theory, therefore, is the obligation to virtue (though that obligation be essentially different in the one from what it is in the other) *dependent* upon the doctrine of a future state. Thus the denier of that doctrine may argue; and he may point out that the force of opinion is with virtue; that enjoyment depends upon property, property upon order, order upon virtue, on that above specified amount of virtue which is required for the peace of society; consequently that the recognition of a God, or of a future state, is not needed for morality, since man has (according to some great educationists of the present day) a natural foundation of morality in his own physical constitution.

15. Now the question is not, whether these arguments are sound, but whether they are consequent. Not, whether they ought to prevail, but whether they would prevail. Not, whether they would prevail here and now; but whether they would prevail in times when, and upon men with whose approbation, the principle of a church and the principle of Christianity had been surrendered, the notion of a *national* regard to God abandoned as visionary, and the entire independence of our competency to perform social duties upon our religious belief established, subject to the single reservation, that, for the purposes of social order, not on religious

* 1 Tim. iv. 8.

grounds, a belief in a future state must still be required as a test for office. The question is, whether men who had separated every other dogma from the holding of civil office by inclination, would, or in consistency could, continue to attach to its tenure that remaining one: whether natural religion (as it is falsely called) would retain a stronger hold over its followers than revealed religion had done, or if not, then whether the principles of civil society would dictate an adherence to what would by that time have come in its turn to be designated "the last remnant of intolerance?" Surely they would not. The doctrine of a future state is an abstract philosophical doctrine, *when it stands alone*. In Christianity it is joined with others, on which its efficiency depends. By Paganism it was dressed in imaginary terrors. But as denuded of the substantial support of revealed truth on the one hand, and of the aid of superstitious credulity on the other, reduced to a pure abstraction, it might indeed hold a place in the confession of faith of some rationalising philosopher, but it would be totally incapable of exercising national influences or forming the groundwork of a constitution.

16. Those who hold an opposite opinion should be reminded that revealed religion derives its strength from its entireness; from the fact that it not merely presents to us a body of abstract truths, but carries with it the *executory powers* necessary to procure their acceptance, the vital influences without which we cannot receive, digest, and assimilate those truths. But when we reject the belief in those powers, when we bring down the

Christian Church from "what is transcendental in her pretensions," when we analyse and dissect the *body* which God has given, and when, impiously dividing it into parts to be rejected or retained at pleasure, we further ridiculously suppose, that each of those parts is to retain the vitality which belonged only to the aggregate, we are the victims of a wretched delusion, and the portion of truth, which we have torn from the quivering trunk, will but as a severed limb putrefy within our grasp. And indeed men seem to forget that this experiment of the influence of mere truth, without covenanted powers, on fallen man, is not a new one, but has been already once at least wrought out to its results. In the effort to describe them, I must be led to assume something of the language and the tone of a writer on religion, but I ask to be excused for that apparent presumption, because it is a matter of necessity, not of option; when influences belonging to religion issue into consequences belonging to politics, and these again produce perceptible effects upon the interests of religion, a writer on either must inevitably, more or less, and for a time, draw his materials as well as his principles from both.

17. When the law of our nature was inverted at the fall, and harmony with the will of the Creator became thenceforward the exception and not the rule among men, divine truth was planted as it were in a little spot upon the surface of the earth, to germinate for a while sheltered from the adverse contact of mankind in general, who systematically followed out the disobedience of their first progenitor, and by natural conse-

quence corrupted, defaced, and almost extirpated the whole of that religious truth, which, in proportion to the degree in which it was allowed to remain among them, could not fail to disturb their conscience by testifying to a degeneracy which it was unable to correct. The melancholy history of those who, though originally possessors, like the subsequently favoured people, of the revealed knowledge of God, became afterwards the Pagan nations of the world, has this among its uses, that it shows us how inadequate is the simple power of truth to produce permanently beneficial results on our corrupted nature, without the covenanted influences of divine grace.

18. The hideous anomaly, which sin had introduced, was now therefore in full exhibition, and the universal creation might behold a world intrinsically alike wonderful and lovely, and set under a being who had received the highest of all honours in being made after the image of the Maker himself, in a state of war with the will of that Maker, and bearing in consequence as it were his provisional curse in a system of mixed dispensations intended to summon and prompt men to repentance. But while a spiritual intercourse between the Almighty and the mass of his human creatures had nearly* ceased, he had not withdrawn even that intercourse from the entire race.

19. He made himself known by personal manifestations, by the voice of prophets, by a written law, by a

* Not altogether. See Bishop Horsley's Treatise on the Extra-judaical Church.

permanent priesthood, by fixed institutions of sacrifice and worship; but it was to a people small and inconsiderable when compared with the mighty nations of the earth; to a people planted in a country of seclusion; and fenced about with laws and customs of an unsocial and absolutely repulsive character when viewed with reference to the rest of the world. Within this narrow spot alone were the oracles of God generally known as such, and kept in faithful custody: while even here, as they themselves assure us, they were at one time in imminent danger, according to all human appearances, of being lost. The wide world lay in darkness and in death, as though the Sun of heaven had risen only for the narrow valley of Jerusalem, and the hills that girt her round about intercepted his rays lest they should go forth for the healing of the nations.

20. Thus for a very long period was divine truth rather kept from mankind than offered to them. It was shut like a tender plant in a hothouse to be reared to a certain maturity before it could endure exposure to the unkindly elements. Alas! those unkindly elements were simply the dispositions of the being, for whose healing the leaves of that precious plant had sprouted, and its flowers had spread their blossoms. How many, and what purposes of good may have been accomplished by this (so to speak) imprisonment of revelation, we cannot know; but this we do too surely know, that with every jealous care and regulation to separate the Jews from the mass of men; and to quicken their spirit of obedience by establishing an immediate and

palpable connection between obedience and reward, as well as between their respective contraries—still the prevalent tendency among them was not that of truth by its expansive force to burst out from its narrow limits and illuminate the world; but was that of inward and essential sinfulness to invite from without the contagion of error, and to attract and imbibe it by vicious sympathy in despite of every bulwark that the care of the Almighty had devised for its exclusion, until the terrible inflictions of the Captivity had repressed the tendency to idol worship, and given scope at the same time for opposite errors. But as the case of the world before the Mosaic law, and independent of it, shows the inability of men to retain pure truth in an abstract form, so the general unfaithfulness of the Jews under that law testifies to the impossibility of bringing the human race to God through considerations of reward and punishment in this life, or what is now termed a well-calculating self-interest; because that particular engine was brought to bear under the law of Moses with a far greater force, than in all human probability it can ever again acquire.

21. A brighter day, however, dawned, when the fulness of time had arrived, and the whole world had been politically and socially re-cast, apparently in order to allow of a free, uninterrupted, and universal propagation of the liberated truth. God sent forth his Son, made of a woman; and that which hitherto had but been chanted in the Temple, or echoed in the mountains of Judah, that which had been enveloped in types and

figures, symbolised in the visible institutes of sacrifice and purification; that which had been known in the letter to a small and single people, and which in the spirit had been the precious food of a yet smaller and obscurer flock, was to be told upon the housetops, to be proclaimed; as with a trumpet, through all lands, beginning from Jerusalem, even unto the ends of the earth; was to summon to its obedience every nation, every class, every character; to purge, to chasten, to restore the whole of the fallen race of man.

22. Such was the scheme of glory that appeared to be announced in the preaching of that gospel under which where sin had abounded, grace was much more to abound: and where, by the disobedience of one, (the) many had been made sinners, so and much more by the obedience of one, were (the) many to be made righteous. The whole earth was to break out into songs of triumph and rejoicing, and was to be filled to overflowing with the universal knowledge of the Almighty in a more than golden age of light, and love, and joy,

> Luce intellettual, pieno d' amore,
> Amor di vero ben, pien di letizia;
> Letizia, che trascende ogni dolzore.*

The universality of this dispensation was its glory. Its message of mercy was to every child of Adam. Rob it of that characteristic, and you rob it of its crown, and St. Paul of his triumphant assertion. It becomes, with reference to the extent of its application, but as

* Dante, Paradiso, c. xxx., v. 40. Conf. St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, viii. 6.

another form of Judaism. What matters it, in respect of universality, whether you take the whole of one nation, or an individual here and there from every nation? There is a limit, a limit of principle, in either case alike, and upon such a supposition, one fixed by the will of the Author of the dispensation, not merely by the stubborn intractability of its recipients.

23. But in the case of the Christian scheme, the limit is imposed, as Scripture informs us, only by the obstinate aversion of the human will from God, which induces it rather to choose misery and destruction, by blinding it in such manner, that it is incapable of sober choice, and yet that it also remains persuaded of its power of sight. The difference, therefore, is this: now the mercies of the covenant are made ready for every one, are offered to and enjoined upon every one; "Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature." Then the vast majority of mankind were left under the darkened natural law, and a covenanted salvation was not placed within their reach. Let us then keep steadily in view this universality, or universal applicability of the Christian dispensation, as opposed to the limited applicability of the Jewish.

24. I proceed to sum up a few of the principal propositions which most pointedly illustrate the position, that the nationality of religion is conducive to the realisation of this intended universality, and, consequently, that the renunciation of the first is unfavourable to the attainment of the second. We may remark, then, that by the nearly universal consent of civilised nations, the care of religion

has ever been a principal or the principal function of the Supreme Power (as we find even in Sparta, where the regal prerogatives were most limited, they yet retained τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεούς). That the connection of the state with the church under Constantine, appears to have been formed, not as the result of ecclesiastical or civil ambition, but after the order (so to speak) of nature and following the course of events. That the territorial division of a country is apparently the best method of providing for the universal extension, whether of civil or religious institutes. That the permanent administration of the ordinances of the church requires permanent pecuniary supplies. That large masses of the people have ever been in a condition of inability to provide such supplies for ministers of religion. That in the present condition of the old countries of the world, the population pressing on the means of subsistence, and the supply of labour exceeding the demand, such inability is likely both long and extensively to continue. That the ties of affection which bind different classes of the community, are not strengthened, but the reverse, by the great increase of trade and manufacture throughout civilised nations, and the gathering of men into masses, by means of large towns: that, consequently, we must not expect (to say the least) that the rich will be much more forward than they were long ago to supply the religious wants of the poor. That besides the unable, we have another large class of persons, unwilling to provide for themselves a power of admonition and control in the shape of religious institutions. That the mere

private support of religion tends to promote differences in its form, and that it is a duty to check those differences by reasonable means, and to promote unity: That, with a greater plenty of general subsistence and property than has been known elsewhere in modern times, the case of the United States of America shows that the voluntary zeal of individuals will make no adequate provision for the wants of an entire nation."

25. Many of these propositions are undisputed, and the rest are such as no friend to the union of church and state, under the most naked form, will question. And we must observe, that the tendency of every one of them is towards the same mournful demonstration,—that when nations in their collective capacity have abandoned the promotion of religion, the natural effect of that abandonment will be, that while it has been difficult heretofore to place the sacred ordinances within the reach of every man throughout human societies, it will thereafter be found absolutely impossible. In the early poverty of the European kingdoms it was done. It is *not* done in the far wealthier youth of that vast republic, where what is termed the voluntary principle bears undisputed sway. What, then, do we see as the first mark of this threatened, but, thank God, not yet inevitable change, but a retrogradation from the great purpose of Divine love, to give a universal reality to the free tenders of the Gospel: a retrogradation which shall remove great masses of men by one broad stage further from the hope of everlasting salvation; which shall retransform the garden and the vineyard into the forest

and the desert, and shall again seem to raise a wall of partition, upon even the Christianised portion of the earth, more lasting than that which was broken down in the Redeemer, between the mixed visible church on the one hand, and the crowd of utter aliens from the commonwealth of Israel and the hope of everlasting life, on the other?

26. That the effect of this blow to the Catholic church from without would not be the suppression of her internal life, we absolutely know from the Divine word. That when thus again thrown into a state of independence, upon the principalities of this world, she might in such manner have recourse to her own inward elasticity as again to put forth her powers of conversion more effectively than ever, and to re-occupy her position in the councils of earthly sovereigns, both chastened and strengthened by trial: all this may or may not be; but when our human vision seems to discern results from any given act which are destructive, it becomes an imperative duty to use every means for averting those results, quite independently of the inquiry, how it might please God to overrule the sin of man for his glory, as he has already overruled the transgression of our first father, Adam.

27. But, besides the abandonment of that path in which it appeared competent to the Church to conduct systematically her aggressions against the entire masses of men in nations, we may perceive in this change an apparent preparation for the consummation of the human apostasy. What was the essence of that apostasy? It

was disobedience. It was the rejection of the old standard of action, and the substitution of a new one. The old and appointed one was the Divine will, in whose observance would have been maintained the unity and harmony of God's creation. The new and forbidden one was simply the will of man. Not merely the positively and palpably evil results into which that will unfolds itself, but the principle itself was forbidden, as an insufficient, an unnatural, a false law of action. Lord Bacon says,* "Man made a total defection from God, presuming to imagine, that the commandments and prohibitions of God were not the rules of good and evil, but that good and evil had their own principles and beginnings, and lusted after the knowledge of those imagined beginnings; to the end, to depend no more upon God's will revealed, but upon himself, and his own light, as a god."

28. And similarly St. Augustine† has shown, that disobedience was the great feature of Adam's sin, not an intrinsic essential evil in the act had it not been forbidden. The question was thus brought simply and nakedly to issue, whether God or man should be supreme in giving law to the *free will* of the latter. Now this disobedience was simply the divesting human agency of its proper and natural reference to the Creator. How fearfully does this definition coincide with the separation of religion from government! An agency,—a personal and responsible agency,—an agency

* In his "Confession of Faith."

† De peccatorum meritis et remissione, B. II. c. 21.

in power, influence, and stability, the highest of all on earth—an agency capable of lending efficient aid to religion—this it is which it is proposed, in the phraseology of modern liberalism, to divest of all regard to religious differences, that is to say, to the differences between the Catholic faith and heresies; between revelation and deism; between the affirmation and the denial of the sovereignty of God; and whose sphere of action, in order to the attainment of this end, must necessarily exclude all functions which assert or imply the superiority of truth in religion to error, or the relevancy of any man's religious creed to his performance of civil duties and his principles of moral conduct. To call this social atheism is no passionate exaggeration, but an inference from our premises, in logical order, not less inevitable than melancholy.

29. Thus would mankind, if they should fall into the snare that is laid for them, set up a vast, unconsecrated, atheistic power at the head of all their social interests, as an example for all individuals to follow, a model to teach them, an authoritative declaration to assist the evil voice within in teaching them that they may withdraw their own individual lives from allegiance to God, and base their methods of social conduct upon a code in which His name is not to be found. In combating the obstinate irreligion of the world, it is something that the authentic permanent convictions of men are declared, beyond dispute, to be with us, by the legalised existence and support of the fixed institutions of religion: but the conclusion, towards which we are now

led and driven, threatened and cajoled, will reverse the whole of this beneficial influence, and will throw it into the opposite direction, to co-operate with the scoffer, the profligate, the unbelieving, the indifferent, when it shall be told, amidst the exultations of some and the tears of others, that there was a time when the power of thrones and the paternal functions of government bore witness to the faith of Christ, and that the witness is now withdrawn, and thus the truth emphatically denied.

30. But further. This divorce of religion from government will proceed upon the principle that men of all religions, or none, are alike to be considered competent for the duties of citizenship. If, however, a man is competent for public, is he not also competent for private duties? If without religion we can learn and discharge our duties to our country and our laws and authorities, can we not also without religion learn our duties to our parents, brethren, families, friends, where we are aided by natural instincts, and where the return, in the shape of enjoyment, is more certain, immediate, and abundant, as well as the corresponding penalty of failure to perform them? In this view the argument, which is good to prove that religious differences have no bearing upon the discharge of political duties, is equally good to prove that they have no bearing on private life, and, consequently, asserts the possibility and propriety of a social system founded on atheism, in its real and substantial sense of the denial of a providential government of the world. Is not this

assertion, conveyed through the most authentic organs which are at human command, an issue awful to contemplate? Let him who is tempted to acquiesce in the doctrine which thus disconnects belief and conduct, remember the precept of St. Paul, "Speak every man truth with his neighbour, *for we are members one of another.*" *He* could scarcely think that relative duties were independent of religious creed, who thus expressly grounded them on the high Christian doctrine of union in the *body* of the Redeemer.

31. Let us beware, in this part of the subject, of being seduced from the truth, by observing in the midst of society certain persons, it may be, who do not believe the catholic faith, or who disavow the name of Christianity, perhaps even any of the forms of Theism, and yet whose discharge of public and domestic duties is equal or superior to that of the average of persons who are members of the church. Nothing can be more false than a supposition that their present conduct is a measure of the natural effects of their creed. To estimate those effects aright, and to compare them with the moral working of the church, we must take the mass of the professors in each. But, further, we must consider whether these be educated persons, aware of the value of good opinion and of the enjoyments of society, and of the consequent necessity of keeping on good terms with society by conforming to many of its approved practices. And yet again, we must consider how all individuals are naturally affected by an extensive system into the midst of which they are cast, which

surrounds them like an atmosphere, and from which they cannot help inhaling and assimilating some, at least, of its properties. And we must not infer that, because society can bear a few of any class or character in its composition, it could therefore bear to be composed of such throughout. The law can dispense with the oaths of Quakers and other small communities while they are small; but would the general administration of justice remain secure, if the whole nation were to pass into Quakerism? But the character of the system, in each case respectively, is to be tried by considering what results it must produce if it were dominant and universal. From certain truths, stolen out of Christianity, has been compiled a structure, under the name of natural religion, which nature did not discover, but which, now that they have been established for her, she can sometimes receive and appreciate. So it was that the heathen writers of the Roman empire reached a higher tone of morals than their predecessors, from the insensible but real diffusion of the balmy influences of Christianity. And just so it is that there are now some individuals whose characters are beneficially modified by the Gospel, but who yield it not their acknowledgments, and cite its benefits against itself, denying the channel through which they came.

32. But some may be inclined to say, public opinion will not endure these excesses and extremes. Doubtless in its present state it would not do so. Public opinion is generally above common practice, but seldom

very greatly above it, and in the long run sure to be sympathetically affected by it, and deteriorated by its deterioration. The prevailing opinion of the nation now exercises a beneficial influence. The individual is affected by it. The sectarian body is affected by it, and is thus unconsciously but powerfully modified by the very institution from which it has departed, and which commands, in a great degree, the formation of public opinion. But let no man conceive that, amid the general fluxion of human affairs, public opinion is stable and unmoved. It is a cause; but it is also an effect. America, I believe, is influenced by the public opinion of Europe; but when the religious institutions of Europe are assimilated to those of America, the waters will have found their level, and the current must cease. Where religious ministrations are crippled and contracted, individual character will suffer in a proportionate degree, and the *materials* for forming a sound public opinion will no longer exist, but will be replaced by others, representing a different set of principles and sympathies.

33. In the separation, then, of religion from government, we see a change which seems to indicate the progressive ripening of those harvests which are in preparation, the one for the love, and the other for the vengeance, of the Lord. Firstly, because it asserts practical atheism, that is a human agency, knowingly, deliberately, and permanently divested of regard to God. Secondly, because it asserts that atheism in the most authentic form, namely, by casting out its antagonist, religion, from

what are most permanent and most authoritative among men, their public politics. Thirdly, because the assertion is made not by individuals alone but by masses, invested with political power, and, under the most wretched infatuation, claiming it as a right of freedom thus to banish themselves from the divine protection and regard.

34. Surely it must touch the heart, when, after having looked upon these awful prospects, which appear palpably to lie at least before some nations of the world, we turn to the blessed Scriptures and observe the strong yearnings of affection wherewith the world's great King wrought for our deliverance, and the exultation with which His prophets and His saints foretold a friendship between earthly thrones and His spiritual body, and a consecration of earthly powers to His glory which has appeared already, so far as to identify the description, but of which it seems as though the obstinacy of human madness would yet struggle to intercept the glorious fulfilment. "He shall have dominion also from sea to sea, and from the river unto the ends of the earth. The kings of Tarshish and of the isles shall bring presents: the kings of Sheba and Seba shall offer gifts. Yea, all kings shall fall down before Him: all nations shall serve Him. His name shall endure for ever: His name shall be continued as long as the sun; and men shall be blessed in Him; all nations shall call Him blessed." And "kings shall be thy nursing fathers, and their queens thy nursing mothers; they

[1] Ps. lxxii. 8, 10, 11, 17.

shall bow down to thee with their face towards the earth, and lick up the dust of thy feet.* And the nations of them which are saved shall walk in the light of it: and the kings of the earth do bring their glory and honour into it.†

35. Let us also consider shortly what would be the civil consequences of the great change we have been discussing. One of the effects of attaching religious sanctions to an office is to render more glaring and offensive any irreligious conduct in it, but upon the whole also to render that conduct rarer. The removal of those sanctions will give a lower tone to governors, in common with society at large. Even the high and delicate feeling of honour which is now entertained by many men regardless of God, is, in its main and better parts, the growth of Christianity; of Christianity, not as cherished here and there in the secrecy of individual breasts, but as recognised and established in public institutions. As her light recedes into sequestered places, the selfishness of men will become colder, and ruder, and harder, and the false refinement which, without religion, may for a while present a varnished surface, will soon crack and disappear.

36. But if such be the result upon the general tone of manners, how will it be found to operate in regulating the most serious and trying circumstances of life? Yet the part of the case which refers to individual character, is too palpable even to need a statement. What, then, will be the social consequences? How

* Is. xlix. 23. † Rev. xxi. 24.

will occasions of discontent be borne? How will visitations of God be undergone? The lower classes are the great object of solicitude with the patrons of the system in question. How will their case be considered? Will the streams of charity flow more largely in communities where the name of Christ shall not claim or receive honour from the mass, and where it shall be deemed a thing indifferent in common society whether a man profess himself a believer in revealed religion, or the contrary? We must recollect this great fact, that we owe to Christianity *alone* the institutions which afford systematic relief to the sick, the wounded, the widow, the orphan, the lunatic, and which acknowledge and meet the claim of the poor to be supported from the land. This has been shown with great force during the present year by an eminently learned minister of our church.* He seems induced to consider it a solitary exception to his general statement, that the infirm citizens of Athens were entitled to support. But the citizens of Athens were, in fact, an oligarchy; and the healthy as well as the infirm were fed by the contributions of subject isles and cities. Communities of men then had no bowels of compassion for their fellow-men before Christianity pervaded them. And should society be thrown back into unbelief, do we flatter ourselves that the old and holy influences would very long survive? No, rather the latter state would be worse than the first; the case would be that of truth rejected, as well as of falsehood received.

* Spital Sermon by the Rev. Christopher Wordsworth—1838.

37. Thus far we have spoken concerning general results, without attempting to determine the amount of probability that they may actually arrive. By attempting to uncover the consequences—by laying bare, to the best of our power, the whole of our danger—we are using the means most likely, under God, to avert the catastrophe itself. In different parts of the world the case very greatly varies. While we have our own peculiar dangers, there are other countries much farther advanced in the separation of religion from government. In America it may be less surprising, where the state rests on the dogma of equality, that no creed should be preferred. It is invidious to allude to results; but neither the good neighbourhood of the United States to those whom they touch on the northern frontier; nor the existence and extension of slavery; nor the state of law and opinion respecting it; nor the sentiment entertained in the north towards the black and coloured race; nor the general tone of opinion on religious subjects in society; nor the state and extent of religious institutions, under circumstances of great facility; induce us to regret that England does not follow the ecclesiastical principles of the western continent. It is, on the other hand, more astonishing that, under the political despotism of Prussia, the state should have entered into the most unequivocal alliance with different and hostile communions; but it is yet further remarkable that in France, where the almost incalculable majority are of one communion, and that communion Roman Catholic, the principle of national religion has been essentially sur-

rendered, and the state joins hands with all creeds alike — a marked and memorable result of her first Revolution.

38. In England we have not proceeded so far. We seem still to have ground which is defensible, and which is worth defending; we are cursed with religious divisions; we have grievously sinned in ecclesiastical abuses; the church is greatly crippled by the state in respect of her government; she is denied the means of ministering to the people where they most need it; yet with all this, and with political institutions in reality very much more popular than those of France, to say nothing of Prussia, our country seems to promise at least a more organised, tenacious, and determined resistance to the efforts against national religion, as well as to the general principles of democracy, than any other country which is prominent upon the great stage of the civilised world. We have, therefore, no cause to be ashamed of the Reformation of religion on account of any apparent connection in which it may seem to stand with spurious and counterfeit principles; but, on the contrary, with our Bibles in our hands, we, of all ranks, may yet render thanks for it to God, and still declare it the blessed Reformation.

39. The symptoms around us are at once ominous and cheering. On the one hand is increasingly perceptible a disposition to defend the institutions of the country in church and state, a disposition pervading all ranks, and combined with an earnest desire to purify the operation of a principle in itself so pure;

and to investigate it in all its parts and bearings, that knowing it more clearly, we may contemplate it more fixedly, defend it more promptly, love it more enthusiastically. Upon the other, a great development of the extremes of the opposite opinion; and with this, which was to be expected, a lukewarmness, or a timidity, on the part of some in high office deeply pledged to our institutions, or even an adoption of notions involving the *seminal* principle of their entire overthrow and abandonment, and preparing us to fear that should the church become, in a secular view, less popular and strong, and should men be called upon to suffer for her sake, we may expect to see these notions carried out by those who dally with them, or by their successors, to their results.

40. We should hide nothing from ourselves, and we do no justice to the case if we fail to observe that there are a variety of civil influences at work, all operating upon religious unity, and operating in a manner unfavourable to the principle of authority, and therefore also in a manner unfavourable to unity, until the average character of man has been both greatly raised and essentially altered. The diminution of the range of intellectual inequality, by the elevation of the lower ranks of mind, and the reduction of the higher, naturally and legitimately lessen the general force of authority. Lord Bacon foresaw in the "Novum Organum," that the tendency of his system was to *equalise* minds. He felt none of that result: he was

not one of its examples. Now the world is full of them.

41. The passing away of influence from definite station and privilege to the mere possession of property, and the increased facility of its acquisition, or at least its increased diffusion, have rendered it of late infinitely more difficult than formerly to attain the end of security to an established church by the exclusion of dissidents from civil office; because political influence attends very considerably upon property, and will therefore be felt in the legislature even when the holder of property is excluded. Thus it was argued in the case of the Roman Catholics, to the effect, that they had increasing numbers, intelligence, and wealth: that these were the elements of power, and that political privilege was but one among its accidental attributes; why, therefore, it was urged, irritate without attaining the desired object of enfeebling?

42. Again, the growth of the opinion that political privilege is in itself valuable, and among the natural rights of man, of course renders it infinitely more invidious to withhold that privilege, than when it was viewed as matter of positive burden, or as attainable only or mainly by inheritance, or in a conscientious view, as a possession of which the responsibility greatly outweighs the enjoyment. Men must have a possitive value for the church before they can be expected to forego on her account, without dissatisfaction, that for which they have a positive value; and this we can hardly expect of

the general mass of dissenters in their state of information and of feeling. All these are among the purely civil causes, which, notwithstanding, have an obvious bearing upon the religious question now before us. . . . .

43. The moral movement, however, of the day, away from religion and towards infidelity, is not merely traceable in the increased growth of that fallacious opinion which excludes the subject of religion from the consideration and preference of governors in the exercise of their office; there are also a set of correlative and parallel symptoms, which greatly fortify the conclusions already drawn from that portion of political acts which directly bears upon the connection between the church and the state. Not contented with excluding religion from the province of government, the spirit of the age struggles with not less zeal to introduce, as its substitute, education; that is to say, the cultivation of the intellect of the natural man instead of the heart and affections of the spiritual man—the abiding in the life of Adam, instead of passing into the life of Christ.

44. Not that in contending for religion as the proper moral engine of governors, it is meant to say that they are not to cultivate the intellect. On the contrary, under the shade of genuine and effective religion, the intellectual harvest will be largest and most secure. But what we would mark is, by what subtle gradations popular opinion is deviating further and further from the truth in the highest of all matters which belong to

political societies. The old notion was that religion was their salt, and in a prudential view their only effective guarantee, as well as a duty of imperative obligation flowing out of the personality of nations, and out of the individual composition of governments. But the modern notion is, first, that the governor is not competent to exercise a preference in religion for the nation or any part of it; and, next, that a matter in which he is not competent to discriminate, manifestly cannot be in any way *essential* to the well-being of societies, or he who is concerned for them must according to his opportunities be concerned for it.

45. After this, it is felt that these conclusions taken alone blot out the light of the world. Accordingly an intellectual illumination is proposed. In truth it is felt how intolerable would be the tyranny if there were a general predominance of the lower parts of man's nature: if we descended at once from the elevating doctrine which, in the words of Mr. Burke, consecrates the commonwealth and all that officiate in it, to the mere sensualism into which political economy, were all its claims allowed, would issue. A substitute, therefore, in some form, for religious truth we must have; and they who deprive us of the national acknowledgment and worship of God, offer us at least a molten calf. To prevent evil, we hear it said, cultivate and strengthen the higher faculties of man. Now Christianity is the one appointed means of doing this. To attempt doing it without Chris-

tianity, is repeating the sin of Adam, who sought a knowledge of things in grounds other than the will of God; but with this aggravation, that it is done after the melancholy experience of six thousand years have shown, by the favourite utilitarian test of consequences, how ruinous was its nature.

46. They of old time thought that there was no injustice in taxing men for the truth, because it was beyond doubt the most precious of all objects, and was, through divine mercy, in degree at least attainable. But now this is deemed arbitrary and insufferable; yet there is an object so clear and so beneficial that men must be taxed for it whether they choose to avail themselves of its benefits, or not. That is the cultivation of the understanding. But why has not the subject a right to, say, I deny the advantages which you say will result from that cultivation, if it be without religion, and I contend, on the contrary, that it will be productive of detriment? If he be an intelligent Christian, he will say so. And if in saying so he be overborne, the fact will only prove, that human opinion is approximating to that state in which it seeks its chief good, and attempts to found its permanent welfare both public and private, not in revelation, but in the principles of deism.

47. The advocates of this theory often deprecate, in words, a mere naked intellectualism. They talk much of moral culture, and assume that it can be sufficiently and generally had without religion. Or, perhaps, they are shocked at the idea of surrendering religion, and they profess that religion consists in certain habits of

mind, entirely apart from dogma; that while they exclude dogma, which they stigmatise as the cause (at most and in any case it is but the sign and the instrument) of dissension, they would carefully include religion. But all these forms of profession come to the same thing. Once cast off allegiance to the revealed truth of God—once assume the function of dispensing with such portions of it as carnal wit here or there does not appreciate; once reject the *means* which God in his mercy has provided by revelation—and the attempt to attain the end will inevitably fail. Do we flatter ourselves that, if we deem His methods impracticable, we shall succeed in our own? All these modes of teaching will resolve themselves into the mere culture of the understanding. We do injustice by terming it intellectualism. The higher faculties will wither beneath its influence wherever it is introduced.

48. But the point upon which we have to fix our attention is this. There is a strong disposition to overthrow the principle of an established church; and therein ultimately to deny that religion is the great sanction of civil society. There is a contemporaneous disposition among us, entertained almost exclusively by the very same persons, to substitute an universal education or general culture at the expense of the state for the universal spiritual culture by the church. The former is to be the substitute for the latter. It is intended fundamentally to change the structure of society; and the one thing needful for its well-being is to be this general culture. The mark of tyranny is upon it

even while the theory is young: it is to be compulsory. This, I suppose, is thought the only way in which the energies of the church can be effectually quelled. But what insanity is this labouring at a moral Babel which will not only confound but crush and grind into the very dust its framers! It is a more fatal repetition of an old experiment, to the failure of which there is not one of us who is not too able, if he be but willing, to bear witness.

49. Perhaps, however, we are desired to find consolation in the fact, that there is a greatly increased diffusion of knowledge among mankind. Of sanctified knowledge, that is of knowledge subordinated to the great purpose of serving God? If so, it is well. All knowledge will then harmonise with the general character, and, increasing its power, will increase its usefulness. But if there be no corresponding extension of the spiritual life, this increase of power will not only not be advantageous but will be detrimental, in the very proportion in which it would and ought to have been advantageous; for it will destroy the equilibrium of the human being, and increase his wants, his desires, his self-opinion, without strengthening in a commensurate degree the sovereign principle which renews his nature. Without that sovereign principle, too, the presumption or supposition of knowledge will increase much more rapidly than knowledge itself, and the effect of such increase will be to leave men much less adapted to the discharge of their duties than they were before. Much might be said on the particular kind of this knowledge.

It is that which tends too much to fix the eyes on the earth instead of raising them to heaven to look for angels' bread.

50. Will it be said, "All this anxiety is very much disproportioned to the case, if you are sincere in your belief, that there is safety within the church as an ark which shall float on the waters when the fountains of the great deep of human Desire are broken up?" It is true that we have nothing to fear for her, who bears a charmed life that no weapon reaches. She pursues her tranquil way of confession, adoration, thanksgiving, intercession, and Divine communion, concentrated alike for the present and the future, upon one object of regard, her Lord in heaven. This of the church of Christ. And in the church of England we find all the essential features unimpaired, which declare her to be a fruit-bearing tree in the vineyard of God. The Scriptures faithfully guarded, liberally dispensed, universally possessed and read; the ancient bulwarks of the faith, the creeds, and the sound doctrine of catholic consent, maintained; the apostolical succession transmitting, with demonstration of the Spirit, those vital gifts which effectuate and assure the covenant; the pure worship; the known and acknowledged fertility in that sacred learning which, when faithfully used, is to the truth what the Israelitish arms were to the ark; and the everywhere reviving and extending zeal, courage, love: these are the signs which may well quiet apprehensions for the ultimate fate of the church of England in the breast of the most timid of her sons.

51. But we need not be ashamed, with all this, to feel deeply and anxiously for our country. For that State, which, deriving its best energies from religion, has adorned the page of history, has extended its renown and its dominion in every quarter of the globe, has harmonised with a noble national character supporting and supported by it, has sheltered the thickset plants of genius and learning, and has in these last days rallied by gigantic efforts the energies of Christendom against the powers and principles of national infidelity, bating no jot of heart nor hope under repeated failures, but every time renewing its determination and redoubling its exertions, until the object was triumphantly attained. For this State we may feel, and we may tremble at the very thought of the degradation she would undergo, should she in an evil hour repudiate her ancient strength, the principle of a national religion. We do not dream that the pupils of the opposite school will gain their end, and succeed in giving a permanent and secure organisation to human society upon the shattered and ill-restored foundations which human selfishness can supply. Sooner might they pluck the sun off his throne in heaven, and the moon from her silver chariot.

52. What man can do without God was fully tried in the histories of Greece and Italy, before the fulness of time was come. We have there seen a largeness and vigour of human nature such as does not appear likely to be surpassed. But it does not comfort us that those opposed to us will fail. They are our fellow-creatures;

they are our brethren; they bear with us the sacred name of the Redeemer, and we are washed for the most part in the same laver of regeneration. Can we unmoved see them rushing to ruin, and dragging others with them less wilful but as blind? Can we see the gorgeous buildings of such an earthly Jerusalem, and the doom impending, without tears? Oh, that while there is yet time, casting away every frivolous and narrow prepossession, grasping firmly and ardently at the principles of the truth of God, and striving to realise them in ourselves and in one another, we may at length know the things which belong to our peace!

53. These arguments and convictions, intended to exhibit a sketch of a subject involving everywhere matter of the deepest concern, now brought daily more and more to bear upon our daily duties in life, are proposed by the writer to those who feel an interest in their theme, with a deep and painful sense of their unavoidable deficiencies, as his offering towards the elucidation and establishment of the Truth, whatever it may prove to be. He has followed what appeared to be her light to the point whither it appeared to lead him. For the last six years he has watched the subject in its practical as well as its speculative forms with the deepest earnestness, and has endeavoured to give his whole mind to the lessons with which they have abounded. He has seen some zealously, and some wisely, defending truth, some discrediting it with adventitious incumbrances, some resolute in opposing it, some seeking it with earnestness, some merely drifting

with the tide of circumstance, some wavering between a multitude of opinions; most, perhaps, acting blindfold, and speaking at random, in a matter beyond all others demanding the adoption of definite principles.

54. His desire is that the whole matter should be freely and carefully discussed, in the certainty that whether he has erred or not in his own particular attempts to probe it, there can be no doubt that it is full of importance, that it is treated with lamentable neglect, and that the time is now arrived, when with a view, if to no higher end, yet to decency and dignity of conduct, an answer should if possible be had to the question, whether it be or be not the manifest ordinance of Almighty God that governments have active duties towards religion, Christian governments towards the Christian church? As was said of old, If the Lord be God, serve Him, but if Baal, then serve him; so it should now be said to the English people, If there be no conscience in states, and if unity in the body be no law of the church, let us abandon the ancient policy under which this land has consolidated her strength, and matured her happiness, and earned her fame; but if the reverse of both these propositions be true, then in the sacred name of God "to the utmost and to the latest of our power" let us persist. If it be not too presumptuous for him to bid farewell, and to request indulgence in the words of Herder, the writer would say: "It is man that writes, and thou, too, reader, art man. He may have erred,

probably he has erred: thou knowest, what he did not, and could not; use of his what may serve thee, consider his intentions, be not content with censuring, rather improve and complete."* Or, with one of the world's greatest men: ἂν οὖν τις ἔχῃ κάλλιον ἐκλεξάμενος εἰπεῖν εἰς τὴν τούτων ξύστασιν, ἐκεῖνος οὐκ ἐχθρὸς ὢν ἀλλὰ φίλος κρατεῖ.†

* Herder, Ideen, Einleitung. † Plato, Timæus, 28.

THE END.

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